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My dissertation revolves around the roles of finance functions, Lean, and 
management control.
1
 The initial inspiration for the dissertation was fostered 
during my master’s program in management accounting at Aalborg University. I 
collaborated with five international firms all employing Lean manufacturing, in 
which I studied the roles of finance functions and management control. I was 
inspired by the interviews and observations that I had in the companies, and it felt 
natural that my dissertation shed light on these topics. The dissertation includes 
five papers which can be found in chapters 7-11. Unfortunately, there is some 
overlap between this short introduction and the papers, but it was simply not 
possible to write the introduction otherwise because the papers must be “self-
contained.”  The structure of the introduction follows that of the sequence of the 
five papers in the dissertation. Subsection 1.1 sets up the research agenda for 
papers 1, 2, and 3, and subsections 1.2 and 1.3 outline the research agendas for 
papers 4 and 5, respectively. Chapter 2 includes a Danish summary of the 
dissertation whereas Chapter 3 provides comprehensive English summaries of the 
papers. Chapter 4 presents the data and provides an in-depth discussion of the items 
and scales that I use in this work. In chapter 5, I present the paradigmatic 
foundations of the dissertation.   
1.1 The roles of finance functions 
So far, standard measurements of the roles of finance functions have not been 
introduced into management accounting research (Mahlendorf, 2014). Furthermore, 
                                                     
1
 Management control is defined by Anthony (1965, p. 17) as “the process by which 
managers ensure that resources are obtained and used effectively and efficiently in the 
accomplishment of the organization’s objectives.” In this dissertation, “management control” 
encompasses management control mechanisms (Kennedy & Widener, 2008) and 
management accounting practices (Fullerton et al., 2013).  
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to my knowledge, there has not been a literature review examining the status of 
research on the roles of finance function. The dissertation’s first paper reviews the 
empirical literature on the roles of finance functions; it covers the status of the 
research, briefly elaborates on research opportunities, and develops a survey 
instrument intended to measure the roles of finance functions in future studies.      
From the literature review, it appears that management accounting research has 
recognized that the roles of finance functions have shifted from a core focus on 
scorekeeping and statutory duties to an additional emphasis on engagement in firm 
operations and strategy (Sorenson, 2009). Yet, scorekeeping and statutory roles 
remain important (Chang et al. 2014; Mouritsen, 1996), which implies that the set 
of roles is larger compared with what it was in the 1980s (Big Eight White Paper, 
1989). To some extent, there is research agreement on the drivers of the change, 
such as increased business and market complexity, organizational changes, new 
management philosophies (Burns & Baldvindsdottir, 2005), and myths about the 
benefits of change (Järvenpää, 2007). Research has also found that the relative 
emphasis on the different finance function roles depends on the context (see, e.g., 
Byrne & Pierce, 2007), but there is consistent evidence of multiple roles in 
contemporary finance function practice (Bechtoldt et al., 2014). Only a few papers, 
however, have studied the possible interplay between roles, and even fewer have 
considered how finance functions create value for firms. Furthermore, the few 
papers studying the interplay between finance function roles can be divided into 
two groups—one arguing that the roles are complementary (Chang et al., 2014), 
and one arguing that the roles are substitutes (Maas & Matejka, 2009). The second 
paper in the dissertation focuses on this tension. It studies the possible 
complementarity among finance function roles and sheds light on how finance 
functions can create value for firms.  
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In the third paper, I study the roles of finance functions in Lean firms. The 
management accounting literature investigating this topic finds that finance 
functions are involved in performance system design (Ezzamel et al., 2008; 
Kennedy & Widener, 2008). Furthermore, controlling operative performance 
seems to be transferred to operational personnel (Jazayeri & Hopper, 1999), but 
finance functions still perform the financial controlling, although to a lesser extent, 
and primarily serve as a function of the demands from higher hierarchical levels 
(Tillema & van der Steen, 2015). The few papers studying the roles of finance 
functions in Lean firms were case studies, and the roles of finance functions were 
not their primary research objective. I seek to grasp this window of opportunity in 
the third paper, which mainly focuses on the roles of finance functions in Lean 
firms.   
1.2 Lean and management control mechanisms 
There is no doubt that Lean manufacturing is of great importance to firms pursuing 
world-class performance (Fullerton et al., 2013). Lean manufacturing is defined as 
an enterprise-wide management system consisting of interdependent, 
complementary practices (Kennedy & Widener, 2008), and it has been found to 
affect firms’ management control mechanisms (e.g., Netland et al., 2015). It has 
been recognized that management control mechanisms can either help or hinder the 
progression of Lean manufacturing (Åhlström & Karlsson, 1996; Fullerton et al., 
2014). However, only a few papers have studied the interdependency and 
complementarity among Lean management control mechanisms, and these are 
either single-firm studies (Emiliani et al., 2003; Kennedy & Widener, 2008; 
Kristensen & Israelsen, 2014) or studies utilizing a reductionist method (Fullerton 
et al., 2013). In the fourth paper, I study complementarity among Lean 
management control mechanisms from a holistic perspective. Furthermore, I apply 
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a statistical method that is 1) new to this topic and 2) captures complementary 
effects to a greater extent than traditional regression analyses.   
1.3 Lean, management accounting practices, and time compression 
diseconomies  
In the fifth and last paper of the dissertation, I contribute to an ongoing debate on 
management accounting practices in Lean firms. The debate began with the book 
Relevance Lost by Johnson and Kaplan (1987) and was further fueled by Johnson 
(1992) with his follow up, Relevance Regained. In these books, the authors claim 
that traditional management accounting practices are at best irrelevant for Lean 
firms and at worst counterproductive, causing dysfunctional behavior. Recent 
academic literature on this topic has shown that Lean firms simplify their 
management accounting practices, use value stream costing, and rely on 
nonfinancial performance measurements (Fullerton et al., 2013; Fullerton et al., 
2014). However, Fullerton et al. (2013; 2014) did not study whether Lean 
manufacturing firms abandon the traditional management accounting practices. 
This paper takes a more holistic perspective on Lean manufacturing and 
management accounting practices; in addition to studying Lean manufacturing–
related management accounting practices, it focuses on traditional management 
accounting practices and studies the behavioral and performance consequences of 
management accounting practices and Lean manufacturing. However, the paper 
does so with a little twist. Callen et al. (2000) studied the performance differences 
between early and late adopters of Lean manufacturing, and found early adopters 
outperformed the late adopters. In their study, however, these authors did not 
control for the extent to which Lean manufacturing was implemented in the firms. I 
grasp this opportunity, and the second contribution of the fifth paper is empirical 
evidence concerning time compression diseconomies (Dierickx & Cool, 1989) in 
Lean manufacturing firms.    
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2. Danske resumé 
Denne ph.d.-afhandling omhandler økonomifunktionens roller, økonomistyring og 
Lean. Ph.d.-afhandlingen indeholder fem artikler, og i afsnittet her præsenteres et 
kort dansk resumé af hver artikel. Læseren kan finde et mere omfattende engelsk 
resumé i kapitel 3. Det danske resumé følger afhandlingens struktur, hvorfor jeg 
indleder med resuméerne vedrørende artiklerne 1, 2 og 3 i undersektion 2.1, 
hvorefter resuméerne vedrørende artiklerne 4 og 5 følger i undersektion 2.2 og 
undersektion 2.3. 
2.1 Økonomifunktionens roller 
Artikel 1: The changing roles of finance functions: A review and analysis of 
empirical management accounting research. 
Forfattere: Henrik Nielsen og Thomas Borup Kristensen. 
Status: Dele af denne artikel er udgivet som bogkapitel under 
titlen: ”Økonomifunktionens roller: Ved vi, hvad vi taler om?” i ”Produktion og 
Styring – Perspektiver på økonomistyringen” (2016), ansvarshavende redaktører: 
Bukh, Per Nikolaj og Kristensen, Thomas Borup. Jurist og Økonomforbundets 
forlag, Danmark.   
Artiklens rolle i afhandlingen: Artiklen indeholder et struktureret litteratur review 
af empirisk forskning om økonomifunktionens roller. De primære formål med 
artiklen er 1) at skabe et spørgeskemainstrument til måling af økonomifunktionens 
roller, 2) at identificere ideer til fremtidig forskning herunder artikel to og tre i 
denne afhandling, og 3) at undersøge om økonomifunktionens roller har ændret sig 
i den empiriske forskning.     
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Forskningsspørgsmål: Hvad er status på forskningen omkring økonomifunktionens 
roller? Ændrer økonomifunktionens roller sig, og hvordan opfanger forskningen 
dette?  
Metodisk design: Artiklen bruger the competing values framework (Cameron et al., 
2014) til at studere rollernes udvikling i empirisk forskning og til at udvikle et 
spørgeskemainstrument, der skal bruges til at måle økonomifunktionens roller i 
artiklerne 2 og 3. Dertil bruger vi i artiklen Shields’ (1997) framework til at 
analysere forskningens nuværende status. Artiklen anvender ligeledes 
korrelationsanalyse for at undersøge, om antallet af økonomifunktionens roller 
øges med udgivelsesårerne for artiklerne.  
Data: 32 publicerede empiriske artikler, et working-paper og en konferenceartikel.  
Resultater: Når vi analyserer litteraturen, finder vi, at antallet af roller inkluderet i 
hver artikel korrelerer positivt med udgivelsesårerne på artiklerne. Vi finder også, 
at det er den traditionelle økonomifunktionsrolle med fokus controlling, der har 
fået størst opmærksomhed i forskningen. På linje med Mahlendorf (2014) finder vi, 
at der mangler et standardspørgeskemainstrument til måling af 
økonomifunktionens roller. Vi udnytter denne mulighed og udvikler et instrument, 
der er bygget på the competing values framework. De fleste udgivelser om 
økonomifunktionens roller har været baseret på kvalitativ forskning, hvor 
institutionel teori er den mest anvendte metode teori, og hvor 
produktionsvirksomheder er det mest populære empiriske miljø. En overvejende 
del af artiklerne undersøger, hvilke faktorer der påvirker økonomifunktionens roller. 
Det gælder eksempelvis Granlund og Lukka (1998), der undersøger, hvordan den 
finske kultur påvirker økonomifunktionens roller, eller Burns og Baldvindsdottir 
(2005), der undersøger, hvordan en organisatorisk forandring i en case-virksomhed 
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påvirker økonomifunktionens roller. Kun få artikler, herunder Byrne og Peirce 
(2007), undersøger relationerne mellem økonomifunktionens roller, og hvilke 
konsekvenser rollerne har.      
Artikel 2: The relations between finance function roles, behavioral 
differentiation, and performance. 
Forfattere: Henrik Nielsen og Thomas Borup Kristensen. 
Status: Denne artikel planlægges indsendt til European Accounting Review. 
Artiklens rolle i afhandlingen: Artiklen bygger på to forskningsmuligheder, der 
blev identificeret i artikel 1. Den første vedfører sammenspillet mellem forskellige 
økonomifunktionsroller. Den nuværende forskning vedrørende dette emne kan 
deles op i to lejre. Den ene argumenterer for, at der er komplementaritet mellem 
forskellige økonomifunktionsroller (Chang et al., 2014), mens den anden 
argumenterer at de forskellige roller substituerer hinanden (Maas & Matejka, 2009). 
Den anden forskningsmulighed er, at der mangler forskning, der undersøger, 
hvordan økonomifunktionen skaber eller destruerer værdi for virksomheden 
(Hartmann & Maas, 2011).  
Forskningsspørgsmål: Er effekten af den simultane brug og komplementariteten 
mellem multiple økonomifunktions roller stærkere på adfærdsmæssig (behavioral) 
differentiation end rollernes additive effekt? Er adfærdsmæssig differentiation i sin 
tur en driver der forbedrer økonomifunktions præstationer og medfører højere 
afkastningsgrad? 
Metodisk design: I artiklen anvender vi både first-order og second-order 
strukturelle ligningsmodeller til at analysere hypoteserne. Vi bygger på 
komplementaritetsteori (Ennen & Richter, 2011) og anvender et 
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paradoksperspektiv (Schad et al., 2016) til at forudsige relationerne mellem de 
eksogene og endogene variable i artiklen. Vi bruger spørgeskemainstrumentet, som 
vi har udviklet via the competing values framework i artikel 1, da det opfanger 
paradokser, som virksomheder opererer under (Cameron et al., 2014).  
Data: Artiklen bygger på en kombination af spørgeskema og regnskabsdata. 
Spørgeskemadata er hovedsageligt indsamlet hos økonomidirektøren i de 408 
deltagende virksomheder, men vi bruger også spørgeskemadata fra 
produktionsdirektøren i 107 af de deltagende virksomheder.  
Resultater: I artiklen finder vi, at den simultane brug af og komplementariteten 
mellem multiple økonomifunktionsroller påvirker adfærdsmæssig differentiation 
positivt, mens kun én rolle har en additiv relation til adfærdsmæssig differentiation. 
Herudover finder vi, at adfærdsmæssig differentiation leder til forbedrede 
præstationer for økonomifunktionen og forbedret afkastningsgrad.   
Artikel 3: Lean and management accountants: Survey evidence of the roles of 
finance functions. 
Forfattere: Henrik Nielsen og Thomas Borup Kristensen. 
Status: Artiklen er præsentereret på EIASM konferencen om Performance 
Measurement and Mangement Control i Nice, september 2017.  
Artiklens rolle i afhandlingen: Artiklen bygger på en forskningsmulighed 
identificeret i artikel 1. I forskningen lader det til, at økonomifunktionens roller er 
vigtige og udgør understøttende parametre i forbindelse med udnyttelse og 
forbedring af nuværende kompetencer (exploitation) og i forbindelse med at finde 
nye forretningsmuligheder (exploration) (se eksempelvis Burns & Baldvindsdottir, 
2005). Virksomheder, der fokuserer på at forbedre nuværende kompetencer og 
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samtidig fokuserer på nye forretningsmuligheder, defineres som ”ambidekstrøse 
organisationer” (March, 1991). Adler et al. (2009) karakteriserer Lean 
virksomheder som ”ambidextrous organizations”, og i den tredje artikel undersøger 
vi, hvordan økonomiafdelingen understøtter exploration og exploitation i 
virksomheder, der indikerer, at de anvender Lean. Vi bruger 
spørgeskemainstrumentet, som vi har udviklet via the competing values framework 
i artikel 1, da det opfanger de vigtige understøttende parametre, der gør, at 
virksomheder både kan ”udvikle” og ”udnytte” (Carmeli & Halevi, 2009). Vi 
undersøger ligeledes, om Lean principper i produktionen spreder sig til 
økonomifunktionen i den tredje artikel. En sådan proces kan kaldes for intra-
organisatorisk diffusion (Kim & Srivastava, 1997). Slutteligt undersøger vi i 
artiklen, om økonomifunktionens roller er indbyrdes afhængige, da der i 
litteraturen om ambidextrous organizations argumenteres for, at ”udnyttelse” skal 
balanceres med ”udvikling” (Cao et al., 2009).   
Forskningsspørgsmål: Hvordan påvirker Lean økonomifunktionen?  
Metodisk design: Vi bruger i artiklen en strukturel ligningsmodel til at undersøge 
direkte og indirekte relationer mellem de eksogene og endogene variable. Vi 
anvender et ambidexterity perspektiv og intraorganisatorisk diffusionsteori til at 
teste artiklens hypoteser.   
Data: Artiklen bygger på en kombination af spørgeskema og regnskabsdata. 
Spørgeskemadata er hovedsageligt indsamlet fra økonomidirektøren i de 408 
deltagende virksomheder, men vi bruger også spørgeskemadata fra 
produktionsdirektøren i 107 af de deltagende virksomheder. 
Resultater: I artiklen finder vi, at Lean er positivt relateret til to roller, der 
understøtter ”udvikling” og to roller, der understøtter ”udnyttelse”. Vi finder 
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ligeledes, at Lean principper fra virksomhedens operationelle områder spreder sig 
til økonomifunktionen, og at økonomifunktionens roller er indbyrdes afhængige.  
2.2 Lean og management control mechanisms 
Artikel 4: The performance effects of complementary management control 
mechanisms.   
Forfattere: Henrik Nielsen, Thomas Borup Kristensen, Lawrence P. Grasso.  
Status: Denne artikel er accepteret til udgivelse i International Journal of 
Operations and Production Management. 
Artiklens rolle i afhandlingen: I afhandlingens fjerde artikel flytter vi fokus fra 
økonomifunktionen og undersøger komplementaritet mellem de ledelsesmæssige 
styringsmekanismer (management control mechanisms) i Lean 
produktionsvirksomheder og effekten på præstation (performance). Tidligere 
forskning på området, eksempelvis Fullerton et al.  (2013), har anvendt en 
reduktionistisk metode til undersøgelse af komplementaritet mellem de 
ledelsesmæssige styringsmekanismer i Lean. Vi anvender holistisk metode, og 
udvider Kennedy og Wideners (2008) framework, da vi i modsætning til dem 
skelner mellem socio-visuelle styringsmekanismer socio-kulturelle 
styringsmekanismer samt mellem finansielle og ikke-finansielle 
styringsmekanismer.   
Forskningsspørgsmål: Er Lean relaterede ledelsesmæssige styringsmekanismer 
komplementære?  
Metodisk design: I artiklen anvender i både first-order og second-order strukturelle 
ligningsmodeller til at analysere hypoteserne. Vi anvender komplementaritetsteori 
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(Ennen & Richter, 2011) til at forudsige relationerne mellem Leans 
ledelsesmæssige styringsmekanismer og virksomhedspræstation.  
Data: Spørgeskemadata fra 368 amerikanske produktionsvirksomheder. 
Resultater: Vi finder, at komplementariteten mellem alle Leans ledelsesmæssige 
styringsmekanismer giver en større præstationseffekt end de isolerede additive 
relationer. Det er faktisk alene adfærdsmæssige styringsmekanismer og socio-
kulturelle styringsmekanismer, der er additivt relateret til performance.   
2.3 Lean, økonomistyringsmodeller og time compression diseconomies 
Artikel 5: The relations between Lean manufacturing, lean thinking, 
management accounting and firm performance – it is about time.  
Status: En tidligere version af denne artikel er præsenteret på EIASM 
manufacturing accounting conference i Lissabon 2016 under titlen: The 
relationships between Lean manufacturing and firm performance: Are they 
constrained in time? Artiklen har været indsendt til et special issue i Journal of 
Management Accounting Research. Artiklen blev afvist, men inviteret til 
genindsendelse til et normalt issue, hvis de foreslåede ændringer foretages. Disse 
ændringer er under gennemførelse for nuværende.  
Artiklens rolle i afhandlingen: Artiklen kigger nærmere på 
økonomistyringsmodeller i virksomheder, der bruger Lean i produktionen. De 
ældre økonomistyringssystemer såsom standard costing har været dømt 
uanvendelige for Lean produktionsvirksomheder, da det argumenteres, at de leder 
til dysfunktionel adfærd (Johnson, 1992; Maskell et al., 2012). Nyere forskning 
viser da også, at virksomheder, der anvender Lean i produktionen, anvender Lean 
relaterede økonomistyringssystemer som value stream costing, men undlader at 
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undersøge om Lean produktionsvirksomheder faktisk forlader de ældre 
økonomistyringssystemer (se eksempelvis Fullerton et al., 2013; 2014). Vi tager et 
mere holistisk perspektiv på økonomistyringssystemer i Lean 
produktionsvirksomheder, da vi, udover at undersøge forholdet mellem Lean i 
produktionen og Lean relaterede økonomistyringssystemer, også undersøger 
forholdet mellem Lean i produktionen og brugen af 
standardomkostningsvariansanalyser. I artiklen undersøges det ligeledes, hvordan 
Lean i produktionen og omkostningsmodellerne påvirker Lean thinking, og om 
Lean i produktionen, omkostningsmodellerne og Lean thinking leder til forbedret 
operationel præstation. Vi studerer forholdet mellem Lean i produktionen og 
operationel præstation med et lille twist. Vi undersøger nemlig om tidsomfanget, i 
hvilken virksomheden har haft Lean, påvirker/moderer forholdet mellem Lean og 
operationel præstation.   
Forskningsspørgsmål: Hvordan påvirker Lean virksomhedens 
omkostningsmodeller og virksomhedens kultur, og påvirker tidsomfanget i hvilket 
virksomheden har haft Lean relationen mellem Lean og operationel præstation? 
Metodisk design: I artiklen anvender vi en strukturel ligningsmodel til at undersøge 
direkte og indirekte relationer mellem eksogene og endogene variable. Der 
foretages ligeledes ”subgroup” analyser og time-compression diseconomies 
(Dierickx & Cool, 1989) i artiklen til at undersøge og forudsige beta 
koefficientforskelle i relationerne mellem Lean og operationel præstation, Lean og 
brugen af standardomkostningsvariansanalyser, Leans visuelle styringsmekanismer 
og operationel præstation samt mellem Lean thinking og operationel præstation. 
Data: Spørgeskemadata fra 368 amerikanske produktionsvirksomheder. 
13 
 
Resultater: Vi finder, at Lean produktionsvirksomheder anvender value stream 
costing og Lean visual controls, altså de Lean relaterede økonomistyringssystemer. 
Men vi finder også, at Lean produktionsvirksomheder anvender 
standardomkostningsvariansanalyser. Faktisk finder vi, at relationen mellem Lean i 
produktionen og standardomkostningsvariansanalyser er positivt 
influeret/modereret af årrækken i hvilken virksomhederne har anvendt Lean i 
produktionen. Lean i produktionen, Lean visual controls og Lean thinking er 
ligeledes positivt relateret til operationel præstation. Men relationerne mellem Lean 
i produktionen og operationel præstation, samt mellem Lean visual controls og 
operationel præstation er positivt influeret af tiden/antal år i hvilken 









3. Extended English Summaries 
3.1 Paper I: The changing roles of finance organizations: A review and 
analysis of empirical management accounting research 
Authors: Henrik Nielsen and Thomas Borup Kristensen 
Status: Parts of this paper was published as a book chapter entitled: 
Økonomifunktionens roller: Ved vi, hvad vi taler om?” in ”Produktion og Styring – 
Perspektiver på økonomistyringen” (2016), Eds.: Bukh, Per Nikolaj, Kristensen, 
Thomas Borup.   
The role of the paper in the dissertation: In the first paper of the dissertation, we 
perform a literature review of empirical papers on the roles of finance functions. 
We identify the research agenda with respect to papers two and three, and we 
develop the measurement instrument pertaining to the roles of finance functions.    
Research Questions: What is the current status of empirical research on the roles 
of finance functions? Are the roles of finance function changing, and if so, how is 
this captured by the empirical management accounting literature?  
Methodological Design: This study reviews the empirical management accounting 
literature on the roles of finance functions. It uses the competing values framework 
(Cameron et al., 2014) in order to separate roles, analyze role development, and 
develop a survey instrument pertaining to the roles of finance functions. The paper 
also studies the literature with respect to methods, data analysis techniques, 
empirical settings, and topics (Shields, 1997). In addition, the papers’ findings are 
briefly described. The paper uses correlation analysis in order to tease out whether 
the number of finance function roles found in the empirical papers is increasing 
with publication year.    
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Data: “Controller and role” and “management accounting/accountant and role” are 
searched for in the ABI/INFORM and EBSCO host business source premier 
databases. Thirty-two published empirical papers, one working paper, and one 
conference paper are reviewed.    
Summary and findings: When we analyze the papers via the competing values 
framework, the roles of finance functions appear to be expanding, as the correlation 
between publication year and the number of roles included per paper is significant. 
Studying the emphases of the roles, we find that 55 percent of the identified roles 
can be related to the internal process quadrant of the competing values framework, 
which places emphasis on the monitoring of performance, stability, and control. 
Twenty-three percent of the roles are related to the open systems quadrant, which 
focuses on growth, innovation, and adaptation to the environment. Fifteen percent 
of the roles identified in the literature are related to the rational goal quadrant, in 
which the overarching emphases are on cost reduction, goal setting, and 
productivity, and eight percent is related to the collaborate quadrant, which stresses 
internal alignment, autonomy, and cooperation. Moreover, we find that research 
has been inconsistent with respect to labeling finance function roles, and likewise, 
the items and scales measuring the roles are very diverse in quantitative papers. We 
argue that this is detrimental but is also an opportunity for future research. We then 
go on to develop a survey instrument that is intended for future survey research on 
finance function roles. It builds on the competing values framework and the 
findings in the review. We also find that 41 percent of the published papers are 
qualitative, with interviews being the most popular primary data analysis technique. 
Thirty-five percent of the papers are quantitative, and this is where structural 
equation modeling is the most used data analysis technique. Institutional theory is 
the most frequently applied method theory, followed by contingency theory and 
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role theory. Regarding empirical settings, most of the research on finance function 
roles has been conducted in the manufacturing sector, followed by the service 
sector and health-care sector, respectively. Most papers studied drivers of finance 
function roles—for example, national culture, enterprise resource planning systems, 
and organizational changes, inter alia (e.g., Burns & Baldvinsdottir, 2005; 
Goretzki et al., 2013; Granlund & Lukka, 1998). Only a few papers studied the 
consequences of the roles and the possible relationships between the roles (Byrne 
& Peirce, 2007; Chang et al., 2014; Maas & Matejka, 2009).    
3.2 Paper II: The relationships between finance function roles, behavioral 
differentiation, and performance 
Authors: Henrik Nielsen and Thomas Borup Kristensen 
Status: This paper is planned to be submitted to European Accounting 
Review. 
The role of the paper in the dissertation: The survey instrument pertaining to the 
roles of finance functions developed via the competing values framework in paper 
one is used in the second paper of the dissertation because the competing values 
framework captures the paradoxes that organizations face (Cameron et al., 2014). 
Paper two is inspired by two research opportunities identified in paper one. The 
first is the tension between the few papers studying relations between the roles of 
finance functions: It is argued by Chang et al. (2014) that the roles of finance 
functions are complementary, whereas Maas and Matejka (2009) argue that they 
are substitutes. The second is the lack of papers studying the positive or negative 
consequences of finance function roles—that is, how they create or destroy value 
for firms (Hartmann & Maas, 2011). 
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Research questions: Does the simultaneous use of and complementarity among 
finance function roles outweigh their isolated, additive effects on behavioral 
differentiation? In turn, is behavioral differentiation a driver for finance functions 
that enables them to increase their perceived performance and, furthermore, a 
driver for increased firm financial performance? 
Methodological Design: The paper uses first-order and second-order factors in a 
structural equation model to analyze the hypotheses. It relies on complementarity 
theory and a paradoxical perspective in order to predict relations between four 
finance function roles, the number of full-time equivalents employed by the finance 
function and behavioral differentiation, and, in turn, the relationships between 
behavioral differentiation, perceived finance function performance, and return on 
invested capital.    
Data: A combination of questionnaire and financial statement data from 408 
different firms in the Danish manufacturing and services sector is used. The 
questionnaire data are primarily obtained from the CFO. In addition, the paper 
utilizes data obtained from the COOs of 107 of the 408 responding firms.  
Summary and findings: According to a paradoxical perspective, organizations 
that are able to integrate contradictory elements achieve a greater understanding of 
causality and organizational wholeness because the contradictory elements inform 
one another (Chreim, 2005). Furthermore, integrating contradictory elements can 
foster dialogue and increase organizational focus (Henri, 2006), and studies have 
found that paradoxical elements are complementary (e.g., Cao et al., 2009). We 
characterize the four finance function roles as paradoxical elements. We predict 
and find that the simultaneous use of and complementarity among all four finance 
function roles is positively related to behavioral differentiation, whereas only one 
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of four roles is positively related to behavioral differentiation in isolation. To test 
complementarity, we use a statistical method introduced by Tanriverdi and 
Venkatranam (2005). We compare a second-order model that captures the 
complementarity among the four finance function roles with a first-order model 
that accounts for the additive effects of the four roles on behavioral differentiation. 
In addition, we find that the simultaneous use of and complementarity among all 
four finance function roles increase the number of full-time equivalents employed 
in the finance function. Behavioral differentiation is the finance function’s ability 
to understand what role to apply when it is needed. In other words, it is the ability 
to differentiate between roles—that is, adaptively, flexibly, situation specifically, 
and appropriately (Hooijberg et al., 1997). As such, when a finance function has a 
great behavioral differentiation, it understands internal customer demands, 
performs roles accordingly, and delivers activities and services with high quality. 
We hypothesize and find that behavioral differentiation is positively related to the 
perceived performance of the finance function. We argue that finance function 
workers are more likely to be perceived as effective if they understand what, when, 
and how a role is expected to be performed. Behavioral differentiation enables the 
finance function to overcome inconsistencies stemming from demands for their 
support of other functions in the firm and increases the quality of the finance 
function’s services. We assume that when the quality of finance function services 
increases, it is likely to be used for managerial decision-making (Weissenberger & 
Angelkort, 2011). Thus, in the final hypothesis of the paper, we predict and find 
that behavioral differentiation is positively related to return on invested capital. 
Implications for practice: Although the simultaneous use and complementarity of 
all four finance function roles increase the number of full-time equivalents 
employed in the finance function, decision makers should not hesitate with respect 
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to expanding the roles of finance functions in their firms, because the greater 
behavioral differentiation enabled by all four roles increases return on invested 
capital.      
3.3 Paper III: Lean and management accountants: Survey evidence of the 
roles of finance functions 
Authors: Henrik Nielsen and Thomas Borup Kristensen 
Status: The paper was presented at the 9
th
 EIASM Conference on Performance 
Measurement and Management Control in Nice, September 2017.  
The role of the paper in the dissertation: The third paper is inspired by findings 
in paper one, in that finance function roles appear to be supporting both 
exploitation and exploration—that is, ambidexterity (March, 1991). We use the 
survey instrument pertaining to finance functions developed via the competing 
values framework in paper one because this framework captures the underlying 
values of the structures that must be in place in order for organizations to be 
ambidextrous (Carmeli & Halevi, 2009). Adler et al. (2009) argue that Lean 
operation firms encompass characteristics of ambidextrous organizations. In the 
third paper, we go on to study how the roles of finance organizations support firms 
that indicate that they have implemented Lean with respect to their exploitative and 
explorative efforts. 
Research question: How does the implementation of a Lean operation affect the 
finance function?  
Methodological Design: The paper uses structural equation modeling and tests 
both direct and indirect relations between exogenous and endogenous variables. It 
relies on an ambidexterity perspective (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004) and intra-
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organizational diffusion theory in order to predict hypotheses between the 
implementation of a Lean operation and the finance function.   
Data: A combination of questionnaire and financial statement data from 408 
different firms in the Danish manufacturing and services sector is used. The 
questionnaire data are primarily obtained from the CFO. In addition, the paper 
utilizes data obtained from the COOs of 107 of the 408 responding firms.  
Summary and findings: Ambidextrous organizations are able to balance 
exploration and exploitation (March, 1991). We characterize Lean operation firms 
as contextually ambidextrous, meaning that they encompass organizational 
structures that enable employees to perform simultaneous exploration and 
exploitation (Adler et al., 2009). We hypothesize that the implementation of a Lean 
operation is positively related to the control role and the compete role. These two 
roles emphasize exploitation. The control role ensures stability and certainty, which 
are essential for exploitation, whereas the compete role, in turn, focuses on the 
continuous refinement of current processes, ensuring that the firm exploits current 
competencies. We also hypothesize that the implementation of a Lean operation is 
positively related to the adhocracy role and the collaborate role. These two roles 
ensure exploration. The adhocracy role deals with understanding external customer 
value and develops new business potential for the firms. These traits are necessary 
for exploration. The collaborate role ensures that information is tailored to 
employees who support the fast decision-making and autonomy necessary in Lean 
operation firms. Likewise, autonomy for employees is essential in ambidextrous 
firms because it increases their potential to generate innovations. We find that the 
implementation of a Lean operation is positively related to all four roles. 
Furthermore, Lean operation firms are tightly coupled (Roberts, 2004), which 
increases the sharing and dispersion of ideas regarding what works and what does 
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not in different functional settings (Ross, 1974). As such, we also hypothesize and 
find that the implementation of a Lean operation is positively related to the use of 
Lean principles in the finance function. Lean principles in the finance function 
include a clear understanding of internal customers’ needs. Thus, we expect Lean 
principles in the finance function to be positively related to all four finance 
function roles, as these are demanded for exploitation and exploration. We find 
Lean principles in the finance function to be positively related to the compete role, 
the control role, and the collaborate role. Finally, we argue and hypothesize that the 
benefits of either role are dependent on the level of the other roles and vice versa. 
We hypothesize and find that the roles of the finance functions in Lean firms are 
interdependent. 
Implications for practice: It should be acknowledged by decision makers that it is 
essential to integrate finance functions into the implementation of Lean 
manufacturing in firms. The finance function supports the refinement of current 
practices and processes—that is, continuous improvements—and ensures that the 
firm is on par with the Lean objectives. Furthermore, the finance function changes 
the management control system so that it fits with the Lean implementation, and it 
participates in enabling the autonomy needed for employees to make fast decisions. 
The finance function also provides valuable input with respect to new business 
opportunities for the firm.  
3.4 Paper IV: The performance effects of complementary management 
control mechanisms 
Authors: Henrik Nielsen, Thomas Borup Kristensen and Lawrence P. Grasso. 




The role of the paper in the dissertation: In the fourth paper, we move on from 
the focus on the roles of finance functions in Lean firms in the third paper and turn 
our attention to the management control mechanisms in Lean firms (cf. Kennedy & 
Widener, 2008). We investigate the complementary effects between Lean 
management control mechanisms and their effects on firm performance. The 
method upon which we model complementarity in the fourth paper is the same as 
the one we use in the second paper.          
Research question: Are Lean management control mechanisms complementary?  
Methodological design: This paper uses structural equation modeling to construct 
a first-order and a second-order model, and relies on complementarity theory 
(Ennen & Richter, 2011) to predict the relationships between Lean management 
control mechanisms and firm performance. 
Data: The data comprise questionnaires from 368 different American 
manufacturing facilities.     
Summary and findings: The implementation of Lean manufacturing has been 
found to be associated with companies’ management control mechanisms (e.g., 
Kristensen & Israelsen, 2014; Netland et al., 2015), and it is recognized in the 
literature that management control mechanisms can either help or hinder Lean 
manufacturing companies with respect to reaching Lean objectives (Åhlström & 
Karlsson, 1996; Fullerton et al., 2014). We use the framework developed by 
Kennedy and Widener (2008) to explain in detail how management control 
mechanisms are interrelated. We expand Kennedy and Widener’s (2008) 
framework. They distinguished between social control, behavioral control, and 
output control mechanisms. We increase the granularity of their framework by 
distinguishing between social cultural and social visual control mechanisms. We 
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argue that this is important because cultural social control mechanisms are input 
oriented and are intended to guide behavior ex ante, whereas visual social control 
mechanisms are intended to guide immediate behavior. We also distinguish 
between nonfinancial output and financial output control mechanisms. Financial 
management control mechanisms typically lag behind nonfinancial control 
mechanisms because many of the nonfinancial management control mechanisms 
are measurement drivers of future financial results (Johnson, 1992). We 
hypothesize that the simultaneous use and complementarity of all management 
control mechanisms has greater performance effects compared with the use of 
management control mechanisms in isolation. For example, the performance 
effects of standard operating procedures (a behavioral control mechanism) are 
greater if they are visualized (a visual social control mechanism) because it is then 
ensured that all employees are aware of the best currently known standard. Another 
example is the motivational effects of nonfinancial performance measurement 
systems. The motivational effects are greater if nonfinancial performance 
measurement systems are combined with peer pressure (a cultural social control 
mechanism). In order to test the hypotheses, we utilize the procedure developed by 
Tanriverdi and Venkatranam (2005). We develop a first-order factor model in 
which the five management control mechanisms are correlated and additively 
related to firm performance. We compare the first-order factor model with a 
second-order factor model in which the first-order factors load on a second-order 
factor. The second-order factor accounts for the covariance and multilateral 
interactions among the Lean management control mechanisms. We find that the 
complementarity effects among all Lean management control mechanisms are 
greater on firm performance than the additive effects of using the management 
control mechanisms in isolation. In fact, only the behavioral control and cultural 
social control mechanisms are significantly related to firm performance in isolation.     
24 
 
Implications for practice: Practitioners should understand that implementing the 
entire system of Lean management control mechanisms enables greater firm 
performance than implementing a partial system. However, the implementation of 
the entire system of Lean management control mechanisms might be relatively 
easy for competitors to replicate. Thus, practitioners should also understand that 
the management control mechanisms are complementary which, in turn, might 
prove to be a competitive advantage (Porter, 1996).  
3.5 Paper V: The relationships between Lean manufacturing, Lean thinking, 
management accounting, and firm performance: It is about time  
Authors: Thomas Borup Kristensen, Henrik Nielsen and Lawrence P. Grasso. 
Status: A previous version of the paper entitled: “The relationships between Lean 
manufacturing and firm performance: Are they constrained in time?” was presented 
at the EIASM Manufacturing Accounting Conference in Lisbon, 2016. The paper 
was submitted to a special issue on survey research in Journal of Management 
Accounting Research. The paper was invited to revise and resubmit, but it would 
be considered as a new submission.  
The role of the paper in the dissertation: In the fifth paper, we also study 
management control mechanisms in Lean firms, as we did in the fourth paper. 
More specifically, we turn our attention to how management accounting practices 
support Lean firms. Moreover, we study the importance of Lean thinking and 
whether the length of time companies have used Lean manufacturing affects the use 
of management accounting practices and Lean’s effect on operational performance.    
Research questions: How is Lean manufacturing related to management 
accounting practices and Lean thinking, and does the length of time companies 
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have used Lean manufacturing affect the relationships between Lean and 
management accounting and performance?  
Methodological design: The paper uses structural equation modeling and tests 
both direct and indirect effects between exogenous and endogenous variables. The 
paper also utilizes subgroup analysis to investigate hypothesized beta coefficient 
estimate differences. The paper relies on time-compression diseconomies (Dierickx 
& Cool, 1989) to predict differences in relationships between Lean manufacturing 
and operational performance, Lean manufacturing and measures of labor and 
materials efficiency, Lean thinking and operational performance, and Lean visual 
controls and operational performance.   
Data: The data comprise questionnaires from 368 different American 
manufacturing facilities.     
Summary and findings: It is argued in the Lean literature that it is necessary for 
companies that are implementing Lean manufacturing to simplify their 
management accounting systems (e.g., Fullerton et al., 2013; Maskell et al., 2012). 
It includes a reliance on visual control, the use of value stream costing (Fullerton et 
al., 2014), and the lesser use of traditional management accounting systems with 
respect to operational decision-making. In fact, Johnson and Kaplan (1987) argue 
that traditional management accounting systems should be used for financial 
reporting only. Following these argumentations, we hypothesize and find that Lean 
manufacturing is positively related to Lean visual controls and value stream costing. 
However, we also hypothesize that Lean manufacturing is positively related to 
measures of labor and materials efficiency. We argue that measures of labor and 
materials efficiency can be used to show variances between actual costs and cost 
reduction objectives, that managers might be hesitant to substitute measures of 
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labor and materials efficiency that worked during previous manufacturing regimes, 
and that measures of labor and materials efficiency show unit-level cost reductions 
that value stream costing, for example, does not. We find that Lean manufacturing 
is positively related to measures of labor and materials efficiency. Additionally, we 
hypothesize and find that measures of labor and materials efficiency, Lean visual 
controls, and value stream costing are interdependent. We also contend that getting 
all employees and management involved with and trained in Lean and continuous 
improvement is essential in Lean manufacturing (Emiliani et al., 2003). We 
conceptualize this as Lean thinking, and we hypothesize and find that Lean 
manufacturing is positively related to Lean thinking. Additionally, we hypothesize 
and find that Lean visual controls and value stream costing are positively related to 
Lean thinking. We argue that both management accounting practices influence 
employees’ cognition in that they are likely to recognize that these Lean congruent 
management accounting practices help them develop Lean manufacturing in their 
facilities (Åhlström & Karlsson, 1996). Lean manufacturing, Lean visual controls, 
and Lean thinking are also hypothesized and found to be positively related to 
operational performance. Lean thinking works as a catalyst in that the relationships 
between Lean manufacturing and operational performance through Lean thinking 
and between Lean visual controls and operational performance through Lean 
thinking are significant. The relationships between Lean manufacturing and 
operational performance and between Lean visual controls and operational 
performance are significantly moderated by the length of time that companies have 
used Lean manufacturing. We argue that this is a function of time compression 
diseconomies (Dierickx & Cool, 1989): The implementation of Lean 
manufacturing restructures the entire company, and it takes time for employees to 
learn and fine-tune the new systems and practices.          
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Implications for practice: Allowing for patience is important for Lean 
manufacturing companies, as greater performance effects will occur over time 
without increasing the extent of the Lean manufacturing implementation. 
Furthermore, practitioners should understand the importance of involving all 
employees at all hierarchical levels in the Lean implementation because this will 
not only leverage operational performance additively but will also function as a 




4. Data and questionnaire item scales 
This dissertation is based on empirical data from three different sources. These 
sources were cross-sectional survey data on Danish firms in the manufacturing and 
services sectors, from which responses were obtained from both the Chief 
Financial Officers (CFOs) and the Chief Operating Officers (COOs) of the 
responding firms; financial statement information for the year 2016 from Danish 
firms obtained from the Danish database of registered companies; and cross-
sectional survey data obtained from American manufacturing facilities. We used 
the Danish data in the second and third papers in the dissertation, and the American 
data were used in the fourth and fifth papers. The sections here describe the 
empirical data and questionnaire items used in the papers 2 and 3, and in the papers 
4 and 5. 
4.1 Papers 2 and 3 - Data  
The data sources for the second and third papers were a cross-sectional survey, 
collected between July 2016 and January 2017, and 2016 financial statement 
information from Danish firms in the manufacturing and services sectors. We 
restricted the population to Denmark to control for cultural and institutional 
differences (Ahrens & Chapman, 2000; Granlund & Lukka, 1998) affecting finance 
functions. The criteria for inclusion in the target population were that the firms had 
to employ more than 50 people and the responses had to be obtained from the 
parent company. Otherwise, sampling was random. The survey was aimed at the 
CFOs of the sample firms. After three rounds of data collection—two via an email 
that included a link to an online survey and one via postal mail—we obtained a 
satisfactory response rate of 29.5 percent. The table below shows the 




Table 1: Sample characteristics   
Manufacturing n=193 Service n=215 
Iron and rubber 30% Retail 42% 
Machines  30% Finance  24% 
Food  13% Transportation 14% 
Textiles 7% Utilities 10% 
Electronics 6% Other 7% 
Chemicals 4% Communication 2% 
Health care 4% Property 1% 
Furniture  3% 
  




    
Total 100%   100% 
 
The CFOs provided 66.4 percent of the responses. Other respondents identified 
themselves as “senior finance manager” (6.6 percent), “controller” (2 percent), 
CEO (2 percent), and “other” (23 percent). On average, the respondents were 48.5 
years of age, had been employed by their current firms for 9 years, and had 5.9 
years of tenure in their current positions. The table below shows the respondents’ 
level of education.  
Table 2: Respondents’ level of education 
Master’s degree 51.1% 
Bachelor’s degree or similar 34.6% 
Professional training 5.9% 






As indicated in Table XX, most respondents were educated at a college or 
university. The majority of the respondents with a college/university degree 
reported that the degree was in accounting (see Table 3 below).   
Table 3: Panel A: Type of master’s degree Panel B: Type of bachelor’s degree   
Accounting 46% Accounting 87.3% 
Management accounting 15.6% Business administration 3.4% 
Finance 15.6% Strategy 3.4% 
Strategy 6.2% Other 5.7% 
Economics 3.9% 
  Other 14% 
  Total 100%   100% 
 
In the second and third papers, we surveyed the CFO with respect to both 
exogenous and endogenous variables that might foster common method biases 
(Podsakoff et al., 2003). Furthermore, the roles of finance functions might be 
performed by one or more than one individual, and the other variables pertaining to 
the finance function represent unit-level variables (the finance function). Therefore, 
it was important to address interrater item agreement. In the third paper, we studied 
finance function roles in Lean firms, and some of the items pertaining to finance 
function roles used in paper two measured the extent of finance function 
engagement in operations. Thus, we decided to address parts of the survey to the 
COOs of the responding firms. We obtained COO responses from 26 percent of the 
responding firms (107/408). We addressed interrater item agreement using the 
average deviation index (Burke et al., 1999), and all indexes were acceptable. The 
responding COOs were 49.5 years old on average, had been employed by the firm 
for 12.6 years, and had been in their current positions for 6.9 years. We also 
addressed common method bias by randomly ordering the items measuring 
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exogenous and endogenous variables in the survey, and we used Hamann’s one-
factor tests as well (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986).  
4.2 Financial statement information as control and endogenous variables 
One problem with a cross-sectional data set is that organizational choices are not 
uniform across sectors. To address this issue, we controlled for sector in papers two 
and three. Likewise, to reduce bias stemming from different firm sizes, we 
controlled for size proxied by the number of employees (Tanriverdi & 
Venkatranam, 2005) in papers two and three, in which we also controlled for 
environmental uncertainty proxied for by the standard deviation of sales growth of 
firms within the same sector during the past three years (Cao et al., 2009). In the 
second paper, we additionally used debt-to-equity ratio as a control variable, and in 
the third paper, we used return on invested capital as an endogenous variable. In 
the table below, we present information on the responding firms with respect to 
earnings before interests and tax, return on assets, and number of employees. 
Table 4: Number of employees, EBIT and ROA (2016)         
 
Min Max Mean Standard dev. 
Number of employees 50 6,833 285 536 
Earnings before interests and tax (DKK in thousands) -628,000 1,541,358 31,789 152,757 
Return on assets -41% 58% 7.8% 12.4% 
 
4.3 Papers 2 and 3- Items and scales 
Choosing the number of response categories was a daunting task, as there are 
opposing theoretical perspectives in this regard. Cox (1980) describes two: the 
theory of information and the absolute judgement paradigm. The theory of 
information predicts that the more scale points added, the more information can be 
obtained. Contrastingly, the absolute judgment paradigm predicts that only limited 
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benefits are obtained from increasing the number of scale points. Furthermore, 
should scale points be fully labeled, or should only the end points of the scale be 
labeled? (Dillman et al., 2009). Eustler and Lang (2015) addressed both the 
number of scale points and the labeling of scale points using two experiments on 
accounting business students. They found that variance is maximized at seven scale 
points; additional scale points do not increase variance, and fewer scale points 
reduce variance. Furthermore, labeling all scale points also increases variance and 
reduces extreme response and central tendency bias. Thus, we chose a labeled 
seven-point Likert scale for all questionnaire items in the second and third papers.  
The roles of finance functions: The development of items that measure the roles 
of finance functions requires special attention here because they represent a 
substantial part of papers 2 and 3 and because we developed several items 
ourselves. The literature review (paper one) provided the foundation for developing 
the measurement instrument. We drew on items used in prior survey studies and 
descriptions of roles in prior case studies, and developed several items ourselves. 
The items covered the four quadrants in the competing values framework. 
Furthermore, we relied on functional role theory, which “focuses on the 
characteristic behaviors of persons who occupy social positions within a stable 
social system” (Biddle, 1986, p. 70).
2
 A social position can be occupied by several 
actors and is typically designated by a label such as a teacher, physician, or a 
management accountant. These social positions act in different ways. For example, 
a teacher grades and lecture students, whereas a physician writes prescriptions. 
Thus, each social position exhibits a characteristic role (Biddle, 1979).  
                                                     
2
 In the management accounting literature, functional role theory has been applied, for 
example, by Maas and Matejka (2009), who studied role conflict and ambiguity with 
respect to business unit controllers’ dual responsibilities.  
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We used a frequency scale ranging from 1: never to 7: almost always to capture the 
extent to which respondents perceived the finance function roles to be part of their 
work activity (Floyd & Wooldridge, 1992; Floyd & Wooldridge, 1997). Four of 
five prior survey papers on finance function roles used an importance scale.
3
 Let us 
put forth an example of one difference with respect to an importance scale versus a 
frequency scale. In measuring the importance of a finance function role, we face 
two obstacles. The first, which is rather obvious, is when respondents indicate that 
a role is important although it is not important in their organizations. This can be a 
function of social desirability bias (Podsakoff et al., 2003). If we measure the 
frequency with which a role is performed, we face social desirability issues as well. 
The second obstacle to using the importance scale is that respondents might 
indicate that a role is in fact important, but it is not performed for different reasons. 
For example, one could imagine that despite respondents indicating that roles are 
important, they do not perform the roles because of resource constraints, 
technological constraints, or inertia. An importance scale might then not cover how 
a role acts (cf. functional role theory). A frequency scale ranging from “never” to 
“always” does not suffer from this problem, as we would expect the respondent to 
report “never” in such a situation, even though the role is important.   
We could also have used an “extent” scale. For example, we could have asked 
respondents to indicate to what extent the finance function “provides operations 
with business advice.” One possible problem with such a scale is that the 
respondent might indicate that the finance function provides operations with 
business advice to a great extent based on the perceived impact of the advice, 
although the finance function rarely does so. In other words, the respondent might 
                                                     
3
 Bechtold et al. (2014) used a frequency scale. Chang et al. (2014), Hartmann and Mass 
(2011), Maas and Matejka (2009), and Mouritsen (1996) applied an importance scale. 
Bechtold et al. (2014) applied a frequency scale.   
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confuse the input with the outcome of a role. A frequency scale does not cause this 
confusion. It captures the input of activities as a function of the frequency with 
which they are performed. All three scales described here suffer from another 
interpretational challenge: Exactly how important is “very important,” how 
frequent is “occasionally,” and how much is “a great deal”? For example, for some 
respondents, “occasionally” might imply that the role is performed once a week, 
whereas it implies once a month for other respondents (Dillman et al., 2009). 
Instead, Dillman et al. (2009) argue that one can apply an actual frequency scale. 
However, the problem with such a scale is that if respondents are asked to indicate 
how frequently the finance function performs for example monthly close, they 
might indicate once a month, but once a month can span 10 days for some finance 
functions and 3 days for others. Altogether, most questionnaire scales have shared 
and individual challenges, but we argue that the frequency scale is best suited for 
capturing the functional form of role theory and is best suited for our research 
purposes.  
In total, the instrument measuring the roles of finance functions consisted of 36 
questionnaire items. Through exploratory factor analysis in paper two, four roles 
were established and each role consisted of five items. We remained loyal to the 
competing values framework when labeling the roles, and below, we show the 
roles’ Chronbach’s alpha and composite reliability. 
 The adhocracy role: Chronbach’s alpha: .835, composite reliability: .846. 
 The compete role: Chronbach’s alpha: .837, composite reliability: .841. 
 The control role: Chronbach’s alpha: .703, composite reliability: .739. 
 The collaborate role: Chronbach’s alpha: .805, composite reliability: .812. 
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Through exploratory factor analysis in paper three, four roles were established and 
each role consisted of four items. This underlines the necessity of using an 
exploratory factor analysis, although variables have been used and have shown 
acceptable reliability and validity in prior research. In other words, items from 
variables used in prior research might load differently when entered in another 
factor analysis containing different items. See, for example, Grabner and 
Speckbacher (2016) for a recent paper that does not apply exploratory factor 
analysis.   
 The adhocracy role: Chronbach’s alpha: .828, composite reliability: .840. 
 The compete role: Chronbach’s alpha: .720, composite reliability: .734. 
 The control role: Chronbach’s alpha: .686, composite reliability: .730. 
 The collaborate role: Chronbach’s alpha: .798, composite reliability: .805. 
4.3.1 Paper 2- Items and scales  
Behavioral differentiation: Behavioral differentiation was measured by four items 
with an agreement scale ranging from 1: strongly disagree to 7: strongly agree. We 
developed the four items, and they captured the definition of behavioral 
differentiation, which is the ability to apply roles differently—that is, adaptively, 
flexibly, situation specifically, and appropriately (Hooijberg et al., 1997)—and to 
apply the right role when it is called for. The variable representing behavioral 
differentiation had Chronbach’s alpha of .849, and composite reliability of .851.
4
  
Enterprise resource planning integration: Enterprise resource planning 
integration was measured by two items with an agreement scale ranging from 1: 
strongly disagree to 7: strongly agree. The two items captured the quality of the 
ERP system used by the finance function. The variable representing enterprise 
                                                     
4
 See paper 2 for all reliability and validity tests.  
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resource planning integration showed a Chronbach’s alpha of .719, and composite 
reliability of .747.  
Finance function perceived performance: Finance function perceived 
performance was measured by three items. They captured the reputation of the 
finance function in the organization, finance function success, and how the finance 
function compared to other finance functions in similar firms. The scale captured 
the level of satisfaction from 1: very dissatisfied to 7: very satisfied. The variable 
representing finance function perceived performance had a Chronbach’s alpha 
of .742, and composite reliability of .765. 
4.3.2 Paper 3 - Items and scales  
Lean operations: All five items were based on Fullerton et al.’s (2013) Lean 
manufacturing. They captured the level of Lean implementation on an agreement 
scale from 1: strongly disagree to 7: strongly agree. The variable representing Lean 
operations showed a Chronbach’s alpha of .705, and composite reliability of .720
5
  
Lean finance: All four items were based on Malmbrandt and Åhlström (2013) and 
were modified to capture the implementation of Lean principles in the finance 
function. They were measured on an agreement scale ranging from 1: strongly 
disagree to 7: strongly agree. The Lean finance variable had a Chronbach’s alpha 
of .732, and composite reliability of .750.  
4.4 Papers 4 and 5 - Data 
The data source for the fourth and fifth papers was a cross-sectional questionnaire 
aimed at members registered in the Shingo Prize Organization Database. The 
Shingo Prize is an award given to companies based on their world-class results and 
organizational culture. Thus, the sample was not random. However, the Shingo 
                                                     
5
 See paper 3 for all reliability and validity tests. 
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Prize Organization Database was chosen because this increased the likelihood of 
respondents understanding the questionnaire and, consequently, helped alleviate 
some of the concerns about data collection in survey research (Fullerton et al., 
2013). The data for the fourth and fifth papers were collected by Professor 
Lawrence P. Grasso, Professor Thomas Tyson, Professor Clifford. R. Skousen, and 
Professor Rosemary Fullerton. The survey was aimed at managers in 
manufacturing facilities. The responses were received between September and 
December 2012. In the Shingo Prize Organization Database, a total of 4,537 
individuals were represented, several of whom worked at the same manufacturing 
facility. A total of 512 responses were received, yielding a response rate of 11.2 
percent. The responses were averaged if more than one response was received from 
a facility. The 512 respondents were employed at 368 of 697 different 
manufacturing facilities, yielding a facility response rate of 52.7 percent. The table 
below shows the characteristics of the responding facilities with respect to sectors. 
   
 
Table 5: Sample characteristics: n=368   
Automotive  30% 
Aerospace 23% 
Department of Defense 19% 




Most respondents were responsible for Lean at their facilities and had an average 
of 11.3 years of management experience. The table below shows respondents’ job 
titles and average years of management experience.
6
  
Table 6: Respondents’ job titles/responsibility areas and average years of management experience 
Job title/responsibility area 
 
Average years of management 
experience 
Lean  27% 9.2 
Production 15% 12.1 
Engineer 8% 9.9 
Plant manager 8% 13.9 
CEO/President/Vice-President 7% 13.9 
Consultant/Analyst 4% 11.4 
Supply chain 4% 10.7 
Technician 2% 2.3 
Finance/Accounting 1% 10.8 
Human resources 1% 6.0 
Other 24% 13.2 
Total 100%   
 
Of the responding facilities, most had revenues of more than $100M and more than 
1,000 employees (see the table below).  
Table 7: Revenue and size     
Revenue 
 
Number of employees 
 
Over $100M 53.5% Over 1,000 43.2% 
$50–100M 13.3% 500–1,000 28.3% 
$5–50M 12.5% 100–500 12% 
Under $5 2.2% Under 100 2.2% 
No response 18.5% No response 14.4% 
Total 100% Total 100% 
  
                                                     
6
 No information with respect to respondents’ ages or educational levels was obtained.  
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As we averaged responses from the facilities from which we received multiple 
responses, we tested relationships from exogenous variables to endogenous 
variables using on respondent. We addressed the potential common method bias 
issue using Hamann’s one-factor tests (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986) in papers four 
and five.  
4.4.1 Papers 4 and 5- Questionnaire items and scales 
We did not develop the items used in papers four and five. They were developed by 
Professor Lawrence P. Grasso, Professor Thomas Tyson, Professor Clifford. R. 
Skousen, and Professor Rosemary Fullerton, and they were mostly based on 
Fullerton et al. (2013; 2014) and Kennedy and Widener (2008). All items were 
measured on five-point labeled Likert scales.  
4.4.2 Paper 4: Items and scales 
In paper four, we used the Lean management control mechanisms framework 
developed by Kennedy and Widener (2008). However, we increased the granularity 
of their framework as we distinguished between social cultural controls and social 
visual control, and between financial and nonfinancial control mechanisms.   
Social cultural controls: Seven of the eight items were developed, while one item 
was adapted from Fullerton et al.’s (2013) empowerment variable. The items were 
measured on a scale ranging from 1: strongly disagree to 5: strongly agree with 
respect to social cultural control mechanisms. The variable representing social 
cultural controls had a Chronbach’s alpha of .904, and composite reliability 
of .908
7
.        
Social visual controls: Four items were adapted from Fullerton et al.’s (2013) 
visual performance measurement information variable. The remaining three items 
                                                     
7
 See paper 4 for all reliability and validity tests.  
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were developed in accordance with Kennedy and Widener (2008). All items were 
developed to measure visualization on an agreement scale ranging from 1: strongly 
disagree to 5: strongly agree.  Social visual controls showed a Chronbach’s alpha 
of .909, and composite reliability of .912.   
Behavioral controls: Three of the four items were adapted from Fullerton et al.’s 
(2013) Lean manufacturing strategy variable, and one item was self-developed. 
The items were measured on an importance scale ranging from 1: not at all to 5: 
critical with respect to the use of behavioral control mechanisms. Behavioral 
controls had a Chronbach’s alpha of .821, and composite reliability of .826.    
Nonfinancial output controls: Three items were developed to measure 
nonfinancial output controls. The items were measured on an importance scale with 
respect to the use of nonfinancial performance measures, ranging from 1: not at all 
to 5: critical. Nonfinancial output controls showed a Chronbach’s alpha of .913, 
and composite reliability of .913.    
Financial output controls: Four items were developed to measure financial output 
controls. The items were measured on an importance scale related to the use of 
financial performance measures ranging from 1: not at all to 5: critical. Financial 
output controls had a Chronbach’s alpha of .797, and composite reliability of .802.   
Firm performance: Seven items were developed in order to measure firm 
performance. They covered both an accounting and a goal-oriented approach (Kihn, 
2005). All the items measured performance improvements caused by Lean on a 
scale ranging from 1: not at all to 5: a great deal. The variable representing firm 
performance had a Chronbach’s alpha of .912, and composite reliability of .913.   
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4.4.3 Paper 5- Items and scales 
Lean manufacturing: Six of the eight items measuring Lean manufacturing were 
adapted from Fullerton et al.’s (2013) Lean manufacturing strategy variable. The 
remaining two items were developed in accordance with Liker (2004) and Shah 
and Ward (2007). The items were measured on an agreement scale with respect to 
the implementation of Lean elements, ranging from 1: not at all to 5: a great deal. 




Lean thinking: One item was adapted from Fullerton et al. (2013), while the 
remaining items were developed on the basis of Emiliani et al. (2003). All the 
items were measured on an agreement scale ranging from 1: strongly disagree to 5: 
strongly agree with respect to statements representing the respondent’s 
organizational culture. The variable representing Lean thinking had a Chronbach’s 
alpha of .904, and composite reliability of .905.  
Lean visual controls: Six of the seven items measuring Lean visual controls were 
adapted from Fullerton et al. (2013). One item was developed in accordance with 
Kennedy and Widener (2008). The items were measured on an agreement scale 
ranging from 1: strongly disagree to 5: strongly agree with respect to statements 
pertaining to the respondent’s management accounting system. Lean visual 
controls had a Chronbach’s alpha of .905, and composite reliability of .907. 
Operational performance: Five items were developed to measure operational 
performance. They captured the operational improvements caused by Lean on a 
scale from 1: not at all to 5: a great deal. Chronbach’s alpha of the operational 
performance variable was .881, and composite reliability was .885. 
                                                     
8
 See paper 5 for all reliability and validity tests. 
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Financial performance: Two items were developed to capture financial 
performance. They measured financial improvements caused by Lean on a scale 
from 1: not at all to 5: a great deal. Financial performance had a Chronbach’s alpha 
of .900, and composite reliability of .900. 
The remaining two variables were single-item measures. Although the variables in 
a structural equation model are typically latent multi-item constructs (Kline, 2011), 
single-item measures are acceptable if they are narrow and unambiguous to the 
respondents (Sacket & Lawson, 1990).  
Value stream costing: One item was developed in order to capture the use of 
value stream costing on a scale ranging from 1: not at all to 5: a great deal. 
Measures of labor and materials efficiency: One item was developed in order to 
capture the use of measures of labor and materials efficiency on a scale ranging 
from 1: not at all to 5: a great deal. 
5. Method 
This section provides the reader insight into the paradigmatic underpinnings of the 
dissertation. I shall emphasize that the paradigmatic foundation of the dissertation 
is not my view of the world per se or the “right” modus operandi with respect to 
researching management accounting phenomena. Jerold Zimmerman (2001) is an 
example of an academic who claims that management accounting research has a 
“right” paradigmatic foundation. In essence, he is convinced that the paradigm that 
is best suited to research inquiries regarding management accounting phenomena is 
based on economics. He states that it is, in fact, from this positivist stance only that 
management accounting researchers can build a cumulative, rigorous body of 
knowledge. I am not one of those researchers, and I concur with Lukka and 
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Mouritsen (2002) that Zimmerman’s (2001) conjectures are dangerous because 
they inevitably lead to the omission of important findings related to management 
accounting research from the academic conversation. I take a much more pragmatic 
stance: Different modes of inquiry and bodies of knowledge provide different 
insights into the aspects of management accounting (Hopwood, 2002). It should, 
therefore, be of no surprise that I do not appreciate being confined to a 
paradigmatic “box.” The box should at least have an open lid, through which it is 
indeed possible to draw knowledge from other boxes; hopefully, the research in 
this dissertation is drawn upon by other researchers who are situated in other boxes 
as well. Nevertheless, it is useful to elucidate the paradigmatic foundation of this 
dissertation because a researcher should be fully aware of the assumptions upon 
which his or her research is based (Burrell & Morgan, 1979), and it is arguably 
useful for the reader as well. 
I begin with a clarification of what I mean by “paradigm.” A paradigm is 
essentially a research perspective; it is the worldview of the researcher, and it 
determines the way in which the phenomenon of interest is studied (Searcy & 
Mentzer, 2003). However, the object of study also determines the way in which it 
is studied, and consequently, the way in which the phenomenon is studied can also 
change when it is studied (see, for example, the Hawthorne studies, Roethlisberger 
& Dickson, 1939). There are differences of thought within any given paradigm, but 
each paradigm has its own basic assumptions and is, thus, fundamentally different 
from other paradigms. I use Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) framework, which 
elegantly distinguishes between four paradigms situated in two dimensions (see 
Figure XX). I describe the two dimensions and not only the paradigm upon which 
this dissertation is based. I do so because I argue that it is necessary to understand 
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the basic assumptions of the different positions of both dimensions in order to get a 












5.1 The horizontal dimension 
The horizontal dimension encompasses the principles of scientific method—in 
other words, how the researcher should study the phenomenon of interest 
(Chapman, 2012). The horizontal dimension ranges from a subjectivist approach to 
an objectivist approach to social science. Let us explain these two extremes in more 
detail. If the researcher believes that management accounting phenomena consist of 
relatively stable social structures that can be identified as if they are real, the 







Sociology of radical change  














Figure 1: Four paradigms for the analysis of social theory (Burrell & Morgan, 1979) 
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perspective, the researcher is then a realist, and the social world even exists 
independently of his or her recognition of it (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). In terms of 
epistemology, the researcher is positive and seeks to explain and predict causal 
relationships between social structures (Chapman, 2012). The people who occupy 
the world have almost no possibility of changing it. Thus, the researcher infers 
from empirical regularities, and only that which is observable is considered valid 
knowledge (Saudagaran & Diga, 1999). The methodological approach to research 
in the objective realm is “staying at the porch”—or “arms-length,” as Chapman 
(2012) puts it—nomothetic by means of hypotheses testing, usually via 
questionnaires, experiments, and the like (Burrell & Morgan, 1979).    
The subjectivist approach is situated on the opposite side of the horizontal 
dimension. The assumption here is that the social world that is external to the 
researcher is made up of names, concepts, and labels that are used to structure 
reality (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). From an ontological perspective, the researcher 
then occupies a nominalist position (Chapman, 2012). The social reality does not 
exist in a concrete sense but is a product of the subjective and intersubjective 
experiences of individuals (Morgan & Smircich, 1980). The researcher uses the 
names, concepts, and labels to make sense of the external world only. With respect 
to epistemology, the researcher inquires knowledge as an anti-positivist, meaning 
that he or she is not interested in causal, stable laws. Rather, he or she focuses on 
particularism, whereby autonomous individuals create their own realities 
(Chapman, 2012), and he or she leaves the porch and approaches research 
ideographically by means of firsthand engagement with the research subject matter 




5.2 The vertical dimension 
The vertical dimension encompasses a distinction between the sociology of radical 
change and that of regulation, and it leaves researchers to choose which aspects of 
a phenomenon they should study (Chapman, 2012). If the researcher is interested in 
providing explanations of society in terms that emphasize its unity and 
cohesiveness, the researcher relies on the sociology of regulation (Burrell & 
Morgan, 1979). This sociology seeks to understand why society is held together as 
an entity instead of falling apart. Its basic assumption about society is that it tends 
to uphold the status quo (Goles & Hirschheim, 2000) and, furthermore, stresses 
social order, consensus, solidarity, need satisfaction, and actuality (Burrell & 
Morgan, 1979). Chapman (2012) operationalizes the sociology of regulation with 
respect to accounting: “Research work that aims to understand and enhance 
earnings persistence, or to reduce earnings management, addresses itself to matters 
of the status quo, the existing social order, and what is actually happening in 
contemporary financial markets” (p. 826).  
Conversely, the sociology of radical change tries to find an explanation for 
structural conflicts, modes of oppression, and structural contradiction, which it sees 
as characterizing modern society, and it characterizes man as emancipated and 
constrained, which limits his potential (Goles & Hirschheim, 2000). It is concerned 
with potentiality and with what is possible rather than moving toward and 
accepting the status quo (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). With respect to accounting 
research, the sociology of radical change can enable an understanding of, for 
example, conflicts between shareholders and employees and can include a study of 




5.3 To which paradigm does this dissertation belong? 
This dissertation has its foundation in the functionalist paradigm. As such, it 
resides in the paradigm formed by the objectivists and the regulation axes. The 
functionalist paradigm is concerned with providing rational explanations of the 
social world, and it focuses on providing explanations of how elements of the 
social world interact with each other to form an integrated whole (Goles & 
Hirschheim, 2000). Burrell and Morgan (1979) further elaborate that the functional 
paradigm emphasizes the importance of understanding order, equilibrium, and 
stability in society, and its approach to social science assumes that the social world 
is one of empirical facts and relationships that can be measured using approaches 
from the natural science (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). As such, the approach of the 
functionalist paradigm to social science is firmly rooted in positivism.  
In papers two and three, we asked respondents to indicate how they perceived the 
roles of finance functions in their organizations. We measured the roles using 
reflective variables (Bisbe et al., 2007) and asked the respondents to indicate the 
frequency with which the finance function performed certain activities. It was then 
obvious that we see finance function roles as determined by the ways in which they 
act, as perceived by the respondent. As such, we see finance function roles based 
on functional role theory (Biddle, 1986), as opposed to, for example, symbolic 
interactionist role theory, whereby roles are, to a great extent, understood as 
informal interactions between actors. In all four empirical papers, we were also 
inspired by systems theory, in that we studied the interdependency and 
complementarity between finance function roles (papers two and three), between 
management control mechanisms (paper four), and between management 
accounting practices (paper five). Systems theory has its paradigmatic foundation 
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in the functionalist paradigm (Burrell & Morgan, 1979) and seeks to enable an 
understanding of groups or entities that work in concert (Abnor & Bjerke, 2009).  
Systems theory recognizes that the “whole is more than the sum of its parts.” As 
such, in order to study systems, one needs to utilize a holistic perspective. We 
applied a holistic perspective to the finance function roles, in that we expanded the 
usual two-role taxonomy to four roles in papers two and three. Furthermore, we 
expanded Kennedy and Widener’s (2008) framework with respect to Lean 
management control mechanisms in paper four, and we utilized a holistic approach 
to Lean manufacturing in paper five. When using systems theory, it is necessary to 
distinguish between open and closed systems (Burrell & Morgan, 1979) and, 
furthermore, to explicate the “magnifying” level (unit of analysis) of the object of 
study (Abnor & Bjerke, 2009). An open system is connected and interdependent 
with other systems in that it “exports and imports” from its environment, and it is 
affected by the environment during the process. On the contrary, a closed system is 
isolated from its context (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). In essence, papers two and 
three are about the roles of finance functions, which, as we measured them, 
expanded to the entire organization. In paper three, we also specifically studied the 
relationship between the organizations’ operations and the finance function. In 
papers four and five, although not represented by roles, we studied how finance 
function systems represented by management accounting practices (paper five) and 
management control mechanisms
9
 (paper four) function in Lean firms. Thus, we 
applied an open systems perspective and focused mainly on the finance function 
and firms’ operations as the units of analysis. We also, however, recognized the 
                                                     
9
 Of course, our framework of Lean management control mechanisms does not encompass 
solely what could be characterized as elements pertaining to the finance function. However, 
it does, for example, encompass financial and nonfinancial output controls.     
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firm as an open system, and controlled, for example, for contingency factors that 
might affect how the firm is organized (Donaldson, 2001).  
In as much as the dissertation resides in the functionalist paradigm, it should be 
underlined that the notion of objectivity should be considered carefully (Chapman, 
2012). The empirical papers in the dissertation use “approaches from the natural 
sciences,” in that they attempt to predict relations via questionnaires and, 
ultimately, statistical modeling. But these models are not entirely objective, as they 
are based on relatively subjective judgements with respect to reliability, validity, 
and fit indices. Although there is, to some extent, agreement regarding what 
represents acceptable construct reliability and validity (e.g., Fornell & Larcker, 
1981; Hair et al., 2014) and model fit (see, e.g., Bollen, 1989; Kline, 2011; Tucker 
& Lewis, 1973), the judgements of the goodness of these indices, and, more 
importantly, the judgements of the plausibility of the conclusions, are necessarily 
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Abstract 
Purpose: Finance organizations are encouraged to change their roles in firms 
because of the shifting dynamics in business environments. However, research on 
this topic has not been reviewed systematically. The purpose of this paper is to 
review the status of empirical management accounting research on the roles of 
finance organizations. 
Design/methodology/approach: This paper categorizes papers according to their 
methods, data analysis technique, research settings, and method theory and 
provides a summary of the results. The labels and descriptions of roles are 
compared, and the competing values framework is utilized to analyze the 
development and distribution of the roles. 
Findings: Research on finance organizations' roles is characterized by great 
diversity when it comes to method theory. Research methods are almost equally 
distributed between qualitative and quantitative methods, and research has 
primarily been conducted in the manufacturing and in the service industry. The 
analysis via the competing values framework shows the roles of finance 
organizations are changing and expanding in research. However, an extensive 
variety of labels and descriptions of roles are used which make it difficult to 
establish a sound body of knowledge on this topic.  
Originality/value: This paper reviews empirical management accounting research 
on finance organizations' roles. Based on the review, the paper develops a survey 
instrument and put forth suggestions for future research. 
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Firms are experiencing increasing complexity when it comes to strategy, 
organizational interdependencies, competition, and change (Hamel and Breen, 
2007). Due to these circumstances, institutional bodies and consultancies 
recommend that finance organizations
10
 expand their roles in firms (see Institute of 
Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, 2011, for a review) which implies 
that finance organizations should move beyond their traditional work efforts, such 
as reporting, control, and compliance (Chang et al., 2014). The call for finance 
organizations to expand their work efforts is not new. In 1916, Gannt advised the 
record keeper to give up his privilege of merely being a critic, and Anderson (1944) 
described that finance organizations should broaden their focus and contribute to 
management by interpreting reports. A change occurred in the late 1960s when 
increasingly complex business environments and economic challenges led 
companies to formally create the chief financial officer (CFO) position (Zorn, 
2004). The adaption of the CFO position accelerated drastically by the end of the 
1970s which was primarily a function of the regulatory demand for replacement 
accounting. The CFO and the chief executive officer (CEO) quickly became a 
dynamic duo, and Zorn (2004) posits that these institutional events are the 
foundations for the finance organizations’ rise to prominence in firms.  
But are finance organizations important for operational and strategic decision-
making, and are their roles expanding? Descriptive studies show mixed results. 
Russel et al. (1999) reported a survey of members of the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants and the Institute of Management Accountants and 
documented a transformation from “traditional accounting activities to newer, more 
                                                     
10
 Similar to Chang et al. (2014) and Mahlendorf (2014), we use “finance organization” as a 
term that refers to all employees in the management and financial accounting function. 
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value-added activities” compared to a similar survey conducted a few years earlier 
(Siegel et al., 1997). Accenture (2014) reported that almost three-quarters of their 
survey respondents stated that the CFO’s influence in strategic decision-making 
had increased within the past two years. IBM (2003) reported that finance 
organizations devoted 50 percent of their work to transactional activities and only 
24 percent to decision support. In a 2010 study, IBM found only a marginal 
increase in the time finance organizations devoted to performance management 
activities compared to the 2003 study. Furthermore, only 30 percent of respondents 
in Ernest & Young’s (2010) survey reported that CFOs played a leading role in 
formulating strategy. The picture is similar in recent surveys conducted by Oracle 
and Accenture (2013) and McKinsey & Company (2016). Although they are 
difficult to compare, these surveys show that some finance organizations have 
moved further than their traditional work efforts whereas some have not. However, 
most of the descriptive studies do not report why and why not finance 
organizations have moved beyond their traditional work. A review of empirical 
management accounting research can help answer these questions. 
Recent management accounting studies have shown that finance organizations 
perform a broad range of activities.
11
 For example, Chang et al. (2014) found that 
finance organizations set strategic directions and imperatives, and Hartmann and 
Maas (2011) found evidence of finance organizations helping managers meet their 
targets. The same studies also showed that finance organizations continued to 
perform traditional work. Thus, recent research has found evidence of change, in 
                                                     
11
 From a role theory perspective, activities contribute to the definition of organizational 
roles (Biddle, 1986) that can be affected by the expectations of the role senders (Katz and 
Kahn, 1978) and how actors performing the focal roles perceive the value that the role 




particular compared with the work finance organizations performed before the 
1960s.  
Notwithstanding the evidence of change in research, the topic is under-researched 
and faces challenges impeding the development of knowledge (Mahlendorf, 2014). 
According to Mahlendorf (2014), clear definitions of finance organizations’ roles 
are lacking, and various labels
12
 are used. Following these statements, Mahlendorf 
(2014) calls for analysis and comparison of the labels and descriptions of finance 
organizations’ roles. 
This paper reviews empirical management accounting research on finance 
organizations’ roles. Based on the review, it provides four contributions to research 
on finance organizations’ roles. First, it uses Shields’ (1997) framework to 
categorize papers, and provides a summary of the research findings and 
antecedents in Appendix 1. The paper finds that empirical management accounting 
research on finance organizations’ roles uses a great variety of method theories. 
Most commonly used is institutional theory, which makes sense given Zorn’s 
(2004) evidence. Contingency theory and role theory are the second and third most 
frequently used method theories. Research methods were almost evenly distributed 
between qualitative and quantitative, and several papers used mixed methods. 
Research on finance organizations’ roles has mostly been conducted in the 
manufacturing sector closely followed by the service sector. Second, this paper 
responds to Mahlendorf’s (2014) call and analyzes the labels and descriptions of 
finance organizations’ roles. The results confirm Mahlendorf’s (2014) concern. In 
sum, 22 labels for 45 roles were encountered, and the descriptions of these roles 
varied significantly. Third, this paper uses the competing values framework (Quinn, 
                                                     
12
 For example, business partner, business strategist, corporate cop, and bean counter. 
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1984) to shed light on the distribution and development of finance organizations’ 
roles in empirical management accounting research. It finds that the research 
mostly acknowledges the roles form a continuum. Furthermore, it finds that the 
complexity (measured as the number of roles included per paper) of the roles is 
increasing with publication date. Fourth, although the inconsistent use of labels and 
descriptions is detrimental for management accounting research, it is also an 
opportunity. We seek to seize this opportunity and use the competing values 
framework and the experience gained through the review to create a survey 
instrument intended to guide and enhance future research. Last, the paper discusses 
prominent determinants of finance organizations’ roles and develops ideas for 
future research. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explains the review 
method, and section 3 reviews the research using Shields’ (1997) work. Section 4 
introduces the CVF. Section 5 analyzes the roles’ labels and descriptions and 
investigates the distribution and development via the CVF. Section 6 provides the 
survey instrument whereas section 7 provides a discussion and ideas for future 
research. Section 8 concludes the paper, and presents limitations. Appendix 1 in 
section 9 includes a summary of the papers’ findings and topics.     
7.2 Method and data collection 
 “Controller” and “role” and “management accountant/accounting” and “role” were 
searched in the abstracts of peer-reviewed academic papers on the EBSCO host 
business source premier database. The search terms were based on Ahrens and 
Chapman’s (2000) clarification that “controller” and “management accountant” are 
used in German-speaking and English-speaking countries, respectively.
13
 This 
search resulted in 296 and 231 hits; some were duplications. To ensure 
                                                     
13
 We included only papers written in English in the review.  
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comprehensiveness, the same search inquiry was conducted in the ABI/INFORM 
complete database. The results were 164 and 180 hits for controller role and 
management accountant/accounting role, respectively. The only criterion was that 
papers had to be empirical and peer-reviewed. The abstracts of relevant papers 
were read, which yielded 18 papers suitable for the review. As the number was 
small, the reference lists of the papers were also examined, and the number of 
publications increased to 33 out of which one was a working paper. Furthermore, 
another working paper presented at the New Directions in Management 
Accounting Research conference in 2014 was also included (Bechtold et al., 2014). 
In sum, 34 papers were suitable as the foundation for the initial research purposes. 
The publication information is presented in Table 1, and the frequency distribution 
of papers since 1980 is shown in Figure 1.  
Table 1: Publication information 
   Journal                     Number of papers                                    
% 
European Accounting Review 
 
10 29% 
Management Accounting Research 
 
7 21% 
Accounting, Organizations & Society 
 
3 9% 
Journal of Acc. and Org. change 
  
3 9% 
The Accounting Review 
 
2 6% 






Journal of Management Accounting Research 1 3% 
The British Accounting Review 
 
1 3% 
Total Quality Management 
  
1 3% 
Journal of Applied Accounting Research 
 
1 3% 





    
  





Figure 1: Frequency distribution of articles 
 
The topic has received the most attention in European journals, and the number of 
publications per year began to increase in the mid-1990s. To compare role labels 
and definitions, to analyze roles via the CVF, and to develop a survey instrument 
for future research, two criteria were added: The papers had to attach a label to a 
finance organization role (e.g., bean counter), and the papers had to describe the 
work or activities performed by the role. These criteria reduced the number of 
papers from 34 to 19. 
7.3 Methods, data analysis techniques, research settings, and topics 
In this section, the initial 34 papers that deal with the roles of finance organizations 
are examined. We use the same framework as Shields (1997) as the papers’ 
methods, data analysis techniques, settings, and method theory are reported. A 
summary of the papers’ findings and topics is provided in Appendix 1. 
7.3.1 Method 
Forty-one percent of the papers were qualitative, and data was collected through 
























ranged from management accountants, finance organization managers, and CFOs 
to end users of management accounting, such as operational managers, sales 
directors, general managers, and company owners. Fifty percent of the papers had 
multiple cases while 36 percent had one case, and 14 percent were longitudinal. 
Thirty-five percent of the papers were quantitative; data was collected through 
questionnaires, and the data sources included management accountants, managers 
in finance organizations, and CFOs. Several papers utilized a dyadic approach, and 
they were aimed at decentralized and centralized management accountants, 
management accountants and operational managers, and management accountants 
in dependent and independent organizations. In 24 percent of the papers, interviews 
and questionnaires were applied.  
Table 2: Method overview 
  




Multiple case study 
Ahrens (1997), Ahrens & Chapman (2000), Byrne & Pierce 
(2007), Chenhall & Langfield-Smit (1998), Friedman & Lyne 
(1997), Granlund & Malmi (2002), Lambert & Sponem (2012) 50% 
Single case study 
Caglio (2003), Goretzki et al. (2013), Granlund & Lukka 
(1998), Lind (2001), Morales & Lambert (2013) 36% 




Questionnaire and interviews 
Chang et al. (2014), Chapman (1998), Graham et al. (2012), 
Granlund & Taipaleenmäki (2005), Hopper (1980), Maas & 







Cooper & Dart (2013), Bechtold et al (2014), Hartmann & 
Maaas (2011), Hiller et al. (2014), Indjekjkian & Matejka 
(2006), Mouritsen (1996), Naranjo-Gil et al. (2009), San Miguel 
& Govindarajan (1984), Verstegen et al (2007), Wolf et al. 
(2015), Yazdifar & Tsamenyi (2005), Zoni & Merchant (2007). 100% 
 
7.3.2 Data analysis technique 
Thirteen of the 14 qualitative papers used interview quotations as the primary data 
analysis technique, and one used participation. Archival analysis was the most 
common secondary data analysis technique in eight papers followed by 
observations in five papers. One paper did not utilize secondary data analysis. 
The most common data analysis technique in five quantitative papers was 
structural equation modeling, whereas multiple regressions, correlation analysis, 
and Mann-Whitney U tests were utilized in two papers. In one paper, cluster 
analysis was used. Interviews were used in all mixed-method papers while in some 
mixed-method papers, multiple regressions, correlation analysis, Mann-Whitney U 
tests, and descriptive statistics were applied.     
7.3.3 Research setting 
The most popular research setting was manufacturing companies, followed by the 
service sector, health care, consumer goods, government/non-profit, marketing, and 
natural minerals. Several papers had multiple research settings. Six papers did not 
report a research setting, but further analysis showed the respondents were former 
students or members of the WHU – Otto Beisheim School of Management 








observed in # 
of papers  Percentage 
Manufacturing 16 36% 
Service (banking, consulting, telecommunications etc.) 12 27% 
Healthcare  5 11% 
Consumer goods  3 7% 
Government/non-profit 1 2% 
Marketing 1 2% 
Natural minerals 1 2% 
n/a 6 13% 
Total 45 100% 
 
7.3.4 Method theory 
Most papers utilized institutional theory as the method theory followed by 
contingency (see Table 4), role, organizational culture, agency, national culture, 
organizational change, organizational life cycle, practice, social identity, 
structuration, reasoned action, and upper echelon theory. More than one fourth of 
the papers did not report a method theory.  
Table 4: Method theory distribution 
  Method theory Authors # of papers  % 
Institutional  
Ahrens & Chapman (2000), Burns & 
Baldvinsdottir (2005), Goretzki et al. (2013), 
Granlund & Malmi (2002), Lambert & 
Sponem (2012), Yazdifar & Tsamenyi 
(2005) 6 18% 
Contingency 
Byrne & Pierce (2007), Chapman (1998), 
Hartmann & Maas (2011), Lind (2001) 4 12% 
Role 
Bechtold et al. (2014), Hopper (1980), Mass 
& Matejka (2009). 3 9% 
Agency 
Indjejikian & Matejka (2006), San Miguel & 
Govindarajan (1984) 2 6% 
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Organizational culture Järvenpää (2007), Morales & Lambert (2013) 2 6% 
National culture Granlund & Lukka (1998) 1 3% 
Organizational change Chenhall & Langfield-Smith (1998) 1 3% 
Organizational life-cycle Granlund & Taipaleenmäki (2005) 1 3% 
Practice (theory) Ahrens (1997) 1 3% 
Social identity Hiller et al. (2014) 1 3% 
Structuration  Caglio (2003) 1 3% 
Upper echelon Naranjo-Gil et al. (2009) 1 3% 
Theory of reasoned action Wolf et al. (2015) 1 3% 
n/a 
Chang et al. (2014), Cooper & Dart (2013), 
Friedman & Lyne (1997), Graham et al. 
(2012), Mouritsen (1996), Pierce & O'dea 
(2003), Sathe (1983), Verstegen et al. (2007), 
Zoni & Merchant (2007) 
9 26% 
Total   34 100% 
 
The first part of this paper and Appendix 1 ensured insights into the status of 
research on finance organizations’ roles. Now the paper turns to the second part of 
the review that responds specifically to Mahlendorf’s (2014) call and analyzes the 
development and distribution of finance organizations’ roles in empirical 
management accounting research. To clarify for the reader, this part of the review 
includes only 19 of the 34 papers. The decision to remove 15 papers is based on the 
criteria. The papers had to attach a label and a description to a role. We begin by 
introducing the CVF.    
7.4 The competing values framework 
Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1981) and several colleagues developed the CVF. It 
includes two dimensions, the structure dimension and the focus dimension (Quinn, 
1984). The dimensions form a continuum of competing values. In the focus 
dimension, the external focus is opposed to the internal focus (from left to right on 
the x-axis in Figure 2). The focus dimension is related to an internal micro-
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perspective on employees’ well-being and an external macro-perspective on 
organizational development and competitiveness (Quinn and Rohrbaugh, 1983). 
Thus, this dimension represents how organizations manage their internal 
components and simultaneously meet external challenges of competition, adaption, 
and growth. In the structure dimension, flexibility is in contrast to control (from top 
to bottom on the y-axis in Figure 1). This dimension is related to a focus on 
stability versus flexibility (Quinn and Rohrbaugh, 1983). The structure dimension 
embodies how organizations handle demands for change while maintaining 
stability.  
The dimensions form four quadrants. Moving clockwise, in the top right corner of 
Figure 2 is the open systems quadrant and then the rational goal quadrant, the 
internal process quadrant, and the human relations quadrant. The open systems 
quadrant stresses flexibility, growth, innovation, and creativity. The rational goal 
quadrant stresses task focus, goal clarity, cost-cutting, efficiency, and performance 
(Quinn and Rohrbaugh, 1983). The internal process quadrant stresses centralization 
and control, routines and formalization, stability, continuity and order, and 
predictable performance outcomes. The human relations quadrant stresses 
teamwork, participation, empowerment, and a concern for employee ideas (Quinn 
and Rohrbaugh, 1983). Each quadrant has a diagonal opposite quadrant with 
contrasting emphases. For example, the open quadrant model stresses flexibility in 
contrast to the internal process quadrant that, in turn, emphasizes control. In 
contrast, the juxtaposed quadrants share emphasis. For example, the rational goal 












Although certain quadrants and their values are in opposite locations, it does not 
mean that they are empirically or theoretically mutually exclusive. For example, 
organizations might be flexible and simultaneously maintain some control (Quinn 
and Rohrbaugh, 1983). However, as some organizations face different external and 
internal environments, different organizations might emphasize different quadrants.  
7.4.1 The second generation of the competing values framework 
Quinn (1984) further developed the CVF with eight roles (two in every quadrant) 
that were incorporated in a circular pattern based on the two dimensions. The open 
systems quadrant includes the innovator role and the broker role. The innovator is 
creative and envisions, encourages, and facilitates change while the broker is 
politically smart and maintains a unit’s external legitimacy through developing, 
scanning, and maintaining a network of external contacts.  
The rational goal quadrant includes the producer role and the director role. The 











Figure 2: The competing values framework  
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conclusions of the task while the director sets goals, clarifies roles, and establishes 
clear expectations. The internal process quadrant encompasses the coordinator role 
and the monitor role. The coordinator maintains the structure, does the scheduling, 
coordinates, solves problems, and ensures that standards are met while the monitor 
collects and distributes information, checks performance, and provides continuity 
and stability.  
Last, the HR quadrant includes the facilitator role and the mentor role. The 
facilitator encourages the expression of opinions, seeks consensus, and negotiates 
compromises. The mentor is aware of individual demands, listens actively, is fair, 
and supports legitimate requests and attempts to facilitate individuals’ development. 



























Figure 3: The second generation of the competing values framework 
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The second generation of the CVF was originally intended to measure leadership 
roles and effectiveness (Quinn, 1984). However, the focus is not only the finance 
manager or CFO. This paper uses the second-generation CVF to analyze the 
activities performed by actors at all hierarchical levels in the finance organization. 
Some finance personnel (the CFO, managers, controllers, and other personnel) 
perform multiple roles, and these roles can be incorporated in the CVF. For 
example, Burns and Baldvinsdottir (2005) found evidence of a finance organization 
giving strategic advice to operations that is related to the broker role, but the 
finance organization it also performed variance analysis which is related to the 
monitor role.  
7.4.2 Criteria for incorporating finance organizations’ roles in the CVF  
The following qualitative criteria are applied for including finance organizations’ 
roles in the CVF: 1) we include a finance organization role if it covers the 
characteristics of a role in the CVF, 2) if a finance organization role covers the 
characteristics of multiple roles it is included in multiple roles in the CVF. Most 
quantitative papers use factor analysis to form roles. The results from the factor 
analyses are used in the analysis. If factor analysis is not applied in the quantitative 
papers, the qualitative descriptions of roles are used in the present analysis. 
Regarding qualitative papers, their findings and qualitative descriptions of roles are 
used.  
7.5 Finance organizations’ roles and the CVF 
Table 5 includes labels and descriptions (and scales if quantitative) of finance 
organizations’ roles in the 19 papers and their corresponding CVF role. This 
section begins with a comparison of the roles’ labels and descriptions in the 
literature. In total, 22 labels are attached to 45 roles in the 19 papers. In section 5.4, 
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the CVF is used to analyze the distribution and development of finance 
organizations’ roles in empirical management accounting research.  
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Table 5: Finance organizations' roles' labels and descriptions related to CVF roles 
  Author Label Description Assigned CVF role(s) Scale 
Bechtold et al. Business Partnering 
Develops new strategies for the business 
and new  Innovator, Broker, Producer Frequency 1-5 
  
 
investment opportunities, finds new ways 









  Corporate Policeman 
Focuses on internal controls/procedures, 
ensures that  Monitor Frequency 1-5 
  
 
managers comply with financial 





develops reports for higher level 















  Score-Keeping 
Prepares financial reports, collects 
performance reports,  Coordinator, Monitor Frequency 1-5 
  
 
maintains data systems and prepares 
financial and  
 
  





Emphasized and gave advice to 









Helped with and were more engaged in 
day-to-day  Producer   
  
 
operational matters and decisions 
 
  
  Clerical Accountant Performed tasks such as month end close,  Coordinator, Monitor   
    
cash-flow analysis, budgets and variance 
analysis     
Caglio 
Hybrid: 
Amalgamation of FA 
and MA 
Tasks such as accounts payable, tax 
duties,  Coordinator, Monitor   
  
 













Extensive understanding of business and 
operations  Broker   
Chang et al Prfm. Mgmt. Impt. 
Monitoring of performance, aligning 
internal systems, Monitor, Facilitator, Mentor, Importance 1-5 
  
 
business improvement, driving cost 
reduction Producer   
  Strategic Partner 
Setting strategic directions and 
imperatives, presenting  Broker, Monotor Agreement 1-5 
  
 
performance metrics and information 
 
  
  RCCR importance 
Finance related compliance, internal 
controls  Monitor  Importance 1-5 
    and fiduciary and statutory reports.      
Cooper & Dart Advisory & Strategic 
Focus is on leadership, managing staff 
and 
Facilitator, Mentor, 
Producer Importance 1-4 
  
 
advisory activities, strategic financial 
planning and Broker   
  
 
management of projects. 
 
  
  Systems 
Mangement of projects and staff, 
management of  Producer, Coordinator, Importance 1-4 
  
 
IT-systems Mentor   
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  Emergent Issues 
 
Not applicable Importance 1-4 
  Financial  
Prepares statutory reports, analysis and 
application of Monitor Importance 1-4 
  
 




  Compliance 
 
Monitor, Producer Importance 1-4 
  Business Information 
Includes 
preparation/interpretation/communication 
of  Monitor, Producer Importance 1-4 
  
 
management accounting information, 
implementation of  
 
  
    management accounting systems     
Friedman & 
Lyne Bean Counter 
Produces financial information which 
was of little  Monitor   
    use in running the business efficiently     
Granlund & 
Lukka Bean Counter 
Has an internal focus, is an information 
collector, Monitor   
  
 








  Controller 
Has knowledge of the business in which 
the firm  Innovator, monitor   
  
 










    gets through      
Granlund & 
Malmi  Business Analyst 
Emphasizes value-adding activities 
related  Broker, Innovator, Producer,   
    managerial control and decision-making. Director   
Goretski et al.  Bean Counter 
Focused on reporting, standardization of 






  Reporter Development of a reporting system Monitor, Coordinator   
  Navigator control several different  Monitor, Coordinator   
  
 




    budgeting     
Graham et al. Fiduciary  
Focusses on reporting, forecasting, 
budgeting and control Monitor, Coordinator   
  Operational 
Focusses on commercial issues and 
project accounting Broker, Monitor   
  Strategic   Not applicable   
Hartmann & 
Maas Business Partner 
Analyzing profitability, reducing costs 
and increasing  Producer, Broker, Innovator Importance 1-5 
  
 






develops/evaluates local business 








  Corporate Policeman 
Develops internal controls/procedures, 





business unit comply with financial 





develops performance reports, assesses 





adhere to company regulations and 
ensures that BU 
 
  
    
managers do not spend more than 
necessary     
Hopper Book-keeper 
A scorer, implements/administrates 






  Service-aid 
Personalizes information and 
identifies/analyze problems Coordinator, Monitor n/a 
Järvenpää Business Partner 
Emphasized an increased business and 
future  Innovator, Broker   
    
orientation as well as good 
communication skills     
Lambert & 
Sponem Discrete Performed reporting and made sure that Monitor, Coordinator   
  
 




  Safeguard 
Emphasized reporting, preparation and 
monitoring  Monitor, Coordinator   
Lind  Business Partner 
Interacted extensively with different line-
employees  Producer   
    helping them to champion project     
Mouritsen Book-keeping Engages in compliance processes Monitor Importance 1-5 
  Consulting 
Business-orientation, collects and 
distributes information Broker, Monitor Importance 1-5 
  
 
and checks performance 
 
  
  Banking 
Focusses on internal aspects such as cash 
flow  Monitor Importance 1-5 
  
 
management and currency management 
 
  
  Controlling Performs budgeting and variance analysis Coordinator, Monitor Importance 1-5 
  Administration administration of debtors/creditors Monitor Importance 1-5 
Pierce & O'dea Business Partner 
Knowledge of the business, team-work 
skills and was  Broker. Facilitator   
    an integral part of management teams Mentor   
Sathe Involved controller Described management-service  Broker, Monitor n/a 
  
 





financial/internal reporting  
 
  
  Independent controller Described management-service  Broker, Monitor n/a 
  
 





Financial/internal reporting  
 
  
  Strong controller Described management-service  Broker, Monitor n/a 
  
 





financial/internal reporting  
 
  




7.5.1 Comparison of labels and descriptions in quantitative research 
Bechtold et al. (2014) used items from Hartmann and Maas (2011). However, 
Bechtold et al. (2014) modified the scale that measured business partner and 
corporate police roles and applied a frequency scale whereas Hartmann and Maas 
(2011) applied an importance scale. Only four papers explicitly used the same role 
labels; corporate policemen and business partners (Bechtold et al., 2014; Hartmann 
and Maas, 2011) and book-keeping (Hopper, 1980; Mouritsen, 1996). By 
calculating the similarities between items
14
 (a similar word stem of similar items 
divided by the total word stem of the similar items), this paper found that only 8 
percent of the total items shared an identical word stem equal to or more than 90 
percent. An additional 8 percent of the items shared a word stem equal to or more 
than 40 percent but less than 90 percent. Most of these items were part of different 
constructs. “Compliance” was an item (Chang et al., 2014) but also a construct 
(Cooper and Dart, 2013), and business partner(ing) was an item (Cooper and Dart, 
2013) but also a construct (Bechtold et al., 2014; Hartmann and Mass, 2011).  
7.5.2 Comparison of labels and descriptions in qualitative research 
Burns and Baldvinsdottir (2005) and Caglio (2003) used the label hybrid or 
hybridization. Caglio’s (2003) label had two meanings. One regarded the 
amalgamation of management accounting and financial accounting. The other 
regarded that controllers needed to gain knowledge of operations and business to 
                                                     
14
 Hopper (1980) was not included in this specific analysis as the paper did not specify 
constructs and items. 
  
 
(involvement in business decisions) and  
 
  
    Financial/internal reporting      
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become a business partner. Burns and Baldvinsdottir (2005) characterized two 
forms of hybrids: a finance analyst and a finance manager. Both interacted heavily 
with operations. The finance analyst primarily supported operations in day-to-day 
activities whereas the finance manager supported operations in strategic matters.  
Sathe’s (1983) “strong controller” shared features with Caglio’s (2003) 
hybridization. The label “business partner” was used by Goretzki et al. (2013), 
Järvenpää (2007), Lind (2001), and Pierce and O’dea (2003). Goretzki et al. (2013), 
Järvenpää (2007), and Pierce and O’dea (2003) shared a common feature of 
business partners: “knowledge of the business.” A similar feature was found in 
Granlund and Lukka’s (1998) definition of a “controller.” The “controller” label 
shared a common feature with Goretzki et al.’s (2013) and Lind’s (2001) definition 
of a business partner, and Sathe’s (1983) definition of an involved controller, 
namely, an emphasis on cross-functional interaction. Granlund and Lukka (1998) 
and Goretzki et al. (2013) found that decentralization was an important aspect in 
becoming “controllers” and “business partners,” respectively. The “bean counter” 
label was used by Friedman and Lyne (1997), Granlund and Lukka (1998) and 
Goretzki et al. (2013) and shared an emphasis on the production and reporting of 
financial information. The “clerical type” of controller (Burns and Baldvinsdottir, 
2005) produced financial information (month end close, cash-flow analysis, 
budgets, and variance analysis), as did Sathe’s (1983) independent controller. 
7.5.3 Comparison of labels and descriptions across methods 
Seven papers used the label “business partner/analyst.” Granlund and Malmi’s 
(2002) “business analyst” and Bechtold et al.’s (2014) and Hartmann and Maas’ 
(2011) “business partner” shared “analytical work” and “analyzing product and 
customer profitability . . . for the business.” Goretzki et al.’s (2013) “business 
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partner” supported firm growth, and “supporting firm growth” can be viewed as an 
umbrella under which several items from Bechtold et al.’s (2014) and Hartman and 
Maas’ (2011) “business partner” would fit. Järvenpää’s (2007) “business partner” 
provided economic support in strategic matters, and Bechtold et al.’s (2014) and 
Hartmann and Maas’ (2011) “business partner” developed new business strategies. 
7.5.4 The distribution and development of finance organizations’ roles  
In this section, the distribution and development of the roles are analyzed. The 
analysis is based on the results from examining the literature via the CVF. 
Fifty-five percent of the roles can be associated with the internal process quadrant, 
and 23 percent of the roles in the literature is associated with the open systems 
quadrant. Roles associated with the remaining quadrants are also found. Fifteen 
percent is associated with the rational goal quadrant while only 8 percent of the 
controller/finance department roles are associated with the HR quadrant. Looking 
at the individual roles in CVF, the monitor role captures most of the roles (39 
percent), and the coordinator and broker roles are associated with 16 percent and 
17 percent, respectively. The director role is associated with only 2 percent.  
Table 6: Role distributions  
    Facilitator 3%   Broker 17% 
Mentor  4% 
 
Innovator 5% 
HR  total 7% 
 
Open systems total 22% 
  
   
  
  












Table 6 shows that finance organizations’ roles associated with the roles in the HR 
quadrant are underrepresented. It might be that these roles are beyond the scope of 
the finance organizations’ activities. Further, it might be that finance organizations 
are not aware of the potential to perform these roles. For example, Russel et al. 
(1999) reported that “human resources and personnel” were the least critical work 
for finance organizations’ employees. Last, it might be that the corresponding 
departments and management do not believe that finance organizations have the 
skills to perform roles in the HR quadrant. However, there is a possibility that the 
lack of roles related to this quadrant represents omitted variables in research.  
 
Several descriptive studies claim that the roles of the finance organization are 
changing (e.g., Russel et al., 1999; Siegel et al., 1997), and Cooper (1996) argues 
that because of automation of some finance organization work, employees will be 
fewer but have different responsibilities. Does the change mean that the roles 
previously performed are substituted with new ones? Or does it mean that roles are 
added to existing ones?    
Table 7: Correlation between publication year and the number of different roles per paper 
  # Different roles 
Year 0.596** 
N 19 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 7 indicates that roles are added as the number of different roles increases 
over time. If the quadrants are examined in aggregate and the number of roles is 
summed through slightly more than three decades, then the evolution of the 





Figure 4 shows that the finance organizations’ roles in the literature have evolved 
from a continuum (from roles in the open systems quadrant to roles in the internal 
process quadrant) from 1980 to 1990, to becoming more multifaceted during the 
following decades.    
It is difficult to say whether the increasing number of different roles and the 
different role emphasis are functions of a real change in roles, a more 
comprehensive measurement, or increasing attention to an increasing number of 
roles and a broader role emphasis. Nonetheless, in the American Institute of 
                                                     
15
 We took the number of publications into account by dividing the sum of roles in each 









Figure 4: Changing role emphasis 
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Certified Public Accountants’ (1989) Big Eight white paper, consultancies stated 
that new tasks and roles were added to management accountants’ work, and Boer 
(2000) found that the number of topics in the management accounting education 
literature is increasing per publication year. In sum, there is evidence of a role 
change. However, old roles are not substituted with new roles. The number of roles 
is increasing, and the role emphasis is multidimensional. It is difficult to predict the 
future, but perhaps 10 years from now, more findings about finance organizations’ 
roles related to the HR quadrant will emerge.   
7.6 Survey instrument 
In this section, a survey instrument for future research on finance organizations’ 
roles is proposed. The instrument builds on the experiences that were gained by 
reviewing the 19 papers, and it is based on the CVF. 
It is not postulated that finance organizations should perform all roles in the CVF. 
Role emphasis can be a function of environmental characteristics, firm 
characteristics, the characteristics of managers/CFO in the finance organization, 
etc. (see the findings in Appendix 1), and might even be idiosyncratic. Likewise, 
extensive role emphasis in one quadrant can reduce the possibility for emphasizing 
other quadrants equally when resources are scarce. However, we posit that 
researchers should, ex ante, be open to the possibility that finance organizations 
perform roles that are related to all quadrants in the CVF to reduce the risk of 
omitted variables and enrich the research with a broader perspective on this topic.  
We put forward the following survey instrument to assist research on finance 
organizations’ roles. Quantitative researchers can use the survey instrument as a 
questionnaire while qualitative researchers can use it as a tool for inspiration for an 
interview guide. The survey instrument is based on the reviewed 19 papers that 
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included labels and descriptions of finance organizations’ roles, and covers the 
roles in all quadrants. Authors, labels, and descriptions of specific roles and the 
associated role in the CVF quadrants are depicted. Items from quantitative 
literature, as well as findings from qualitative literature are included. As suggested 
by Mahlendorf (2014), and to reduce the risk of social desirability bias, the survey 
instrument includes questions covering activities and not roles directly. We suggest 
a frequency scale to capture the extent to which finance organization employees 
perceive the roles to be part of their work activity (Floyd and Wooldridge, 1992). 
Furthermore, we propose a labeled Likert scale from 1 to 7 as it has been shown to 
reduce measurement error and response bias (Eustler and Lang, 2015). As finance 
organizations’ roles associated with the roles in the HR quadrant are under-
represented in the literature three items were developed in the HR quadrant to 
ensure that the survey instrument is balanced. In addition, one item was developed 







The survey instrument is also helpful for measuring finance organizations’ 
efficiency. For example, if researchers and practitioners investigate optimization 
effects, they need to consider not only the relative number of full-time employees 
(FTEs) employed in finance organizations but also the relative role coverage. 
Using the survey instrument, researchers and practitioners can avoid characterizing 
finance organizations only by emphasizing the roles in the internal process 
quadrant as more efficient than finance organizations that cover roles in multiple 
quadrants and thus, potentially, have more FTEs. 
7.7 Discussion and future research  
The evidence from the literature shows that finance organization roles are 
determined by external and internal company factors, factors within the finance 
organization, and among employees themselves. In this section, we elaborate on 
prominent findings in the papers and discuss ideas for future research. A summary 
of the papers’ findings is provided in Appendix 1.   
Currently, it seems that the implementation of a well-functioning enterprise 
resource planning systems (ERPS) affects finance organization roles by 
automatizing some reporting and compliance processes that, in turn, can free up 
capacity for employees in finance organizations making other business-oriented 
activities possible (Byrne and Pierce, 2007; Chang et al., 2014; Granlund and 
Malmi, 2002) and foster interaction between finance organizations and other 
personnel blurring functional boundaries (Caglio, 2003; Goretzki et al., 2013; 
Järvenpäa, 2007). A possible challenge for finance organizations with well-
functioning ERPS might be that it can legitimize companies to lay off employees 
as the need for their reporting and compliance activities is reduced. Furthermore, as 
some reporting is taken over by software, it might reduce finance organizations’ 
sense of power from being the favored information provider (Mouritsen, 1996). 
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CFOs with a business-oriented background and shorter tenure might negate this 
development by finding new roles for finance organizations as they have been 
found to be more creative and more experimental with innovative management 
accounting systems (Naranjo-Gil et al., 2009). A future research possibility is to 
investigate whether an ERPS implementation fosters a loss of power or, 
alternatively, increases the performance of reporting and compliance processes, 
and the performance of business-oriented activities legitimizing expanding roles 
for the finance organization. If ERPS improves the quality of reporting and 
internal/external compliance processes, the system might lead to an improved 
foundation for performing activities related to roles in the open systems quadrant. 
Furthermore, the implementation of ERPS will foster discussions with other 
personnel. This might lead to that Finance organization employees achieve a richer 
understanding of what to report and how to report it, and a richer understanding of 
how they can support corresponding departments.   
Another prominent factor in some of the papers is environmental uncertainty. One 
would expect that environmental uncertainty demands extensive interaction 
between the finance organization and other personnel as employees in the finance 
organization themselves attempt to piece together the meaning of changing 
information and results, and then communicate these results and information to 
other personnel (Chapman, 1998). In contrast, when the environment is stable, 
there might not be a need for extensive interaction between the finance 
organization and other personnel as information and results are easier to interpret 
and communicate. However, the evidence for how environmental uncertainty 
affects finance organization roles is mixed. Byrne and Peirce (2007) found that 
increased monitoring was necessary because of environmental uncertainty. 
Hartmann and Maas (2011) did not find a relationship between the business partner 
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role or the corporate policeman role and environmental uncertainty. Mouritsen 
(1996) found a negative relationship between the consulting role and 
environmental uncertainty whereas Chang et al. (2014) found positive significant 
relationships among RCCR importance, performance management importance, 
strategic partner importance, and environmental uncertainty. A possible 
explanation for Mouritsen’s findings might be that the finance organization, 
through its consulting competencies and interaction with other personnel, reduces 
their perception of environmental uncertainty (Mouritsen, 1996). However, he 
surveyed only finance organization personnel so the explanation remains uncertain. 
A future research opportunity is to apply either a dyadic questionnaire or to 
conduct case research. It might be that finance organizations perceive the 
environment to be uncertain, but by applying appropriate management control 
systems and by performing appropriate roles, other functional areas will not share 
this perception. 
This paper found that the role emphasis of finance organizations has broadened 
over time. Furthermore, it found that some finance organizations perform opposing 
roles in the opposite diagonals of the CVF. For example, Burns and 
Baldvinsdottir’s (2005) roles were incorporated in the open systems quadrant and 
the internal process quadrant as they ensured that resources were used efficiently 
by performing variance analysis. However, they also supported operations 
providing advice on strategic matters. Thus, this finance organization supports the 
firm with respect to both exploration and exploitation which are the characteristics 
of ambidextrous organizations (He and Wong, 2004). An interesting path for future 
research is to shed more light on how and if finance functions enable firms to both 
explore and exploit.  
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In as much as the roles of finance functions appear to be broadening, most prior 
research has still distinguished between two roles (e.g.: Granlund and Lukka, 1998; 
Hartman and Mass, 2011; Maas and Matejka, 2009). We argue that future research 
can benefit from being more open to that finance functions can occupy different 
and an increasing number of roles than the two roles that are often studied. 
Furthermore, we argue that a broader research perspective on finance function roles 
increases the likelihood of research providing evidence on how finance functions 
can create value for firms (cf. Hartmann and Maas, 2011).   
Another future research possibility is to investigate complementarities between 
roles. Sathe (1983) argued that roles in finance organizations could be 
complementary. However, Hartmann and Maas (2011) did not find evidence of 
complementarity between the business partner role and the corporate cop role. On 
the contrary, by correlating residuals from their main regressions, Chang et al. 
(2014) found that all three roles were complementary. As pointed out by Grabner 
and Moers (2013) and Mahlendorf (2014), this approach assumes that managers 
make optimal choices when choosing roles and role emphases. The evidence of 
change in finance organization roles suggests that managers are still experimenting 
with new roles. Thus, regressing an interaction term of the roles on performance 
(Mahlendorf, 2014) seem more viable, or alternatively, authors could use the 
proposed survey instrument to develop a second-order construct using structural 
equation modeling and test the relations between the individual roles and 
performance, and the second-order construct and performance (Tanriverdi and 
Venkatraman, 2005). 
None of the papers reviewed investigated possible relationships between firms’ 
financial goal attainment and the roles of the finance organizations. It seems 
plausible that different degrees of attainment discrepancy between budgets and 
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goals affect the roles of finance organizations. Lant and Montgomery (1987) 
investigate how attainment discrepancy affects companies’ risk-taking behavior, 
companies’ innovative behavior regarding new customers, markets, and products, 
and innovative behavior in operational processes. They found that attainment 
discrepancy is positively related to both types of behaviors. In a finance 
organization perspective, and if finance organizations have a say, then these 
processes could be related to roles in the open systems quadrant in the proposed 
survey instrument. However, when firms face financial distress to a higher extent, 
tight budgetary controls might be needed (Van der Stede, 2001). The processes 
associated with tight budget controls can be related to roles in the internal process 
and the rational goal quadrant in the proposed survey instrument.  
Last, albeit academics, consultancies, and practitioners continue to claim that there 
is a need for role change, there are pitfalls with an increased business orientation 
and new roles and tasks for finance organizations’ personnel. For example, new 
tasks that are normally perceived positively by finance organizations’ employees 
can be polluted meaning that they are compatible with, for example, a business 
partner role and even prestigious for the finance organizations’ employees. 
However, the tasks can be perceived as demeaning as the audience repositions 
them instead enforcing a devalued identity for the finance organizations’ 
employees (Morales and Lambert, 2013). If that is the case, then the new tasks and 
roles of finance organizations can be used politically which might foster tensions 
and conflicts between finance organizations and other departments, and between 
other departments. A positive attitude from other departments thus seems important 
if the new tasks and roles for finance organizations are to be implemented 
successfully (Hiller et al., 2014; Wolf et al., 2015). This positive attitude can be 
achieved by the finance organization legitimizing its new tasks and roles, for 
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example, by indicating the ability to add value to management (Järvenpäa, 2007) 
and/or to show to other functions that they deserve legitimacy by proving the value 
of the new tasks and roles (Goretzki et al., 2013). This task, of course, is not easy 
as other functional areas might feel that the finance organization is moving onto 
their turf potentially reducing the need for their services. That may be an 
explanation for the lack of recent large-scale descriptive findings regarding the 
expanding or changing roles of finance organizations (e.g., Accenture, 2011; Ernst 
& Young, 2010). Another point to raise in this context is the potential of robotics. 
In a survey by Deloitte (2015), respondents reported that there was a 50 percent 
chance that their traditional finance organization work efforts would be overtaken 
by robotics. This will leverage the need for finance organizations to legitimize their 
potential to perform other tasks, for example, the HR roles in the proposed survey 
instrument, as they seem to be unknown territory for finance organizations today. 
Ernst & Young (2016) argue that the potential for robotics is related not only to the 
automation of traditional tasks. They argue that robotics can deal with large 
amounts of data from internal and external sources, such as social media, and 
robotics can recognize texts and graphical information. Robotics can also 
contribute with initial business analyses, insights, and conclusions. If the latter is 
the case, then robotics could leverage finance organizations’ contribution to 
strategic and operational decision-making. However, robotics can possibly take 
over finance organizations’ place in business decisions, making it necessary for 
finance organizations to legitimize themselves in other playing fields in their firms. 
How finance organizations are affected by and how they will cope with robotics is 





7.8 Conclusions and limitations 
This paper reviewed the status of empirical management accounting research on 
finance organizations’ roles within the 1980–2015 timeframe. It used Shields’ 
(1997) framework to structure the review, responded to Mahlendorf’s (2014) call 
for analysis and comparison of the labels and descriptions of finance organization 
roles, and analyzed the distribution and development of finance organizations’ 
roles in research. From a positive perspective, several method theories have been 
used. Institutional theory has been utilized the most which makes sense given that 
Zorn (2004) found that institutional factors accelerated the development of the 
CFO role. The CFO role quickly became the norm in firms, and it initiated the 
increasing prominence of finance organizations. It also makes sense that 
contingency theory is the second most frequently applied theory. One would expect 
that external factors affect the finance organization either directly or indirectly 
through the firm and that these effects determine whether a specific role emphasis 
in a given context is appropriate or not. There is almost an equal distribution 
between quantitative and qualitative papers, and several papers apply mixed 
research methods. The latter is positive as such a combination can provide 
substantial learning about management accounting (Ittner and Larcker, 2002). 
Research on finance organizations’ roles has primarily been conducted in the 
manufacturing industry followed closely by the service industry. These two sectors 
comprise more than half of the research settings altogether. However, there is still 
much to explore about how these sectors affect the roles of finance organizations as 
their effects are rarely elaborated in much detail (see also Messner, 2016). 
Furthermore, for many other industries, only sparse knowledge of their effects on 
finance organizations’ roles is available. This is a challenge and an opportunity as 
industry-specific contexts might affect the roles of finance organizations to a great 
extent albeit Chang et al. (2014) found only limited evidence. 
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Finance organizations have been called to move further than their traditional roles. 
Descriptive studies have not shown consistent evidence. Analyzing the research on 
finance organizations’ roles via the CVF, this paper has shown that academia has 
been slightly more consistent as the number of roles is increasing with publication 
date. For a longer period of time, management control systems have collected and 
provided information to several different playgrounds in companies, and the results 
indicate that finance organizations are also beginning to participate in other 
functions’ turfs. However, a point of concern is that especially quantitative papers 
almost exclusively use different labels and items in questionnaires. This paper 
concurs with Mahlendorf (2014) in as much as it makes it difficult to establish a 
sound body of knowledge on this topic. As much as it is a concern, it is also an 
opportunity for future research. This paper has attempted to assist future research 
by developing a survey instrument based on the CVF and the literature on finance 
organizations’ roles. The instrument can serve as a questionnaire for quantitative 
researchers and support qualitative researchers during their engagement with the 
field. The instrument is also useful for practitioners as they can use it to measure 
the efficiency of their specific finance organization. Furthermore, this paper has put 
forward several research ideas intended to catalyze exciting new research 
endeavors. Altogether, this paper provides a comprehensive insight into the status 
of empirical management accounting research on finance organizations’ roles, and 
this paper can guide future research. 
As with any other type of paper, this review has limitations. A particular limitation 
is the research inquiries that might neglect papers on this topic. Another limitation 







Author  Topic Findings 
Ahrens (1997) 
Everyday practice of MAs in 
Germany and Britain 
He found that management accountants in Germany kept a distance from and were 
detached from everyday operational matters and strategic planning in the 
companies. Instead, MAs dealt with departments’ execution of the companies’ 
strategy not by being involved in planning and execution but more by keeping 
score of departments' activities using formal frameworks. Economic planning in 
operational departments and strategic planning were beyond the scope of 
management accountants as they believed that they did not had the tools to do so. 
Instead, they focused on getting management’s in other departments’ ends to meet. 
Thus, management accountants in German breweries saw themselves as 
supporters, not proactive interactors. The opposite was found in British breweries. 
Here, they were proactively involved in planning and executing strategy, e.g., by 
deciding what product to produce. They were also involved in everyday matters, 
such as helping salespeople decide which deals to pursue.  
Ahrens and Chapman (2000) 
Occupational identity of MAs 
in Germany and Britain 
Management accountants in GB aspired to the job because of the high salary and 
easy education. In Germany, a job as a controller was not only the best alternative. 
German controllers also figured that to become a member of management, 
controlling was a great path. German controllers also saw themselves as 
moderators between senior staff and line management. However, German 
controllers were more distant in business and operational matters while British 
management accountants increased their organizational responsibilities by 
achieving operational and technical skills.  
Bechtold et al. (2014) Multi-role job profile of MAs 
They found that multi-role controllers (i.e., controllers with a broad scope of 
responsibilities) were more likely to face incompatible role expectations. 
Furthermore, they found that controllers with broad responsibilities also 
encountered conflicts due to work overload or divergent values or standards. 
However, they did not find issues of incompatible role expectations adversely 
affected job satisfaction, and they found that job satisfaction was improved by the 
increased influence at work caused by the broad scope of responsibilities.  
Byrne and Pierce (2007) 
Antecedents, characteristics 
of, and consequences for the 
roles of MAs 
They found several factors affect the roles of finance organizations: ERP systems 
that reduce repetitive work free up capacity for other tasks, uncertain environments 
foster a need for monitoring, and regulations increase the need for compliance. In 
small firms, MAs work horizontally to a higher extent whereas in bigger firms, 
MAs have a predefined role. Most essential in determining the roles of MAs is the 
demand for tasks placed on them by the company, the educational background for 
MAs, and the tenure of the MAs. In addition, operational managers and MAs had a 
different perspective on how MAs could contribute. Operational managers 
perceived MAs interaction as hijacking the decision process and fit poorly to 
operational decision-making while MAs thought the opposite. 




Burns  Baldvinsdottir (2005) Role change for MAs 
MAs were clerical, performing tasks such as month end close, cash-flow analysis, 
and budgets. Because of an increased competitive environment, the case company 
implemented a process method of working, and MAs were financial analysts 
working closely together with operations and supporting them in day-to-day 
matters. MAs were also finance managers advising operational managers on 
strategic matters and risks. Operational personnel performed many of the tasks 
previously performed by MAs. 
Caglio (2003) ERP  MA roles 
Implementation of ERP transformed the role of accountants in two ways: The 
financial accountants’ and MAs’ roles were amalgamated, and the ERP system 
blurred functional boundaries as it considered entire work processes. This led to a 
redefinition of the relationship between workers and accountants and moved the 
role of accountants toward “hybridization” (i.e., the accountants’ responsibilities 
and competencies were more broadly defined). 
Chang et al. (2014) Determinants of MA roles 
Found that the roles of finance organizations were determined by several company 
and external characteristics. They reported too many to mention here, but the 
important relationships were the following: Information systems integration was 
positively associated with the importance of RCCR (internal control/risk 
management activities), performance management activities, and strategic partner 
activities. There were national differences in role importance. Sector differences, 
size, growth, and organizational change also affected the three roles differently. 
They also identified gaps between the importance of finance organizations’ roles 
and the perceived effectiveness of those roles. Furthermore, they found evidence of 
complementarity among the finance organizations’ roles. 
Chapman (1998) 
Environmental uncertainty 
and MAs’ roles 
In one company, the finance organization played a prominent role in supporting 
other personnel because of high environmental uncertainty and shifting 
environments. The finance organization communicated heavily with other 
personnel about prior, current and future performance, expectations, and planning. 
In another company affected by environmental uncertainty, this was not the case as 
communication was substituted with complex software that spread information to 
other personnel. The finance organization sorted and manipulated the information 
passed on to other personnel, however. In one company that was not challenged by 
environmental uncertainty, the finance organization interacted heavily with other 
personnel in planning and evaluation but not in everyday matters. In the last 
company, not challenged by environmental uncertainty, the finance organization 
did not interact with other personnel to a high extent. 
Chenhall and Langfield-Smith 
(1998) 
Factors influencing how 
MA’s influenced the 
development of performance 
measures 
They found five factors affecting how MAs influenced the development of 
performance measures: 1) A shared belief that the finance organization could play 
a role in change programs, 2) the level of senior management support for the 
development of innovative MAs, 3) the presence of a MA master, 4) the level of 
technical and social skills of MAs, and 5) the hierarchical position of MAs in the 
companies. In three of five companies, MAs participated in developing 
performance measures.  
Cooper and Dart (2013) 
The importance of various 
MA activities 
They found that decentralized accountants ascribed more importance to advisory 
and strategic and emergent issues than centralized accountants. Furthermore, they 
found that the relative importance of strategic and advisory and compliance 




Friedman and Lyne (1997) 
The implementation of ABC 
and the resulting view of the 
bean counter role 
In six of 11 cases, they found that activity-based techniques required more 
interaction between MAs and operational managers and improved their mutual 
relationship. Further, because of the increased interaction, the view of MAs as 
merely bean counters was fading. 
Goretzki et al. (2013) 
Changes in the finance 
organization driven by a 
newly appointed CFO 
The appointment of a new CFO changed the MAs’ roles from bean counters to 
business partners and innovators. The CFO brought with him new ideas about how 
employees of the finance organization should work, implemented a new ERP 
system, and decentralized some MAs to other functional areas, such as marketing, 
manufacturing, and logistics.  
Graham et al. (2012) 
Exploration of financial 
controller roles  
Found that the traditional role (the fiduciary role and to some extent, the 
operational role) of financial accountants had not diminished. Instead, the 
traditional role was supplemented by tasks that are more concerned with the 
business as a whole. Furthermore, they found that the financial controllers believed 
that their role should be expanded. They did not investigate the antecedents of 
management accountants’ roles. 
Granlund and Lukka (1998) 
Investigation of how Finnish 
culture affects controllers in 
operations and 
communication 
Finnish culture affected MAs’ roles, and a transition among roles was present. 
MAs’ roles transitioned from bean counters to controllers. However, this transition 
was realized only for MAs who worked in companies undergoing decentralization.  
Granlund and Malmi (2002) 
ERP implementation and 
MAs’ roles 
ERPS automatized daily routing work and freed up capacity enabling MAs to 
move from bean counters to business analysts in some cases. Most remained bean 
counters but aspired to be business analysts in the future. 
Granlund and Taipaleenmäki 
(2005) 
Investigation of management 
accounting and control in a 
new economy firm  
They found that the roles of the finance organization become more active and 
analytical when companies move forward in their life cycles. The roles move from 
1) historian and watchdog to 2) roles as advisors, consultants, and change agents 
and 3) ultimately, business partners. However, preparing financial statements, etc., 
continued to be important regardless of the current role. Thus, the roles were not 
substituted; they were expanded. 
Hartmann and Maas (2011) 
Investigation of the effects of 
uncertainty on budget use and 
controller roles 
They found that the enabling use of budgets was positively associated with a 
higher emphasis on controllers’ business partner role. Enabling use of budgets was 
also positively associated with the corporate policeman role. Furthermore, they 
found that coercive use of budgets was positively associated with a higher 
emphasis on controllers’ corporate policeman role, and they found that task 
uncertainty was positively associated with the business partner role while 
environmental uncertainty was not associated with either role. The impact of other 
business units (how much the focal business unit was affected by other business 
units) was positively associated with the business partner role while the impact on 
other business units was not.  
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Hiller et al. (2014) 
Investigation of MAs’ 
occupational prestige 
They found that higher perceived occupational prestige (i.e., how MA’s perceived 
other personnel’s attitude toward MA’s) led to a higher level of professional and 
organizational identification and to lower organizational and professional conflict. 
In addition, perceived occupational prestige indirectly through organizational and 
professional conflict reduced MAs’ turnover intentions. A positive attitude toward 
MA’s in companies thus seems to be important in reducing possible conflicts 
between the general values of MA’s and their company also reducing MAs’ 
intention to find other companies to work for.  
Hopper (1980) Role conflicts of MAs 
He found that in general, managers wanted more interaction with accountants. 
Furthermore, when managers were asked what their accountant’s role should be, 
only two of 12 managers restricted it to the book-keeping role-related tasks. 
Indjejikian and Matejka (2006) 
How business unit controllers 
focus affect organizational 
slack 
They found partial evidence of higher organizational slack when business units 
(represented by controllers) had more knowledge than the corporate headquarters 
(information asymmetry). Likewise, they found that organizational slack is higher 
when business unit controllers focus more on providing information for local 
decision-making rather than for central organizational control. However, at the 
same time, a local focus by business unit controllers is beneficial for the business 
unit.  
Järvenpää (2007) Change in MA culture 
Because of business change, the case company reorganized and implemented new 
management accounting systems and ERP. These changes fostered interaction 
among MAs and other staff, and shifted MAs’ focus from short to long term, from 
historic to future orientation and from pure financial matters to business processes 
and strategies making management accountants business partners.  
Lambert and Sponem (2012) Investigation of MAs’ roles 
Found four roles for the finance organization with different logics, activities, 
positioning, clients, and authority. These roles, in turn, had different positive and 
negative effects at the organizational and individual levels. 
Lind (2001) 
Investigation of how a 
company’s world class 
manufacturing (WCM) 
affected MAs 
The case company implemented WCM. This affected MAs to function more as 
business partners. They now help champion operations projects; they also 
emphasize non-financial measures and provide more disaggregate information to 
line staff.  
Maas and Matejka (2009) 
Role conflicts and role 
ambiguity of business units 
controllers 
They studied business unit controllers’ dual and conflicting demands. They found 
that even though business unit controllers were willing to compromise functional 
duties within “some range,” an emphasis on their functional responsibility 
(responsibility to HQ) was negatively associated with the controllers’ ability to 
support local decision-making and induce role ambiguity and role conflict (because 
of the simultaneous occurrence of several pressures or unclear job demands). In 
addition, role conflict and role ambiguity are associated with misreporting. Thus, 
business unit controllers respond to role conflict and ambiguity by misreporting 
probably to deal with role stress. 
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Morales and Lambert (2013) The perception of MAs’ work 
They found that business partner–oriented tasks (normally perceived positively) 
could be viewed as polluted (meaning tasks that are compatible with the business 
partner role and maybe even prestigious for MAs but have the potential of being 
perceived as demeaning as the audience repositions those tasks instead enforcing a 
devalued identity). For example, the creation of business reports intended to 
influence the organization to make the right decision by one MA (normally 
perceived positively), but instead, they were used as rigid frameworks upstream 
and to impose decisions by the vice CFO. They also found that although increasing 
business orientation avoided unclean work (work not compatible with MAs’ work 
identity), it generated more polluted work.   
Mouritsen (1996) 
Exploration of finance 
organizations’ roles 
Mouritsen found that accounting departments’ work is infrequently related to 
macro-organizational (contingency) factors. However, environmental uncertainty 
was negatively associated with the consulting role, as were financial firm 
characteristics. Internationalization was negatively associated with the book-
keeping role, while firm size (revenue) was positively related to this role. 
Internationalization, organization size, and financial firm were positively 
associated with the banking role while service firm was negatively associated. 
None of the chosen contingency factors were positively associated with the 
controller and administration role. Instead, he found that finance organizations’ 
roles are mostly determined by interaction with senior management and line 
functions (e.g., their demand for finance organizations’ work), and he argued that 
the roles were determined by what finance organizations wanted to do themselves 
in companies yet ultimately determined by demand.  
Naranjo-Gil et al. (2009) 
CFO role in management 
accounting systems’ 
innovation 
They found that younger, business-oriented CFOs (measured by their education) 
with a shorter tenure tend to adopt more innovative management accounting 
systems than their counterparts. Likewise, they found that companies’ tendency to 
be prospectors interacted positively with business-oriented CFOs and CFO tenure 
(shorter) in affecting the use of innovative management accounting systems.  
Pierce and O’dea (2003) 
 
They identified several differences in the perceptions of managers and MAs. 
Typically, MAs over-rated the quality of the information they provided to the 
managers. In addition, there were differences in the perceived use of management 
accounting techniques by MAs and managers that suggest managers supplement 
information received from MAs with information from others. Managers generally 
perceived the information provided by MAs as driven by accounting rules rather 
than their needs. However, in some instances, MAs were important members in 
different aspects of operations and business. Managers wanted MAs to act as 
business partners, e.g., by being in close physical proximity with operational 
managers fostering business and operations understanding and an understanding of 
the managers’ information needs. However, some MAs were reluctant to pursue 
this transformation as they feared losing hierarchical control.  
Comparison of the 
perceptions of MAs and 
managers in the same 
organizations 
regarding information 
supplied by the MA function 
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San Miguel and Govindarajan 
(1984) 
The use of internal and 
external compliance auditing, 
the use of financial audit data, 
and controller independence  
They found that companies used internal and external compliance audits to a 
higher extent in firms with lower division controller independence compared to 
firms with higher division controller independence. In addition, they found that 
companies used financial internal audit data to a higher extent in firms with lower 
division controller independence than in firms with higher controller 
independence. Thus, less independence between division controllers and corporate 
fostered the use of more audits/controls to ensure the independence of the division 
controller.  
Sathe (1983) 
Controllers’ involvement in 
management 
Found evidence of four controller roles according to their responsibility and the 
involvement in and contribution to management decision-making,  
Verstegen et al. (2007) 
An exploratory study to 
classify controllers by 
activities 
Found that the following triggers were statistically significant in predicting MAs’ 
roles: The greater someone’s financial expertise, the more likely he or she is an 
information adapter; the more someone is a line member, the more likely he or she 
is a watchman; the larger an organization, the more likely someone is a watchman. 
The bigger the effect of information and telecommunications technology had on 
control, the more someone is bound to be an information adapter; the more rational 
someone is, the more likely he or she is a watchman; the more someone is 
extrovert, the more often he or she is classified as an information adapter.  
Wolf et al. (2015) 
Investigates whether MAs’ 
individual attitude and 
subjective norms are 
associated with business 
partner behavior and whether 
the actual behavior 
(involvement in decision-
making) is associated with 
increased organizational 
performance 
They found that MAs’ actual business partner behavior was determined by their 
subjective norm  (how MAs perceive that colleagues are important to them, e.g., 
general managers, expect and value their contributions to decision-making), rather 
than their personal attitude (how MAs themselves value their contributions to 
decision-making). Further, business partner behavior was positively associated 
with general managers’ perceptions of the contributions from that finance 
organization that, in turn, were positively associated with company internal 
efficiency and company process improvement.   
Yazdifar and Tsamenyi (2005) 
Comparison of independent 
and dependent organizations 
regarding to management 
accounting change and the 
role of MAs 
They found only a few significant differences between MAs working in 
independent vs. dependent companies: Analytical/interpretive skills were ranked as 
more important to management accountants in independent companies. Further, 
MAs in independent companies ranked integrating financial and non-financial 
information as more important than management accountants in dependent 
companies. There was no statistical difference in how management accountants 
were perceived (i.e., their role) by managers.  
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Zoni and Merchant (2007) 
Controller involvement in 
management 
They found that controllers were involved managers in larger Italian companies, 
and they contributed to strategic and operational decision-making. Controller 
involvement in strategic decision-making was positively associated with firm 
capital intensity and with the formalization of strategic planning and budgeting 
processes and negatively related to line management financial expertise. 
Involvement in operating decision-making was positively associated with line-
management financial expertise and negatively associated with the use of 
controller positions as training for line roles. Additionally, they found a positive 
correlation between controller involvement in management and profit margin 
growth. 
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Purpose – This paper studies the complementarity and the simultaneous use of 
multiple finance function roles, the effects on behavioral differentiation and the 
number of full-time equivalents in the finance function, and in turn, the relationship 
between behavioral differentiation and perceived finance function performance and 
firm financial performance.  
Design/methodology/approach – The paper uses structural equation modeling to 
analyze data from 408 firms operating in the manufacturing and services sectors. 
Furthermore, it utilizes a dyadic approach to analyze a subsample of 107 
respondents to study the interrater-item agreement of the main variables. The paper 
also introduces a second-order factor model to the management accounting 
literature in order to investigate the complementarity among finance function roles.   
Findings – The paper shows that the simultaneous use and complementarity of 
finance function roles are positively related to behavioral differentiation. Only one 
role is positively related to behavioral differentiation in isolation. Moreover, the 
simultaneous use and complementarity among the entire set of finance function 
roles are also positively related to the number of full-time equivalents employed by 
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the finance function. However, behavioral differentiation is positively related to 
perceived finance function performance and return on invested capital. Thus, there 
appears to be no trade-off between emphasizing only a few finance function roles 
compared with emphasizing them all.    
Research limitations/implications – The paper applies a paradoxical perspective 
to the finance function roles in order to predict that the roles are complementary, 
and the paper expands the debate on whether different finance function roles are 
substitutes or complementary. It also shows that finance functions potentially 
create value for firms with respect to perceived finance function performance and 
return on invested capital.  
Practical implications – Decision-makers in firms should not hesitate to expand 
the roles of finance functions. Although the simultaneous use and complementarity 
of all roles increase the number of full-time equivalents employed in the finance 
function, the benefits from emphasizing all roles outweigh the costs.  
Originality/value – This paper provides large-scale evidence of the 
complementarity among multiple finance function roles and shows how finance 
functions can create value for firms. It also relies on the competing values 
framework to develop items that measure finance function roles. Furthermore, it 
expands the two-role taxonomy often applied in previous research as this paper 
identifies four finance function roles. The paper is the first to use a second-order 
model that captures the covariance and multilateral interactions among finance 




Research on the roles of finance functions dates back more than half a century 
(Anderson, 1944; Simon et al., 1954). Researchers have focused on the broadening 
roles and responsibilities for finance functions, and the antecedents of these 
developments (Granlund and Lukka, 1998; Maas and Matejka, 2009; Hartman and 
Mass, 2011). It is common for this research stream to distinguish between two 
types of finance function roles on opposite ends of a continuum. The roles are often 
referred to as the corporate policeman and the business partner. Corporate 
policemen are assigned tasks such as monitoring functional performance and 
ensuring that functions comply with budgetary boundaries and external regulations. 
Business partners, however, are typically seen as providing strategic advice and 
supporting managerial decision-making. A few previous studies have also focused 
on the interplay between the dual roles, and the studies can be divided into two 
groups: One suggests that the roles are substitutes (Maas and Matejka, 2009) while 
the other suggests that the two roles are complements (Sathe, 1983). The contrast 
between the corporate policeman and the business partner role is often referred to 
as an independence-dependence dilemma (Bechtold et al., 2014), and much 
previous research focuses on controllers as units of analysis (Granlund and Lukka, 
1998; Caglio, 2003). However, notable exceptions focusing on the entire finance 
function are Chang et al. (2014), Lambert and Sponem (2012) and Mouritsen 
(1996). We focus on the finance function as the unit of analysis, and the main 
purpose of this study is contribute to the debate on complementarity between roles 
of finance functions (Mahlendorf, 2014). We utilize a paradoxical perspective 
(Schad et al., 2016) and study the relation between the simultaneous use and 
complementarity of finance function roles and behavioral differentiation (BD) and, 
in turn, the relation between BD and performance. In previous research, finance 
function roles were theoretically vaguely developed (Mahlendorf, 2014). We use 
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the competing values framework (CVF; Cameron et al., 2014) as guidance for 
developing items pertaining to the roles of finance functions. We use the CVF 
because it captures our paradoxical perspective on finance function roles, and 
consequentially, we develop four finance function roles.  
According to Ennen and Richter (2010), there are two approaches to test for 
complementarity: One is a reductionist approach focusing on the interaction 
between two variables while the other is a holistic approach focusing on the 
complementarity between multiple variables (Ennen and Richter, 2010). We apply 
the holistic approach and utilize the procedure developed by Tanriverdi and 
Venkatranam (2005) to construct a second-order factor structural equation model 
(SEM) capturing the covariance and multilateral interactions between multiple 
finance function roles, as well as the effects of the second-order factor on BD. This 
model is compared with a first-order SEM model that conceptualizes finance 
function roles as first-order factors and explores their additive effects on BD. We 
argue that this test for complementarity is superior to other procedures such as 
various regression analyses.  
We use a sample of 408 companies from the Danish manufacturing and services 
sectors, and we contribute to the literature on finance functions in several ways. 
First, we hypothesize and find that the simultaneous emphases and the 
complementarity among all finance function roles are positively related to BD. 
Only one finance function role is additively related to BD. Second, we hypothesize 
and find that BD is related to the perceived performance of the finance function 
and, furthermore, that BD is positively related to the company financial 
performance (return on invested capital). These two contributions respond to 
Hartmann and Maas (2011) who called for studies shedding light to how finance 
function roles create value for organizations. Third, we expand the taxonomies 
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previously used on the finance function as we use the CVF to define four roles 
instead of the two roles used in much previous research. Thus, we respond to Byrne 
and Pierce (2007) who called for a more comprehensive view of contemporary 
finance function roles. We also measure the roles consistently via activities (Maas 
and Matejka, 2009; Mahlendorf, 2014), and we use a dyadic approach (Schäfer, 
2007) as we survey the chief financial officers (CFOs) and chief operating officers 
(COOs) in the participating firms. We use a dyadic approach and the average 
deviation index (ADI; Burke et al., 1999) to test the interrater agreement of items 
with respect to our main exogenous and endogenous variables. We find that the 
interrater agreement is more than acceptable. Fourth, we find that the 
complementarity among finance function roles is positively related to an increase 
in the number of full-time equivalents (FTEs) employed in the finance functions. 
However, there does not appear to be a trade-off between the simultaneous 
emphases on all four roles versus emphasizing only a few of them because a 
greater BD is related to an increase in firm financial performance. Last, we are the 
first to utilize the second-order technique for testing complementarity among 
finance function roles.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we review the 
relevant literature and construct the hypotheses. We present the methods in section 
3 and the results in section 4. We discuss and conclude our findings in section 5, 
and in section 6, we discuss limitations and an avenue for future research. 
8.2 Literature review and hypotheses development  
This section begins with a brief summary of the research on the roles of finance 
functions. We then discuss the scarce research on complementarity among finance 
function roles and explain the concept of behavioral differentiation. In the 
subsection that follows, we present the paper’s paradoxical perspective and relate 
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that to the roles of finance functions. In the next subsection, we present the CVF 
and describe how it is used to measure the roles of finance functions.  
8.2.1 The roles of finance functions, complementarity and behavioral 
differentiation  
Research on finance functions’ roles dates back to the 1940s (Anderson, 1944), and 
it began to capture momentum in the 1990s (Mouritsen, 1996; Chapman, 1998; 
Granlund and Lukka, 1998). It is evident that the roles have changed from a core 
focusing on score-keeping and statutory duties to also emphasizing an engagement 
in firm operations and strategy (Sorenson, 2009). Yet scorekeeping and statutory 
roles appear to remain important (Mouritsen, 1996; Chang et al., 2014) which 
imply that the set of roles is larger compared with, say, the 1980s (The Big Eight 
White Paper, 1989). To some extent, there is agreement on the drivers of the 
change; examples are increased business and market complexity, organizational 
changes, new management philosophies (Burns and Baldvindsdottir, 2005) and 
myths about the benefits of change (Järvenpää, 2007). Research has also shown 
that the relative emphasis on the different finance function roles depends on the 
context (see e.g. Byrne and Pierce, 2007), but there is consistent evidence of 
multiple roles in contemporary finance function practice
16
 (Bechtoldt et al., 2014).   
Although researchers recognize that the set of finance function roles appears to be 
increasing, only a few studies have shed light on the complementarity among the 
multiple finance function roles. Describing different responsibilities and 
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 Several studies in this section describe the roles of management accountants (Granlund 
and Lukka, 1998; Byrne and Pierce, 2007) or controllers (Sathe, 1982; Bechtoldt et al., 
2014). We decided to include these studies as controllers and management accountants (see 
Ahrens and Chapman, 2000, for elaboration on the differences between and similarities of 
the two terms) are, of course, a part of the finance function.    
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characteristics of the controller, Sathe (1983) suggested that strong controllers 
would benefit from their dual responsibilities, functional and local. He argued that 
the strong controller would be able to overcome conflicts between local and 
functional responsibilities, and that by getting involved in local decision-making, 
the strong controller would be in a better position to perform functional duties. In a 
survey study, Maas and Matejka (2009) empirically tested Sathe’s arguments, and 
they found that the dual responsibilities were substitutes. Subsequently, they 
argued that they could “thus reject the alternative view that there are significant 
complementarities between functional responsibilities of business-unit controllers 
and their support of local decision making” (p. 1247). They tested for 
complementarity by modeling an additive relation between the functional 
responsibility and local decision-making support of controllers in a structural 
model.  
Chang et al. (2014) examined antecedents of the importance of three finance 
function roles in a survey study: reporting, compliance and internal control/risk 
management; performance management; and strategic partner. They tested for 
complementarity among the three roles on perceived role effectiveness. They 
argued that a positive correlation between the three roles and a positive additive 
relation between the three roles and perceived role effectiveness were evidence of 
complementarity
17
. In footnote 10, moreover, they described the results of another 
test recently discussed in the management accounting literature by Grabner and 
Moers (2013). They correlated the residuals of the three roles from their main 
regressions and found positive significant relations indicating that the roles were 
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 Chang et al.’s (2014) and Maas and Matejka’s (2009) primary methods for testing 





. In a multiple case-study, Byrne and Peirce (2007) studied 
antecedents, characteristics and the consequences of the roles of finance functions. 
Managers in most firms acknowledged an inherent conflict between the finance 
functions’ business and controlling responsibilities, but they found that when 
finance function employees were more involved in business decisions, the 
employees developed a greater organizational understanding that strengthened the 
effectiveness of control, and as a consequence, the finance function created “more 
workable control systems” (p. 492). Byrne and Peirce (2007) further elaborated 
that with more interaction accounting information was used more in a broader 
organizational domain. Thus, the quality of control and the quality of finance 
function employees’ business activities were increased by increased interaction.   
To establish clear evidence of complementarity between the roles of finance 
functions, it is necessary to compare the additive effects of the roles with the 
effects stemming from the complementarity among the roles (Tanriverdi and 
Venkatranam, 2005). Furthermore, a holistic perspective encompassing a larger set 
of roles is essential as a reductionist perspective comes with a risk of neglecting 
that the complementarity between two roles might be a function of a third role 
(Ennen and Richter, 2010). Thus, Maas and Matejka’s (2009) method for testing 
complementarity is problematic because it is reductionist. The method includes 
only two roles which might have affected the authors’ results as the 
complementarity between the functional reporting role and the local support role 
could be a function of a third role. Furthermore, Maas and Matejka’s (2009) and 
Chang et al.’s (2014) methods do not compare additive with complementary effects. 
Likewise, although describing the benefits from the interplay between a control 
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 This method for testing complementarity assumes a theory that predicts that managers 
make, more or less, optimal decisions (Grabner and Moers, 2013).   
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focus and a partnership focus, Byrne and Pierce’s (2007) findings are difficult to 
generalize as they are based on 18 companies. Altogether, this provides a unique 
opportunity for establishing evidence of the complementarity among finance 
function roles.  
As we will elaborate later, we argue that the multiple roles of finance functions are 
complementary, and by integrating and simultaneously using the roles and 
recognizing their complementarity, finance functions will achieve a greater BD. 
BD is the ability to apply roles differently, that is, adaptively, flexibly, situation 
specifically and appropriately (Hooijberg et al., 1997) and applying the right role 
when it is called for. BD is usually related to managers’ abilities (Hooijberg, 1996) 
and has been found to increase managerial effectiveness (Denison et al., 1995). 
However, BD has also been described as a group characteristic (Carmeli and 
Halevi, 2009). In this paper, BD is a characteristic of the finance function, and 
when a finance function has a great BD, the function understands the demands for 
its role performance from internal customers, it performs the roles accordingly, and 
it delivers activities and services with a high quality. In the hypotheses section, we 
argue that a greater BD increases the perceived performance of the finance function 
and the financial performance of the company.  
8.2.2 Paradoxes and the roles of finance functions 
Before the roles of finance functions are described with a paradox lens, it is 
necessary to understand what a paradox is and what it is not. We use the definition 
put forward by Schad et al. (2016) who describe a paradox as a “persistent 
contradiction between interdependent elements” (p. 6). Typically, paradoxes are 
latent, but they become salient, for example, if the organization faces uncertainties 
(Denis et al., 2012) or resource constraints (Smith & Lewis, 2011; Schmitt and 
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Raisch, 2013). A paradox is different from related phenomena, such as a dilemma 
or a dialectic perspective. A paradox is different from a dilemma because a 
dilemma implies that an organization can choose temporarily between competing 
choices each with advantages and disadvantages, but at some later point in time, 
the dilemma will resurface. Furthermore, a paradox is different from a dialectic 
perspective because a dialectic perspective implies that the contradiction between 
elements (thesis and antithesis) will be solved by integration (synthesis) which, 
over time, faces a new contradiction (Smith and Lewis, 2011). The main difference 
between a paradox and a dilemma, and a dialectic perspective is then that a 
paradox cannot be temporarily resolved; instead, organizations cope, that is, “learn 
to live” with the paradox.  
A noteworthy example of a paradox from organization research is ambidextrous 
organizations (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004, see also Ylinen and Gullkvist, 2014, 
for an example from the management accounting literature). Ambidextrous 
organizations cope with the conflicting demands of exploitation and exploration 
either structurally by devoting some organizational units to exploitation and other 
units to exploration (O’Reilly and Tushman 2008), or contextually by having 
structures permeating the entire organization enabling employees to simultaneously 
exploit and explore (O’Reilly and Tushman, 2013)
19
. Another example, introduced 
to the management accounting literature by Ahrens and Chapman (2004), is the 
emphasis on alignment and standards while maintaining flexibility, that is, enabling 
formalization (Adler and Borys, 1996). 
                                                     
19
 The third possibility of dealing with the conflicting demands of exploration and 
exploitation is temporal, meaning that at some point in time, organizations exploit whereas 
at another point in time, they explore (Laplume and Dass, 2012). However, the third 
“solution” to the paradox of exploration and exploitation is not within the definition of a 
paradox cf. Schad et al. (2016). The temporal perspective implies that the conflicting 
demand of exploitation and exploration is a dilemma.   
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As an illustration of a paradox that finance functions face, we can use Sathe’s 
(1983) characterization of a strong controller. A strong controller faces competing 
demands in that she is responsible for supporting and helping a local business unit 
while, at the same time, she has monitoring and reporting responsibilities for the 
same business unit as a function of requirements from headquarters
20
. She copes 
with the conflicting demands by being actively involved in local decision-making 
while simultaneously retaining a sense of objectivity and independence. Another 
example is Hartmann and Maas’s (2011) study of business unit controllers. They 
found that business unit controllers attributed almost equal importance to a role 
ensuring that business units adhered to company and legal regulations and a role 
helping the business unit with strategic advice. Regarding evidence pertaining to 
the finance function as a unit of analysis, Chang et al. (2014) found that a role 
emphasizing monitoring of performance and a role emphasizing strategic decision 
support were attributed almost equal importance by the 832 respondents. In 
multiple case studies by Byrne and Pierce (2007) and Granlund and Lukka (1998), 
management accountants had control and reporting responsibility and 
responsibility for providing business advice. Altogether, it appears from research 
on finance function roles that finance functions face paradoxes. Now we turn to the 
CVF and describe how we use it to measure the roles of finance functions and 
develop the hypotheses in the subsequent sections.  
8.2.3 The competing values framework and the roles of finance functions 
Much research considers the roles of the finance function as consisting of two roles 
on the opposite ends of a continuum often referred to as a corporate policeman 
versus a business partner (Granlund and Lukka, 1998; Hartmann and Maas, 2011). 
                                                     
20
 In a sense, this can be characterized as a “belonging” paradox (cf. Schad et al., 2016). 
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In this paper, the roles of the finance function are expanded as we define four roles. 
We use the CVF to operationalize and measure finance functions’ roles because it 
captures tensions and paradoxes that organizations face (Cameron et al., 2014). 
The CVF highlights contradictory yet interdependent organizational components 
by shedding light on differences among a dimension of control versus flexibility 
and a dimension of internal versus external focus. The integration of the two 
dimensions forms four quadrants that have different foci (Hooijberg, 1996). The 
four quadrants and their different foci represent the distinctions between the four 
different finance function roles used in this paper. The external and flexibility axes 
form the adhocracy quadrant which emphasizes growth, innovation and adaption to 
the environment (Lawrence et al., 2009). The finance function role related to the 
adhocracy quadrant is characterized by providing advice on strategy, initiating 
strategic changes and developing growth opportunities for the company. The 
external and control axes form the compete quadrant which focuses on cost 
reduction, goal-setting and productivity (Kalliath et al., 1999). The finance 
function role related to the compete quadrant develops cost-cutting and profit-
increasing plans, and motivates and helps employees reach financial and non-
financial goals. The internal and control axes define the control quadrant which 
stresses monitoring of performance, stability and control (Lawrence et al., 2009). 
The finance function role that is related to this quadrant prepares and implements 
budgets, performs variance analyses and statutory tasks, and monitors the 
performance of other functions. The control role’s emphasis is described as the 
foundation on which other roles are built (Granlund and Lukka, 1998) yet is rarely 
measured in the literature (Bechtold et al., 2014). Last, the internal and flexibility 
axes form the collaborate quadrant which emphasizes internal alignment, autonomy 
and cooperation (Cameron et al., 2014). The finance function role related to this 
quadrant focuses on aligning financial and operational systems with the overall 
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business, collaborating and establishing consensus among other functions in the 
firm. The CVF has been applied and validated in a wide range of research (Kalliath 
et al., 1999) since it was developed by Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1981). The CVF and 











8.2.4 Complementarity hypotheses  
Studies describe elements of paradoxes as complementary (Cao et al., 2009; 
Gerbert et al., 2010) and interwoven (Denison et al., 1995; Lewis, 2000). This 
description implies that these elements are not orthogonal to one another but serve 























Figure 1: The competing values framework 
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paradoxical elements create a greater sense and understanding of causality and the 
organizational wholeness as paradoxes inform one another (Chreim, 2005).  
We argue that the four finance function roles inform one another which foster a 
comprehensive understanding of the organization’s demands for the roles and 
increases the quality of the services and roles performed. For example, advice on 
strategic decisions and investments, and the initiation of strategic change (the 
adhocracy role), and motivational efforts and advice (the compete role), will have a 
more sound foundation if based on knowledge of the current performance of the 
company (the control role). In other words, the quality of advice on strategic 
decisions, investments and motivational efforts will be greater, and the initiation of 
strategic changes for the company will be more aligned with what is currently 
possible for the company to reduce the costs and time of obsolete advice. Granlund 
and Lukka (1998), Mouritsen (2004), and Weber (2011) state that traditional 
activities (in this research, activities performed by the control role) are sin qua non 
with respect to performing more business-oriented activities (the adhocracy role 
and the compete role). Furthermore, mastering traditional activities increases the 
legitimacy of the finance function’s advice to operations (the compete role) and 
regarding strategy (Goretzki et al., 2013; see also Keyes et al., 2000). Yet 
monitoring and analyzing the performance of a strategic decision are also more 
effective if the finance function is engaged in the decision (the adhocracy role) 
because the function has a greater understanding of where, why and when control 
is required (Byrne and Peirce, 2007).  
Aligning the company’s management control system with the business (the 
collaborate role) also becomes a less daunting task if the finance function has a 
thorough understanding of the company’s operations (the compete role) and 
strategic intent (the adhocracy role), and if the finance function administers the 
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company’s financial reporting system (the control role). The control role and the 
compete role can ensure that the benefits from the adhocracy role and the 
collaborate role will be achieved. For example, in some instances the benefits from 
the adhocracy role will not occur if the financial boundaries are insufficiently 
delineated by the control role, or if the plan for achieving strategic objectives is not 
implemented accordingly (the compete role). On the contrary, an excessive use of 
the control and compete roles might impede the benefits of the adhocracy role, for 
example, caused by a narrow focus on cost reduction and reduced attention to 
innovation and strategic opportunities.  
Integrating contradictory and paradoxical elements is not without challenges in that 
the integration can cause conflicts and tensions (Henri, 2006) that are difficult to 
overcome. However, conflict literature scholars suggest that avoiding conflict 
reduces decision quality and communication (Dedreu, 1991; Nicotera, 1995). The 
conflicts that might arise from the integration of contradictory and paradoxical 
elements can foster dialogue and increase organizational focus (Henri, 2006). Thus, 
we contend that the four finance function roles are complementary and that the 
complementarity leads to a greater BD. 
When complementarities exist among finance functions’ roles, organizations have 
to coordinate the performance of the roles and integrate them. Therefore, we 
develop a second-order factor (Mishra and Shah, 2009; Tanriverdi and 
Venkatranam, 2005). This second-order factor captures the covariance and 
multilateral interactions among the first-order factors, that is, the adhocracy role, 
the compete role, the control role and the collaborate role. Furthermore, to establish 
clear evidence of complementarity, we need to compare the additive relations 
between the first-order factors and BD, with the relation between the second-order 
factor and BD, and we have to make sure that the complementarity effects 
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outweigh the additive effects (Tanriverdi and Venkatranam, 2005). Thus, we 
develop two competing hypotheses to investigate whether BD for finance functions 
is dependent on the complementarity among finance functions’ roles or whether the 
individual role has an additive effect on BD. The first hypothesis (H1), which we 
label the “strong form,” states that the complementarity among finance function 
roles has a direct positive relation with BD whereas the second hypothesis (H2), 
which we label the “weak form,” states that the four finance function roles have 
additive positive relations with BD: 
H1 (strong form): The complementarity of the adhocracy role, the compete role, 
the control role and the collaborate role has a positive effect on behavioral 
differentiation. 
H2 (weak form): The adhocracy role, the compete role, the control role and the 
collaborate role have additive positive effects on behavioral differentiation.  
We also contend that the simultaneous use of all four finance function roles affects 
the number of FTEs employed in finance functions. We have no theory or 
empirical guidance for this relation. On the one hand, we should expect that the 
simultaneous use of all four roles increases the number of FTE as, ceteris paribus, 
the finance functions have a larger set of activities to cover. On the other hand, we 
could expect that emphasizing all four roles simultaneously also increases finance 
functions’ knowledge of which activities not to perform in certain circumstances. 
Thus, we cannot predict the direction of the relation, but we expect that the 
simultaneous use of all roles is related to the number of FTEs. 
H3: The complementarity of all four finance function roles is related to the number 
of FTEs.   
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8.2.5 Behavioral differentiation and performance  
We have described how the simultaneous use and complementarity among 
paradoxical finance function roles are related to a greater BD which enables 
understanding and clarity of the demands for their efforts. This greater 
understanding and clarity increase effectiveness (Poole and Van de Ven, 1989). In 
addition, Drach-Zahavy and Freund (2007) argue that integrating paradoxes 
increases space for maneuvering which fosters increased effectiveness. We contend 
that a greater BD enabled by the complementarity of the four finance function roles 
increases the perceived performance of the finance function. Specifically, finance 
function employees are more likely to be effective if they understand what is 
needed to be done, and how and when they are expected to perform different roles. 
This is particularly important as finance function employees are subjected to an 
increasing set of tasks (Burns and Baldvinsdottir, 2005), and some of the tasks 
conflict (Byrne and Pierce, 2007). In contrast, finance function employees who are 
uncertain about the constituents of and expectations for their roles are likely to 
hesitate and not take initiative due to uncertainty (Hall, 2008). Furthermore, Tubre 
and Collins (2000) find that ambiguity leads to deteriorated work effectiveness. 
Altogether, this leads to the fourth hypothesis: 
H4: Behavioral differentiation is positively related to finance function performance. 
We also argue that an increased BD is positively related to financial performance. 
BD will enable the finance function to overcome inconsistencies stemming from 
demands for their support of other functions in the company, and the quality of the 
finance function services also increases. In turn, and relying on rational decision 
theory (Hedström and Swedberg, 1996), we assume that when the quality of the 
finance function services increases it is likely that they will be used more for 
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managerial decision-making (Weissenberger and Angelkort, 2011), and it is likely 
that this will improve the overall financial performance of the company. In addition, 
research from the services literature shows that understanding the demands of the 
internal customer is related to a reduction of waste and costs in the organization 
and an improved external customer service quality leading to sustained 
competiveness in the market (Jun and Cai, 2010). This leads to our fifth hypothesis: 
H5: Behavioral differentiation is positively related to financial performance.    





The test of the complementarity hypothesis demands additional tests compared 
with a traditional SEM where researchers begin with an exploratory factor analysis 
and a confirmatory factor analysis and then test the hypothesized relations in a full 
structural model. Therefore, we decided to depict the sequence of our statistical 
tests in Figure 3.  









The sample for this research is found in the Danish database of registered firms. 
For the entire survey, we included private and publicly held companies, as well as 
government and nonprofit firms. Firms had to have more than 50 employees, and 
we contacted the CFO as our target respondent which is similar to other survey 
papers on the roles of finance functions (Mouritsen, 1996; Chang et al., 2014). In 
total, 1775 firms were suitable for the survey. Contact information for CFOs was 
collected via telephone, and firms also received information about the research. 
The questionnaire was pre-tested on a small sample of management accounting 
academics to ensure the content and face validity of the items. We used the 
feedback from the researchers to change some words on the questionnaire and then 
tested the questionnaire on a small sample of CFOs to ensure that meanings were 
clear. Data collection in the initial two rounds was performed via e-mail from June 
2016 until December 2016. The e-mail included a brief description of the research 
and a link to an online survey instrument. A third round of data collection was 
performed via postal mail in January 2017. In total, 525 firms responded to the 
survey yielding a response rate of 29.5 percent. The response rate is within the 10 
to 30 percent range reported in recent survey studies in management accounting 
targeting senior management members (Hansen and Van der Stede, 2004; Henri, 
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In this study, we use return on invested capital as a dependent variable and 
accounting data as control variables. Therefore, we exclude government and 
nonprofit firms and use a sample of 408 firms. We assess possible non-response 
bias via t-tests and compare responding and non-responding firms by number of 
employees (t = .651, p = .515), 2015 revenue (t = .392, p = .695) and 2015 return 
on assets (t = .143, p = .633). None of these tests indicate non-response bias. On 
average, respondents are 48.5 years of age, have been employed 9 years at their 
current firm and have 5.9 years of tenure in their current position. Thus, 
respondents have several years of experience on which to base their answers to the 
survey. Table I illustrates the sample characteristics.  
Table 1: Sample characteristics   
Manufacturing n= 193 Service n=215 
Iron and Rubber 30% Retailing 42% 
Machines  30% Finance  24% 
Food  13% Transportation 14% 
Textiles 7% Utilities 10% 
Electronics 6% Other 7% 
Chemicals 4% Communication 2% 
Health-care 4% Property 1% 
Furniture  3% 
  




    
Total 100%   100% 
 
After collecting responses from the CFOs, we found names and contact 
information for COOs in the responding firms via the Danish database of registered 
companies. We performed two rounds of data collection; one via e-mail that 
included a link to the online survey instrument and one via postal mail. In total, 
131 
 
107 responses were received. In this study, these responses are used to assess 
interrater agreement for the items of the variables representing the roles of finance 
function, perceived finance function performance and BD. T-tests are used to 
compare the subsample of firms in which the COO and the CFO responded with 
the sample of firms where only the CFO responded. We compare these groups by 
number of employees (t = .839, p =.402), 2015 revenue (t = 452, p = .652) and 
2015 return on assets (t = 523, p = .601). None of these tests produce significant 
results. On average, COOs are 49.5 years of age, have been employed by their 
current firm for 12.6 years and have 6.9 years of tenure in their current position.  
8.3.1 Variable measurement 
The questionnaire has 158 items, but we use only a portion in this research. All 
items are measured on a 7-point labeled Likert scale. Eustler and Lang (2015) 
recommend this approach as labeled scales are superior to unlabeled scales because 
labeled scales reduce centrality and extreme response bias. Furthermore, a range of 
1 to 7 increases the variances in the responses (Eustler and Lang, 2015).  
8.3.1.1 Behavioral differentiation  
We measure BD using four items. The first item captures the perceived ability of 
the finance function to conform to the organization’s expectations for finance 
function work represented by behavior. The second item captures whether the level 
of activities performed by the finance function conforms to the demands from the 
organization. The third item captures the extent to which the finance function 
complies with internal customer demands on time, and the last item captures the 




8.3.1.2 Full-time equivalents 
We ask respondents to indicate the total number of FTEs employed in the finance 
function. This number includes finance function employees at headquarters and 
finance employees situated in decentralized business units.  
8.3.1.3 Finance function performance 
Finance function performance is measured utilizing three items. The first item 
captures the perceived reputation of the finance function in the firm, and the second 
item captures the perceived success of the finance function. The third item captures 
the perceived performance of the finance function relative to finance functions in 
similar firms. 
8.3.1.4 Financial performance 
As recommended by Dess and Robinson (1984), we use accounting data to 
measure financial performance. Financial performance is operationally defined by 
return on invested capital (ROIC) in the company year of 2016. We calculate ROIC 
using after-tax operating profit divided by invested capital (Hawawini and Viallet, 
2011). As the denominator, we use average assets in 2016 (beginning 2016 + end 
2016 divided by 2) and subtract the average accounts payable.   
8.3.1.5 Roles of the finance function 
We performed a literature review of empirical research to capture a sound base of 
items pertaining to the roles of finance functions. “Controller” and “role”, and 
“management accounting”/“accountant” and “role” were searched for in paper 
titles and abstracts in the EBSCO host business source premier database and in the 





. Mahlendorf (2014) argues that finance function roles have 
the characteristics of practice-defined variables. He refers to Luft and Shields 
(2007) who argue that, in comparison with practice-defined variables, “theory-
defined variables are more likely to have well-defined, unitary and stable meanings 
making it possible to identify consistent cause and effect relations” (p. 43). 
Therefore, we rely on the CVF as a lens for identifying items and descriptions of 
finance function activities that fit each quadrant’s underlying values because it 
captures the tensions and paradoxes that organizations face (Cameron et al., 2014). 
We use activities to reduce the effects of social desirability bias (Mahlendorf, 
2014), and we use a frequency scale in order to capture the frequency of which 
respondents perceived the roles to be part of their work rather than to measure the 
number of times a given activity was performed (Floyd and Wooldridge, 1992). 
The adhocracy role is measured using five items. The first item captures the 
frequency at which the finance function provides strategic advice to operations, and 
this item is based on Burns and Baldvindsdottir (2005). The second item is adapted 
from Maas and Matejka (2009), and it captures the frequency at which the finance 
function develops new investment potentials. The third item is adapted from Chang 
et al. (2014) and captures the frequency at which the finance function helps the 
firm set strategic directions and imperatives. The fourth item is based on Goretszki 
et al. (2013) to capture the frequency at which the finance function contributes with 
advice on growth potential for the firm. The last item is based on Granlund and 
Lukka (1998) and captures the frequency at which the finance function initiates 
strategic changes.  
                                                     
21
 European Accounting Review: 10, Management Accounting Research: 7, Accounting, 
Organizations and Society: 3, The Accounting Review 2, and Journal of Management 
Accounting Research: 1.   
134 
 
We measure the compete role using five items. Item 1 was adapted from Maas and 
Matejka (2009) intended to capture the frequency at which the finance function 
develops cost-saving plans for the firm. Item 2 was based on Hartmann and Maas 
(2011) and captures the frequency at which the finance function provides advice to 
other functions for achieving their non-financial and financial objectives. We 
developed item 3, and it captures the frequency at which the finance function 
develops profit optimization plans for the firm. Item 4 was based on Lind (2001) 
and captures the frequency at which the finance function helps other functions 
finish projects. We developed item 5, and it is intended to capture the frequency at 
which the finance function motivates other functions. 
The control role is measured using five items. We developed item 1 to capture the 
frequency at which the finance function performs statutory tasks such as monthly 
close. Item 2 was based on Mouritsen (1996) intended to capture the frequency at 
which the finance function performs variance analysis. Item 3 was adapted from 
Chang et al. (2014), and it captures the frequency at which the finance function 
monitors the performance of other functions. We developed item 4 to capture the 
frequency at which the finance function administers the reporting system in the 
firm. Item 5 was based on Mouritsen (1996) intended to capture the frequency at 
which the finance function participates in preparing and implementing the budget 
in other functions.  
We measure the collaborate role using five items. We developed items 1 and 2. 
They capture the frequency at which the finance function establishes common 
objectives when communicating with other functions in the firm and the frequency 
at which the finance function exhibits leadership toward other functions in the firm, 
respectively. Item 3 was adapted from Chang et al. (2014) capturing the frequency 
at which the finance function aligns management control systems to the firm’s 
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business. Item 4 is based on Peirce and O’dea (2003) to capture the frequency at 
which the finance function collaborates with other functions in order to establish 
consensus between them. We developed item 5 to measure the frequency at which 
the finance function listens to, and legitimizes, other functions’ finance-related 
suggestions.   
8.3.2 Control variables 
We control for three contingency variables; size, environmental uncertainty 
(Donaldson, 2001) and strategy (Chenhall, 2003)
22
. Size is proxied for by the 
logarithm of the total number of employees in the firm (Tanriverdi and 
Venkatraman, 2005), environmental uncertainty is captured by the standard 
deviation of sales growth of firms within the same sector during the past three 
years (Cao et al., 2009) and strategy is assessed with the self-typing paragraph used 
by, for example, Slater and Olson (2000) to capture whether respondents’ firms are 
characterized as prospectors, analyzers, defenders or reactors. We relate size, 
environmental uncertainty and strategy to all endogenous variables. Furthermore, 
we control for the level of enterprise resource planning (ERP) integration. A high 
level of ERP integration might affect the perceived performance of the finance 
function as ERP has been found to free capacity for finance function employees 
(Byrne and Pierce, 2007). Thus, we model a relation between ERP integration and 
perceived performance. We ask respondents to indicate the level of ERP 
integration using two items. Item 1 captures the quality of the data and information 
provided by the system whereas item 2 captures whether the degree of data and 
information provided by the system meets the needs of the finance function. We 
                                                     
22
 Chenhall (2003) argues that strategy is somewhat different from other contingency 




include a dummy for respondents’ position (CFO or not) as only 66.4 percent of 
respondents were CFOs
23
, and we control for the respondents’ tenure in their 
current position and whether the firms operate in the services vs. manufacturing 
sector. We model relations between these four variables and all endogenous 
variables.     
8.3.3 Exploratory factor analysis and confirmatory factor analysis 
We perform an exploratory factor analysis that includes all latent variable items 
with oblique rotation. The exploratory factor analysis yields seven factors with 
eigenvalues greater than one: the adhocracy role, the compete role, the control role, 
the collaborate role, finance function performance, BD and ERP integration. 
Altogether, the seven factors explain 62.9 percent of the variance in the data, and 
Cronbach’s alphas for the factors range between .703 and .849 showing adequate to 
excellent reliability (Kline, 2011); see Table II.  
Table 2: Exploratory factor analysis and descriptive statistics 
Factor Adhocracy role Compete role Control role Collaborate role BD Perceived performance ERP integration Mean Std. deviation 
Indicator                   
ROLE1 
.792 
            5.708 1.171 
ROLE2 
.670 
            4.193 1.657 
ROLE3 
.828 
            5.832 1.249 
ROLE4 
.819 
            4.741 1.606 
ROLE5 
.548 
            4.228 1.427 
ROLE6   
.698 
          5.079 1.329 
ROLE7   
.568 
          5.115 1.376 
ROLE8   
.729 
          4.780 1.492 
ROLE9   
.581 
          4.529 1.421 
ROLE10   .817 
  
        4.067 1.686 
ROLE11     
.774 
        6.830 .518 
                                                     
23
 Other respondents identified themselves as “senior finance manager” (6.6 percent), 
“controller” (2 percent), CEO (2 percent) and “other” (23 percent).  
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ROLE12     
.694 
        6.550 .952 
ROLE13     
.608 
        6.071 1.380 
ROLE14     .560 
  
      6.494 1.016 
ROLE15     .674 
  
      6.631 .868 
ROLE16       
.581 
      4.864 1.210 
ROLE17       
.694 
      5.202 1.247 
ROLE18       .750 
      
5.225 1.277 
ROLE19       .857 
      
5.954 1.096 
ROLE20       .747 
      
5.878 1.033 
BD 1         
.764     
5.781 1.018 
BD 2         
.843     
5.778 .987 
BD 3         
.847     
5.935 .924 
BD 4         
.728     
6.236 .763 
PPERF1         
  .738   
5.000 .934 
PPERF2         
  .847   
5.040 .722 
PPERF3         
  .715   
5.111 .776 
ERP1         
    .801 
5.658 1.418 
ERP2         
    .891 
4.651 1.535 
KMO of sampling adequacy for factors: .853. Bartlett's Test of Sphericity is significant p. <. 000 
   
Only loadings exceeding .400 are shown 
        
8.3.4 Confirmatory factor analysis 
We run a confirmatory factor analysis in AMOS 23 including all latent variables. 
In this procedure, factors are correlated in a model without structural parameters 
(Hair et al., 2014). We use several fit indices (Kline, 2011) to ensure that the 
measurement model fits the data. We evaluate the chi-square to degrees of freedom 
(Bollen, 1989), which should be less than 3 (Kline, 2005); the root mean square 
error of approximation (RMSEA), which should be less than .08 (Browne and 
Cudeck, 1993); and the standardized root mean square residual, which should be 
less than .1 (Schmermelleh-Engel et al., 2003). Furthermore, we assess the 
comparative fit index (CFI; Bentler, 1990), the incremental fit index (IFI; Bollen, 
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1989) and the Tucker-Lewis index (TLI; Tucker-Lewis, 1973) where values above 
0.9 indicate acceptable fit (Bentler, 1992; Kline, 2005). Last, we evaluate the 
consistent Akaike information criterion (CAIC; Bozdogan, 1987) which is the ratio 
between the hypothesized model and a saturated model. The CAIC should be less 
than one as an indicator for model parsimony (Byrne, 2010). The measurement 
model shows acceptable fit; see Table III.  
Table 3: Confirmatory factor analysis, composite reliability and cronbachs alpha     




ROLE 1 .782 12.323 
  
ROLE 2 .634 10.059 
  
ROLE 3 .824 12.585 
  
ROLE 4 .737 11.738 
  





ROLE 6 .770 14.210 
  
ROLE 7 .707 13.270 
  
ROLE 8 .807 14.975 
  
ROLE 9 .593 10.919 
  





ROLE 11 .465 8.069 
  
ROLE 12 .759 11.205 
  
ROLE 13 .675 9.508 
  
ROLE 14 .441 7.697 
  





ROLE 16 .577 9.025 
  
ROLE 17 .675 10.072 
  
ROLE 18 .752 10.597 
  
ROLE 19 -732 12.551 
  









BD 2 .929 18.929 
  
BD 3 .649 13.961 
  
BD 4 .831 10.470 




PPERF1 .478 a 
  
PPERF2 .714 9.511 
  
PPERF3 .836 7.233 
  
ERP integration 
    
ERP1 .928 a .747 .719 
ERP2 .607 7.539     
χ2 to degrees of freedom: 1.992 RMSEA: .049, SRMR: .052, IFI: .927, TLI: .913, CFI: .926, CAIC: .428(1308.365/3049.901 saturated 
model) 
"a" indicates a loading fixed to 1 
      
To assess construct validity, we evaluate the factors’ convergent validity, 
discriminant validity and construct reliability. Convergent validity is established by 
assessing the fitted residual matrix and the standardized coefficients of factor 
loadings (Fullerton and Wempe, 2009). Four residuals in the fitted matrix exceeds 
the threshold of 2.58 (Jöreskog and Sörbom, 1988) with the largest difference .72. 
However, as the SRMR is within the acceptable threshold (Schmermelleh-Engel et 
al., 2003; see Table III), we decided not to trim the measurement model
24
. All 
standardized factor loadings are significant at p < .05 as indicated in Table III. 
Discriminant validity is established by comparing factor correlations with their 
squared average variance extracted (AVE; Fornell and Larcker, 1981), where the 
squared AVE of the factors should be greater than their correlation with other 
factors. As reported in the diagonal in Table IV, the squared AVEs of individual 
factors are greater than all factor correlations. In addition, as indicated in Table III,  
                                                     
24
 One modification indice was greater than 10 suggesting a correlation between the 
residuals of items 2 and 3 of the adhocracy role factor. Byrne (2010) describes that a 
correlation between residuals in a measurement model should be performed only when it 
has substantial meaning. Both items represent a strategic orientation. Therefore, we 
correlate the residuals of items 2 and 3 of the adhocracy role. 
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the composite reliabilities (CRs) are greater than the .7 threshold (Hair et al., 2014).  
 
The main latent variables in this research represent characteristics of different 
finance function roles, BD and perceived finance function performance. The 
variables representing the roles of the finance function might be performed by 
more than one individual, and BD and perceived finance function performance are 
unit-level (the finance function) variables. We reason that the CFO is most likely to 
have a comprehensive understanding of these elements. However, surveying the 
CFO on the roles of the finance function, BD and perceived finance function 
performance might foster common method bias (Podsakoff et al., 2003). Therefore, 
it is important to assess interrater-item agreement for the items representing the 
four finance function roles, BD and perceived finance function performance. We 
use the COO responses from the 107 companies in which the CFO and the COO 
responded to the survey
25
 and use the ADI as suggested by Burke et al. (1999). The 
ADI is determined by evaluating to what extent the individual factor item rating 
                                                     
25
 We did not obtain responses to the ERP and strategy items from the COOs.  
Table 4: Variable correlations and squared average variance extracted           
  Perceived perf. Compete role Adhocracy role Control role Collaborate role BD ERP integration ROIC 2016 
Perceived perf. .724 
       
Compete role .089 .719 
      
Adhocracy role .045 .681** .726 
     
Control role -.029 .380** .369** .609 
    
Collaborate role .355** .454** .403** .291** .683 
   
BD .485** .274** .243** .193** .346** .769 
  
ERP integration .284** .368** .276** .250** .322** .446** .777 
 
ROIC 2016 -.008 .063 .019 -.020 .016 .253** .013 n/a 
FTE -.085 .222** .240** .169* .003 .027 .195** -.349** 
**indicates a p <.01., *indicates a p <.05 Squared AVE at the diagonal 
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differs from the mean of the factor and then summing the absolute difference and 
dividing the sum with the number of deviations (Burke et al., 1999). An ADI of 
1.714 indicates acceptable interrater-item agreement for a 7-point Likert scale 
(Burke and Dunlap, 2002). The ADIs of the factors rage between 0.82 (perceived 
performance) and 1.56 (the compete role) thus indicating acceptable interrater-item 
agreement. We also address common method bias ex ante by ensuring respondent 
anonymity and by randomly ordering the measures of the exogenous and 
endogenous variables. Ex post, we assess common method bias with a Harmann 
one-factor test (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986). The test does not reveal any great 
concern for common method bias as a one-factor model explained only 24.64 
percent of the variance in the data. 
Last, we test for linearity between the exogenous and endogenous variables. All 
relations are linear with F-values ranging between 2.0640 and 93.799, and R
2
s 
ranging from .020 to .188. Furthermore, the measurement model does not indicate 
multicollinearity issues as none of the variation inflation factors are above 1.78 and 
all tolerance statistics are greater than .58.  
In the following, we describe the approach that we use to test complementarity.  
8.3.5 Testing for complementarity 
A key tenet of complementary theory is that the return from jointly using, in our 
case, finance function roles is greater than the sum of the returns obtained from 
finance function roles in isolation. Thus, to test for complementarity, a test that 
compares the additive effects with the complementarity among finance function 
roles is necessary (Ichniokowski et al., 1997; Whittington et al., 1999; Tanriverdi 
and Venkatraman, 2005). Ennen and Richter (2010) distinguish between two 
approaches of testing for complementarity: the interaction approach and the system 
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approach. The interaction approach models complementarity with pairs of 
interactions and their main effects in a regression model. The interaction approach 
is problematic for this study for two reasons. 1) The main variables in regression 
models used to test the interaction approach are typically heavily correlated, and 
heavily correlated with the interaction term. When the main variables and their 
pair-wise interaction terms are heavily correlated, estimates obtained from the 
regression model reflect only the marginal or partial effects of an exogenous 
variable on an endogenous variable, given the other exogenous variable (Tanriverdi 
and Ventakraman, 2005), and not the inherent effect of one exogenous variable on 
the endogenous variable. Our main variables (finance function roles) are 
significantly correlated as indicated in Table IV and significantly correlated with 
their interaction terms, r ranging from .309 to .945
26
. Therefore, the interaction 
approach is unsuitable for comparing additive effects with the complementary 
effects of finance function roles. 2) Our research is about the complementarity of 
multiple finance function roles. Using the interaction approach, we might then 
overlook that the expected complementarity between two finance function roles 
can be because of a third role (Ennen and Richter, 2010). 
The system approach focusses on complementarity among a larger set of variables. 
Gerdin and Greve (2004) suggest profile deviation analyses in order to test 
complementarity using the system approach. Profile deviation analyses involve 
segmenting data according to a criterion variable and then finding the ideal state 
within these segments. As the next step, Euclidian and city-block distances are 
calculated, and it is hypothesized that deviations from the ideal state are negatively 
related to a given endogenous variable. However, the city-block distances capture 
only additive effects, and it is unclear what is exactly captured by the Euclidian 
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 This test was performed in SPSS. 
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distance in terms of testing complementarity effects. Another method for testing 
complementarity when applying the system approach is to use a categorical 
variable that captures whether an organizational component is in place or not and 
then test coefficient estimate differences with respect to the relation between an 
exogenous variable and an endogenous variable (Ennen and Richter, 2010). 
However, this method captures only the effects of the exogenous variable on the 
endogenous variable given the categorical variable, and not the effects of the 
categorical variable on the endogenous variable given the exogenous variable. 
Therefore, this method provides little evidence of complementarity. The last 
method for testing complementarity using the system approach is to apply higher-
order interactions in a regression model. However, this method increases 
correlations between individual variables and their multiplicative interactions 
leading to interpretational challenges of the regression model results (Tanriverdi 
and Venkatranam, 2005).   
In sum, the tests described are not appropriate for testing H1 and H2. Tanriverdi 
and Venkatranam (2005) used a two-model approach to test for complementarity: 
A first-order factor model that captured the sub-additive effects of their exogenous 
variables on the endogenous variable was compared with a second-order factor 
model that accounted for the multilateral interactions and covariance among the 
exogenous variables. A second-order factor is an entity that is reflected by its first-
order factors functioning as its indicators (Williams et al., 2004) and is the main 
source of covariance among first-order factors (Rindskopf and Rose, 1988). 
Utilizing Tanriverdi and Venkatranam’s (2005) approach enables us to compare the 
isolated additive effects of finance function roles on finance function capability 
(the first-order factor model) with the complementarity effects among finance 
function roles on finance function capability (the second-order factor model), and 
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we avoid the interpretational challenges of regression models due to 
multicollinearity. We are thus able to determine whether the complementary effects 
among finance function roles outweigh their isolated additive effects and whether 
some of the finance function roles are related to finance function capability in 
isolation. In other words, using Tanriverdi and Venkatranam’s (2005) approach, we 
are able to test H1 and H2. 
8.3.6 Assessment of the second-order measurement model  
In order to assess the existence of a second-order model and to ensure its 
multidimensionality, construct and convergent validity, we compare a 
measurement model where the first-order factors representing the finance function 
roles are correlated with a model where the first-order factors load on a second-
order factor (Tanriverdi and Ventakraman, 2005)
27
. We use the target coefficient 
statistic (T) which is the ratio of the chi-square of the first-order model to the chi-
square of the second-order model (Marsh and Hocevar, 1985). The T has an upper 
value of 1, and support for the existence of a second-order model increases the 
more T approaches unity (Tanriverdi and Ventakraman, 2005). The chi-square of 
the first-order model is 386, and the chi-square of the second-order model is 387.3 
resulting in a T of .99. Thus, the second-order model accounts for 99 percent of the 
relations among the first-order factors indicating the existence of the second-order 
model. Furthermore, we assess the second-order loadings; all loadings are 
significant at a p < .01. These results support the multidimensionality, convergent 
and discriminant validity and the existence of the second-order complementarity 
factor (Tanriverdi and Ventakraman, 2005; Mishra and Shah, 2009); see Table V 
                                                     
27
 Similar to Mishra and Shah (2009) and Tanriverdi and Venkatraman (2005), we include 
only the factors we expect to be complementary in this test.  
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which also includes fit indices of the first-order factor model and the second-order 
factor model.  
Table 5: Panel A: Fit indices for the first-order measurement model and the second-order measurement model 
 
Fit indices 
First order measurement 
model 
Second order measurement 
model 
  
X2 381.669 382.971 
  
Degrees of freedom 159 161 
  
X2 to degrees of freedom 2.4 2.379 
  
IFI .929 .929 
  
TLI .914 .916 
  
CFI .928 .929 
  
RMSEA .059 .058 
  
SRMR .056 .057 
  CAIC (default model to saturated 
model) .502 .493 
  
Target statistic .99 
   
     Panel B: loadings on 
complementary factor 
    
Relationships     
Standardized 
coefficient 
T-values (all significant p 
<.01 
Adhocracy role <= Complementarity factor .791 a* 
Compete role <= Complementarity factor .836 7.750 
Control role <= Complementarity factor .493 6.401 
Collaborate role <= Complementarity factor .556 6.431 
* Indicates a loading fixed to 1 
     
8.4 Empirical results 
8.4.1 Test of hypotheses  
As we described in section 2.5, we constructed two competing hypotheses in order 
to test whether the four finance function roles are complementary and whether the 
four roles have additive relations with internal customer understanding. Figure 4 
shows a graphical representation of H1 which we label the complementarity model. 
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The directions of the structural parameters in Figure 4 are from the second-order to 
the four first-order factors indicating that the second-order factor captures the four 
finance function roles’ covariance and multilateral interactions. To test H1 (the 
strong form), we relate the second-order factor to BD. Figure 5 depicts a graphical 
representation of H2 which we label the additive model. It shows that the second-
order complementarity factor is removed. Instead, the four finance function roles 
are modeled as first-order factors with pair-wise covariance, and the four roles are 
additively related to BD. Furthermore, the FTE variable is not included in the 
additive model. In Figure 4, the structural parameter from the complementarity 
factor to BD is statistically significant (p < .01, std. β = .430); H1 (the strong form) 
is supported. In Figure 5, only the structural parameter from the collaborate role to 
BD (p < .01, std. β = .258) is significant. Thus, H2 (the weak form) is not 
supported
28
. Therefore, we use the complementarity model for evaluating 
hypotheses 3, 4 and 5. In H3, we contended that the simultaneous use and 
complementarity of all four finance function roles were related to the number of 
FTEs employed in the finance function. The result is positive and statistically 
significant (p < .01, std. β = .230) indicating the simultaneous use and 
complementarity of all four roles increase the number of FTEs employed. 
Regarding H4, we predicted that a greater BD was positively related to perceived 
finance function performance. As indicated in Figure 4 (see also Table VI) and 
consistent with our prediction, the relation between BD and perceived performance 
is positive and statistically significant (std. β = .404, p < .01). Furthermore, we 
predicted that BD was positively related to financial performance (H5). The result 
                                                     
28
 Fit indices of the complementarity and additive model without the FTE variable. 
Complementarity model: χ
2
: 700.790, degrees of freedom: 339, χ
2
 to degrees of freedom: 
2.067, IFI: .919, TLI: .909, CFI: .919, RMSEA: .051, SRMR: .063, CAIC: .041. Additive 
model: χ
2
: 689.979, degrees of freedom: 334, χ
2
 to degrees of freedom: 2.066, IFI: .921, 
TLI: .909, CFI: .920, RMSEA: .051, SRMR: .058, CAIC: .041.   
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is consistent with the prediction as the relation is positive and statistically 










Next, we add the control variables described in section 3.2; see Table VII. 
Although the relations between CFO or not and BD, CFO or not and FTE, tenure 
and all endogenous variables, strategy and financial performance, and 
environmental uncertainty and FTE are statistically significant, the statistical 
inferences from the main model remain similar indicating that the main model is 
robust. 
 
Table 7: Empirical results with control variables Dependent variables 
Independent variable FTE BD Perceived performance Financial performance 





Control variables         
CFO or not .119* -.191** -.092 -.081 
Tenure -.103* .125** .185** .006 
Strategy -.097 -.018 -.083 -.137* 
Size -.078 .073 .028 -.017 
Table 6: Empirical results  




  The adhocracy role ==> BD .051 
The compete role ==> BD .109 
The control role ==> BD .064 
The collaborate role ==> BD .236** 
Panel B: Test of H1         
Complementarity ==> BD .352** 
Panel C: Test of H3         
Complementarity ==> FTE .230** 
Panel D: Test of H4 and H5         
BD ==> Perceived performance .463** 
BD ==> Financial performance  .115* 
** Indicates a p <.01, * indicates a p <.05 
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Environmental uncertainty .232** .030 -.099 -.029 
ERP integration     .086   
** indicates p <.01, * indicates p <.05 
     
8.5 Discussion and conclusion 
Large parts of the literature on finance function roles recognize that the set of roles 
is increasing and suggest that it is increasing as a function of, for example, 
organizational changes, environmental uncertainty and myths about benefits 
stemming from a larger role set. Only a few studies have examined the possible 
complementarity among finance function roles. Maas and Matejka (2009) used a 
reductionist approach to test for complementarity among two contrasting controller 
responsibilities. Furthermore, Maas and Matejka (2009) and Chang et al. (2014) 
did not compare additive effects with the complementary effects which is 
necessary to provide evidence of complementarity (Tanriverdi and Venkatranam, 
2005). In this study, we draw upon holistic method testing for complementarity 
(Ennen and Richter, 2011) and a paradoxical perspective (Schad et al., 2016) on 
finance function roles. The combination of the complementary and paradoxical 
perspectives suggests that the use and integration of all four roles enable the roles 
to inform one another and lead to an increased understanding of the causes and 
effects and of the organizational whole (Chreim, 2005; Cao et al., 2009; Gerbert et 
al., 2010). We use SEM on a sample of 408 companies in the services and 
manufacturing sectors to empirically test our hypotheses. 
This study informs the literature on the roles of finance functions in four main 
ways. We find that the four finance function roles are complementary and that the 
complementarity enables a greater behavioral differentiation. Only the collaborate 
role is positively associated with a greater understanding of behavior. As an 
illustrative example of our findings, consider a finance function which only 
152 
 
emphasizes the control role and the compete role. Then the possible benefits 
stemming from emphasizing the adhocracy role might be reduced by a too narrow 
focus on control and cost reductions. On the contrary, if a finance function 
overemphasizes the adhocracy role, then benefits from the adhocracy role might 
not occur if the financial boundaries of the organization are not properly delineated 
by the control role. Furthermore, controlling becomes more cumbersome if the 
finance function lacks business understanding because (all things equal) the finance 
function has less understanding of what and when to control.  
This study also shows that a greater behavioral differentiation leads to a greater 
perceived performance of the finance function. This finding suggests that a greater 
behavioral differentiation enables finance function employees to be more effective 
because they understand what roles to perform, and when and how to perform them. 
Furthermore, greater behavioral differentiation reduces role ambiguity and enables 
the finance function employees to overcome mixed signals in the demand for their 
work efforts. Last, we find that behavioral differentiation is positively related to 
return on invested capital, because a greater understanding of internal customer 
demands increases the likelihood of finance function services and information are 
used for decision-making, and it reduces the costs and waste of finance function 
employees providing obsolete information to other functions in companies. 
We also contended that the simultaneous use and complementarity of all four 
finance function roles were related to the number of FTEs in the finance function. 
We found a positive significant relationship indicating that finance functions 
emphasizing all roles employ more FTEs. However, there does not appear to be a 
trade-off between emphasizing all roles simultaneously and emphasizing some of 
the finance function roles because the complementarity among all four roles is 
related to an increase in behavioral differentiation which, in turn, is related to an 
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increase in financial performance. Thus, although the simultaneous emphasis of all 
four roles increases the number FTEs employed, this additional cost appears to be 
offset by the increase in behavioral differentiation. The increased behavioral 
differentiation caused by the simultaneous use and complementarity among all four 
roles of finance functions seem to be a competitive advantage for the organizations.  
Methodologically, we contribute to the literature by using a second-order model 
technique in order to find evidence of complementarity among finance function 
roles. This technique is new to this body of literature, and it overcomes many of the 
struggles of other techniques testing for complementarity. The second 
methodological contribution of this paper is that we construct finance function 
roles based on ex ante guidance using the CVF (Cameron et al., 2014). The CVF 
enables us to develop finance function roles from a paradoxical perspective. 
Furthermore, our research brings a more granulated understanding of finance 
function roles as we identify two roles rarely measured in the literature, the control 
role and the collaborate role. In other words, we identify four roles compared with 
the two-role taxonomy used in much of the previous research (Granlund and Lukka, 
1998; Hartmann and Mass, 2011). In addition, we applied a dyadic approach 
(Schäfer, 2007) as we collected responses from CFOs and COOs to items 
measuring the main exogenous and endogenous variables. We used the responses 
from COOs and CFOs to assess the ADI (Burke et al., 1999) of the main variables, 
and the results were more than acceptable.  
This study also provides important evidence for decision-makers. First, although 
the simultaneous use of and complementarity between all four finance function 
roles increases the number of FTEs in finance functions, the benefits from 
emphasizing all roles outweigh these costs. This means that if decision-makers in 
organizations currently emphasizing a limited number of roles are seeking to grasp 
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the benefits from emphasizing all four finance function roles, they should not 
hesitate to develop the additional roles although there is a relative increase in the 
costs incurred by the finance function. Second, the four roles of finance functions 
might be easy to replicate. However, decision-makers should understand that the 
complementarity increases behavioral differentiation which ultimately increases 
the organization’s financial performance. Thus, understanding the complementarity 
among finance function roles might contribute to a competitive advantage for the 
organization.   
8.6 Limitations and future studies 
The common challenges confronting a cross-sectional study are that it does not 
allow for causal inferences and might be affected by measurement errors. 
Furthermore, we might have a common method bias problem using the same 
respondents to indicate exogenous and endogenous variables. The severity of this 
problem increases when the endogenous variable is perceived performance 
(Grabner and Speckbacher, 2016). However, we addressed this problem ex ante by 
randomizing the ordering of exogenous and endogenous variables and ex post by 
performing the Harmann one-factor test, and common method bias did not appear 
to be a big issue. Furthermore, we obtained responses from chief financial officers 
and chief operating officers and found that interrater-item agreement was within 
the threshold. We found that the simultaneous use of all four finance function roles 
showed complementary effects on behavioral differentiation and that behavioral 
differentiation positively affected the perceived performance of the finance 
function and the financial performance of the firm. Future studies can shed light on 
how the increased set of finance function roles is perceived by other functions in 
the firm. For example, one could imagine that other functions would be hostile 
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toward the increased set of roles as they might fear that the finance function is 
expanding its roles to their function’s turf. 
8.7 Appendix 1    
Appendix 1:Ttable 1: 
Survey items             
Adhocracy role 
       Please indicate the frequency of which the finance function perform the following activities 
 1: never, 2: very rarely, 3: rarely, 4: occasionally, 5: frequently, 6: very frequently, 7: almost always 
 ROLE 1 Provides advice on strategic matters to operations 
   ROLE 2 Develops and evaluates investment opportunities for the business 
  ROLE 3 Helps to set strategic directions and imperatives for the business 
  ROLE 4 Provides advice concerning growth and future potentials for the business 
 ROLE 5 Initiates strategic changes          
Compete role 
       Please indicate the frequency of which the finance function perform the following activities 
 1: never, 2: very rarely, 3: rarely, 4: occasionally, 5: frequently, 6: very frequently, 7: almost always 
 ROLE 6 Develops cost-savings plans for the business 
   ROLE 7 Advices other functions with respect to reaching financial and non-financial goals
 ROLE 8 Develops profit increasing plans for the firm 
   ROLE 9 Helps other functions finish projects 
    ROLE 10 Motivates other functions in the firm to reach their objectives   
Control role 
       Please indicate the frequency of which the finance function perform the following activities 
 1: never, 2: very rarely, 3: rarely, 4: occasionally, 5: frequently, 6: very frequently, 7: almost always 
 ROLE 11 Statutory tasks such as monthly close 
    ROLE 12 Variance analysis of cost and revenue incurred in other functions 
  ROLE 13 Monitors performance of other functions 
   ROLE 14 Administrates the firm's reporting system 
   ROLE 15 Prepares and implements budgets in other functions    
Collaborate Role 
       Please indicate the frequency of which the finance function perform the following activities 
 1: never, 2: very rarely, 3: rarely, 4: occasionally, 5: frequently, 6: very frequently, 7: almost always 
 ROLE 16 Establishes common objectives and values when communicating with other functions in the firm 
ROLE 17 Exhibits leadership towards other functions in the firm 
   ROLE 18 Aligns finance and operational systems with the business 
  ROLE 19 Collaborates with other functions and establishes consensus among them 
 ROLE 20 Actively listens to and legitimizes other employees' suggestions that affects the firm's financials  
Behavioral 
differentiation  
      Please indicate  the degree of which you agree with respect to the following statements 
 1: totally disagree, 2: disagree 3: partially disagree, 4: neutral, 5: partially agree, 6: agree, 7: strongly agree     
BD 1 The conduct of the finance function is in line with organizational expectations 
 BD 2 The level of activities performed by the finance function conform to organizational expectations 
BD 3 The finance function comply with internal customer demand on time 
 BD 4 The finance function performs activities with great quality    
Perceived performance 
      Please indicate the level of satisfaction with respect to the following statements 




PPERF 1 The reputation of the finance function in the firm 
   PPERF 2 The success of the finance function 
    PPERF 3 Performance of the finance function relative to finance functions in similar firms  
ERP integration 
       Please indicate  the degree of which you agree with respect to the following statements 
 1: totally disagree, 2: disagree 3: partially disagree, 4: neutral, 5: partially agree, 6: agree, 7: strongly agree     
ERP 1 
We use an IT-system that ensures great quality with respect to information and data input for the finance 
function 
ERP 2 
We use an IT-system in the finance function that ensures that we do not receive redundant or information and 
data that are not necessary 
Strategy 
       Please indicate the description of firms below that fit the most to your firm 
   PROSPECTOR These businesses are frequently the first-to-market with new product or service concepts.  
 
They do not hesitate to enter new market segments where there appears to be an opportunity.  
 
These businesses concentrate on offering products that push performance boundaries.  
 
Their proposition is an offer of the most innovative product, whether based on dramatic performance 
improvement or cost reduction 
ANALYZER These businesses are seldom ‘first-in’ with new products or services or to enter emerging market segments.  
 
However, by carefully monitoring competitors’ actions and customers’ responses to them,  
 
they can be ‘early-followers’ with a better targeting strategy, increased customer benefits, or lower total 
costs. 
DEFENDER 
These businesses attempt to maintain a relatively stable domain by aggressively protecting their product–
market position.  
 
They rarely are at the forefront of product or service development; instead they focus on producing goods or 
services as efficiently as possible 
 
These businesses generally focus on increasing share in existing markets by providing products at the best 
prices. 
REACTOR These businesses do not appear to have a consistent product–market orientation. 
   They primarily act to respond to competitive or other market pressures in the short term. 
 
8.8 Literature  
 
Adler, P. S., Borys, B. (1996). Two types of bureaucracy: Enabling or coercive. 
Administrative Science Quarterly. Vol. 41, pp. 61-89.   
Ahrens, T., Chapman, C. S. (2000). Occupational identity of management 
accountants in Britain and Germany. European Accounting Review, Vol. 9 No. 
4, pp. 477-498.  
 
Ahrens, T., Chapman, C. S. (2004). Accounting for Flexibility and Efficiency: A 
Field Study of Management Control Systems in a Restaurant Chain. 
157 
 
Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol. 21 No. 2, pp. 271-301.  
 Adler, P. S., Borys, B. (1996). Two types of bureaucracy: Enabling or coercive. 
Administrative Science Quarterly. Vol. 41, pp. 61-89.   
Anderson, D. R. The function of industrial controllership (1944). The Accounting 
Review, Vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 55-65.  
 
Bechtold et al., C., Reimer, M., Schäffer, U. (2014). The Multi-Role Job Profile of 
Controllers: A Double-Edged Sword. Working paper presented at the “New 
Directions in Management Accounting Research” conference 2014, Brussels, 
Belgium. 
Bentler, P. M. (1990). Comparative fit indexes in structural models. Psychological 
Bulletin, Vol. 107, pp. 238-246. 
Bentler, P. M. (1992). On the fit of models to covariances and methodology to the 
Bulletin. Psychological Bulletin, Vol. 112, pp. 400-404.  
Bollen, K. A. (1989), Structural equation with latent variables, New York: Wiley. 
Bozdogan, H. (1987). Model selection and Akaike's information criteria (AIC): 
The general theory and its analytical extensions. Psychometrika, Vol. 52, pp. 
345-370 . 
Browne, M. W., Cudeck, R. (1993). Alternative ways of assessing model fit. In: 
Bollen, K. A. Long, J. S. (Eds.). Testing Structural Equation Models. Sage, 
Newbury Park, California, pp. 136-162. 
Burke, M. J., Dunlap, W. P. (2002). Estimating interrater agreement with the 
average deviation index: A user’s guide. Organizational Research Methods. Vol. 
158 
 
5, No. 2, pp. 159-172.  
Burke, M. K., Finkelstein, L. M., Dusig, M. S. (1999). On average deviation 
indices for estimating interrater agreement. Organizational Research Methods. 
Vol. 2, pp. 49-68. 
Burns, J., Baldvindsdottir, G. (2005). An institutional perspective of accountants’ 
new roles – the interplay of contradictions and praxis. European Accounting 
Review. Vol. 14, No. 4, pp. 725-757. 
Byrne, S., Pierce, B. (2007). Towards a More Comprehensive Understanding of the 
Roles of Controllers, European Accounting Review, Vol. 16. no. 3, pp. 469-498. 
Byrne, B. M. (2010). Structural Equation Modeling with AMOS – Basic Concepts, 
Applications, and Programming. 2
nd
 edition, Routledge, Taylor & Francis 
Group. New York. 
Caglio, A. (2003). Enterprise Resource Planning Systems and Accountants: 
towards hybridization? European Accounting Review, Vol. 12 No. 1, pp. 123-
153.  
Cameron, Kim S., Robert E. Quinn., Jeff Degraff & Anjan V. Thakor. (2014). 
Competing Values Leadership. New Horizons in Management, 2
nd
 edition.  
Carmeli, A., Halevi, M. Y. (2009). How top management team behavioral 
integration and behavioral complexity enable organizational ambidexterity: The 




Cao, Q., Gedajlovic, E., Zhang, H. (2009). Unpacking organizational ambidexterity: 
Dimensions, contingencies and synergistic effects. Organization Science, vol. 
20, No. 4, pp. 781-796. 
Chang, H., Itnner, C. D., Paz, M., T. (2014). The multiple roles of the finance 
organization: Determinants, effectiveness, and the moderating influence of 
information system integration. Journal of Management Accounting Research, 
vol. 26. No. 2, pp. 1-32 
Chapman, C. S. (1998). Accountants in organizational networks. Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, Vol. 23 No. 8, pp. 737-766.  
Chenhall, R. (2003). Management control systems design within its organizational 
context: findings from contingency-based research and directions for the future. 
Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol. 28, pp. 127-168.  
Chreim, S. (2005). The continuity-change duality in narrative texts of 
organizational identity. Journal of Management Studies, Vol. 42, no. 3, pp. 567-
593. 
Dedreu, C. K. W. (1991). Productive conflict: The importance of conflict 
management and conflict issue. Using conflict in Organizations. Dedreu, C. K. 
W., Van de Vliert, E. (Eds.). Sage Publications: London.  
Denis, J., Langley, A., Sergi, V. (2012). Leadership in the plural. Academy of 
Management Annals, Vol. 6, January, pp. 211-283. 
Denison, D, R., Hoijberg, R., Quinn, R, E. (1995). Toward a Theory of Behavioral 




Dess, G. G., Robinson jr. R. B. (1984). Measuring organizational performance in 
the absence of objective measures: The case of the privately-held firm and 
conglomerate business unit. Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 
265-273.  
Donaldson, L. (2001). The contingency theory of organizations. Sage Publications: 
Thousands Oaks, CA.  
Drach-Zahavy, A., Freund, A. (2007). Team effectiveness under stress: A structural 
contingency approach. Journal of Organizational Behavior, Vol. 28, No. 4, pp. 
423-450. 
Ennen, E., Richter, A. (2010). The whole is more than the sum of its parts – or is it? 
A review of the empirical literature on complementarities in organizations. 
Journal of Management, Vol. 36 No. 1, pp. 207-233. 
Eustler, J., Lang, B. (2015). Rating scales in accounting research: The impact of 
scale points and labels. Behavioral Research in Accounting, Vol. 27 No. 2, pp. 
35-51. 
Floyd, S. W., Wooldridge, B. (1992). Middle management involvement in strategy 
and its association with strategic type: A research note. Strategic Management 
Journal, vol. 13, pp. 153-167. 
Fornell, C., and Larcker, D. F. 1981. Evaluating structural equation models with 
unobservable variables and measurement error. Journal of Marketing 
Research, vol, 43, pp. 39–50.  
Fullerton, R. R., Wempe, W. F. (2009). Lean manufacturing, non-financial 
performance measures, and financial performance. International Journal of 
161 
 
Production Management, Vol. 29 No. 3, pp. 214-240. 
Gerdin, J., Greve, J. (2004). Forms of contingency fit in management accounting 
research – A critical review. Accounting, Organizations & Society, Vol. 29 No. 
3-4, pp. 303-326 
Gibson, C. B. Birkinshaw, J. (2004). The antecedents, consequences, and 
mediation role of organizational ambidexterity. Academy of Management 
Journal, vol. 47. No. 2, pp. 209-226. 
Grabner, I., Moers, F. (2013). Management control as a system or a package? 
Conceptual and empirical issues. Accounting, Organizations & Society, Vol. 38, 
pp. 407-419. 
Grabner, I., Speckbacher, G. (2016). The cost of creativity: A control perspective. 
Accounting, Organizations and Society, vol. 48, pp. 31-42. 
Granlund, M., Lukka, L. (1998). Towards increasing business orientation: Finnish 
controllers in a changing cultural context, Management Accounting Research, 
Vol. 9, pp. 185-211 
Hall, M. (2008). The effect of comprehensive performance measurement systems 
on role clarity, psychological empowerment and managerial performance. 
Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol. 33, pp. 141-163. 
Hair, J., Black, W., Babin, B., Anderson, R. (2014). Multivariate data analysis (7th 
ed.). Pearson Education Limited. Edinburgh, England.  
Hansen, S. C., Van der Stede, W. A. (2004). Multiple facets of budgeting: an 
exploratory analysis. Management Accounting Research, vol. 15, pp. 415-439. 
162 
 
Hartmann, F. G. H., Maas, V. S. (2011). The effects of uncertainty on the roles of 
controllers and budgets:  an exploratory study. Accounting and Business 
Research, Vol. 41 No. 5, pp. 439-458. 
Hawawini, G., Viallet, C. (2011). Finance For Executives – Managing for Value 
Creation. South-Western Cengage Learning: Mason, OH. 
Hedström, P., Swedberg, R. (1996). Rational choice, empirical research and the 
sociological tradition. European Sociological Review, Vol. 12, pp. 127-146.  
Henri, J-F. (2006). Management control systems and strategy: A resource-based 
perspective. Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol. 31, No. 529-558. 
Hooijberg, R. (1996). A Multidirectional approach toward leadership: An extension 
of the concept of behavioral complexity. Human Relations, vol. 49, No. 4, pp. 
917-946. 
Hooijberg, R., Hunt, James. G., Dodge, G. E. (1997). Leadership Complexity and 
Development of the Leaderplex Model. Journal of Management, Vol. 23 No. 3, 
pp. 375-408. 
Ichniouwski, C., Shaw, K., Prennushi, G. (1997). The effects of human resource 
management practices on productivity: a study of steel finishing lines. American 
Economic Review, Vol. 87 No. 3, pp. 291-313.  
Jun, M., Cai, M. (2010). Examining the relationships between internal service 
quality and its dimensions, and internal customer satisfaction. Total Quality 
Management, Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 205-223.   




Inc., Chicago, IL. 
Järvenpää, J. (2007). Making business-partners: A case study on how management 
accounting culture was changed, European Accounting Review, vol. 16, No. 1, 
pp. 99-142. 
Kalliath, T. J., Bluedorn, A. C., Gillespie, D. F. (1999). A confirmatory factor 
analysis of the competing values instrument. Educational and Psychological 
Measurement, vol. 59, no. 1, pp. 143-158. 
Keyes, C. L., Hysom, S. J., Lupo, K. L. (2000). The positive organization: 
Leadership legitimacy, employee well-being, and the bottom-line. The 
Psychologist-Manger Journal, Vol. 4, No.  2, pp. 143-153. 
Kline, R.B. (2005). Principles and practice of structural equation modeling, 2
nd
 
edition. New York: The Guildford Press. 
Kline, R. B. (2011). Principles and practice of structural equation modeling, 3
rd
 
edition. New York: The Guildford Press. 
Lambert, C. Sponem, S. (2012). Roles, Authority, and Involvement of the 
Management Accounting Function: A Multiple Case-study Perspective. 
European Accounting Review, Vol. 21 No. 3, pp. 565-589.  
Laplume, A. O., Dass, P. (2012). Exploration and exploitation for various stages of 
firm growth through diversification. Paper presented at the annual meetings of 
the Academy of Mangement, Boston. 
Lawrence, K. A., Lenk, P., Quinn, R. E. (2009). Behavioral complexity in 
leadership: The psychometric properties of a new instrument to measure 
behavioral repertoire. The Leadership Quarterly, vol. 20, pp. 87-102.  
Lewis, M. W. (2000). Exploring Paradox: Toward a More Comprehensive Guide. 
The Academy of Management Review, Vol. 25 No. 4, pp. 760-776. 
164 
 
Lind, J. (2001). Control in world class manufacturing – A longitudinal case study. 
Management Accounting Research, vol. 12, pp. 41-74. 
Luft, J. Shields, M. D. (2007). Mapping management accounting. Graphics and 
guidelines for theory-consistent empirical research. In Handbook of 
Management Accounting Research, Vol. 1, Eds.: Chapman, C. S., Hopwood, A. 
G., Shields, M. D., pp. 27-95. Oxford: UK.  
Mahlendorf, M. D. (2014). Discussion of the roles of the finance organization: 
Determinants, effectiveness, and the moderating influence of information 
system integration, Journal of Management Accounting Research, vol. 26, No. 
2, pp. 33-42. 
Marsh, H. W. Hocevar, D. (1985). Application of confirmatory factor analysis to 
the study of self-concept: First- and higher order factor models and their 
invariance across groups. Psychological Bulletin, Vol. 97 No. 3, pp. 562-582. 
Maas, V, S., Matejka, M. (2009). Balancing the Dual Responsibilities of Business 
Unit Controllers: Field and Survey Evidence, The Accounting Review, Vol. 84, 
No. 4, pp. 1233-1253. 
Misra, A., Shah, R. (2009). In union lies strength: Collaborative competence in 
new product development and its performance effects. Journal of Operations 
Management, Vol. 27, pp. 324-338. 
Mouritsen, J. (1996). Five aspects of accounting department’s work, Management 
Accounting Research, Vol. 7, pp. 283-303. 
Mouritsen, J. (2004). Økonomifunktionens rolle og strategi. Håndbog i 
Økonomistyring, 1st edition. Revifora. 




O’Reilly, C., Tushman, M. L. (2008). Ambidexterity as a dynamic capability: 
Resolving the innovator’s dilemma. Research in Organizational Behavior, vol. 
28, pp. 185-206.  
O’Reilly, C., Tushman, M. L. (2013) Organizational ambidexterity: past, present, 
and future. The Academy of Management perspectives, vol. 27, No. 4, pp. 324-
338. 
Patel, P. C., Messersmith, J. G., Lepak, D. P. (2013). Walking the tightrope: An 
assessment of the relationship between high-performance work systems and 
organizational ambidexterity. Academy of Management Journal, vol. 56 No. 5, 
pp. 1420-1442.  
Pierce, B., O’Dea, T. (2003). Management accounting information and the needs of 
managers’ perceptions of managers and accountants compared. The British 
Accounting Review, vol. 35, pp. 257-290.  
Poole, M. S., Van de Ven, A. H. (1989). Using paradox to build management 
organization theories. The Academy of Management Review, Vol. 14, No. 4, pp. 
562-578.  
Podsakoff, P.M., Organ, D.W. (1986). Self-reports in organizational research: 
problems and prospects. Journal of Management, Vol. 12 No.4, pp. 531-544. 
Podsakoff, P. M., Mackensie, S. B., Lee, J. Y., Podsakoff, N. P. (2003). Common 
method bias in behavioral research: a critical review of the literature and 
recommended remedies. Journal of Applied Psychology, vol. 88, no. 5, pp. 879-
903. 
Quinn, R, E., Rohrbaugh, J. (1981). A Competing Values Approach to 
166 
 
Organizational Effectiveness, Public Productivity Review. Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 
122-140. 
Rindskopf, D. and Rose, T. (1988). Some theory and applications of confirmatory 
second-order factor analysis. Multivariate Behavioral Research, Vol. 23 No. 1, 
pp. 51-67.   
Sathe, V. (1983). The Controller’s Role in Management, Organizational Dynamics, 
Winter, pp. 31-48. 
Schad, J., Lewis, M. W., Raisch, S., Smith, W. (2016). Paradox Research in 
Management Science: Looking back to move forward. The Academy of 
Management Annals, April, pp. 1-60.   
Schermelleh-Engel, K., Moosbrugger, H., Muller, H. (2003). Evaluating the fit of 
structural equation models: tests of significance and descriptive goodness-of-fit 
measures. Methods of Psychological Research Online, Vol. 8 No. 2, pp. 23-74.  
Schmitt, A., Raisch, S. (2013). Corporate turnarounds: The duality of retrenchment 
and recovery. Journal of Management Studies, Vol. 50 No. 7, pp. 1216–1244. 
Schäffer, U. (2007). Management Accounting & Control Scales Handbook. 
Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag: Wiesbaden.  
Simon, H. A., H. Guetzkow, G. Kozmetsky, Tyndall. (1954). Centralization Versus 
Decentralization in Organizing the Controller’s Department. The 
Controllership Foundation: New York. 
Smith, W. K., Lewis, M. W. (2011). Toward a theory of paradox: A dynamic 
equilibrium model of organizing. The Academy of Management Review, Vol. 36 
No. 2, pp. 381-403. 
Slater, S. F., Olson, E. M. (2000). Strategy type and performance: the influence of 
sales force management. Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 21, pp. 813-829. 
Sorensen, J. (2009). Management Accountants in the United States: Practitioner 
and Academic Views of Recent Developments. Handbook of Management 
167 
 
Accounting Research, vol. 3. Chapman, C. S., Hopwood, A, G., Shields, M. D 
(Eds). Elsevier: U.K.    
Tanriverdi, H., Venkatraman, N. (2005). Knowledge relatedness and the 
performance of multibusiness firms. Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 26 No. 
2, pp. 97-119.  
Tucker, L. R., Lewis, C. (1973). A reliability coefficient for maximum likelihood 
factor analysis. Psychometrika, Vol. 38, pp. 1-10. 
Tubre, T. C., Collins, J. M. (2000). Jackson and Schuler (1985) revisited: A meta-
analysis of the relationships between role ambiguity, role conflict and job 
performance. Journal of Management, Vol. 26, pp. 155-169. 
Ylinen, M., Gullkvist, B. (2014). The effects of organic and mechanistic control in 
exploratory and exploitative innovations. Management Accounting Research, 
Vol. 25, pp. 93-112.  
Widener, S. K. (2007). An empirical analysis of the levers of control framework. 
Accounting, Organizations and Society, vol. 32, pp. 757-788. 
Williams, L. J., Gavin, M. B. and Hartman, N. S. (2004). Structural Equation 
modeling methods in strategy research: Applications and issue. In Research 
Methodology in Strategy and Management, 1. Ketchen, D. J. and Berg, D. D 
(Eds). Elsevier/JAI press, Connecticut, pp. 33-65.   
Weber, J. (2011). The development of controller tasks: explaining the nature of 
controllership and its changes. Journal of Management Control, Vol. 22 No. 25, 
pp. 25-45. 
Weissenberger, B. E., Angelkort, H. (2011). Integration of financial management 
accounting systems: The mediating influence of a consistent financial language 
168 
 
on controllership effectiveness. Management Accounting Research, vol. 22, pp. 
160-180. 
Whittington, R., Pettigrew, A., Peck, S., Fenton, E., Conyon, M. (1999). Change 
and complementarities in the new competitive landscape: A European panel 
study, 1992-1996. Organization Science, Vol. 10 No. 5, pp. 583-600. 
 
 
9. Paper 3: Lean and management accountants: Survey evidence of the 
roles of finance functions 
Henrik Nielsen
a
 and Thomas Borup Kristensen
a 
a
Department of Business and Management, Aalborg University 
 
Keywords: Lean operation, the roles of finance functions, structural equation 
modeling.  
Abstract 
Purpose: This paper studies the relations between Lean operations, Lean principles 
in finance functions, and the roles of finance functions.  
Design/Methodology/Approach: The paper uses structural equation modeling to 
analyze data from 408 different firms in the Danish production and services sectors. 
A dyadic approach is applied, as a sub-sample of 107 chief operating officers in the 
responding firms is used to investigate the construct validity, reliability, and 
average deviation index of the instrument measuring the roles of finance functions. 
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Findings: The paper finds that Lean operation firms emphasize four different yet 
interdependent roles of finance functions. The paper also finds that Lean operation 
leads to finance functions in Lean operation firms adapting Lean principles.  
Research limitations/implications: This paper characterizes Lean operation firms 
as contextually ambidextrous in order to predict relations between Lean operation 
and roles of finance functions. The paper expands prior case study findings on the 
roles of finance functions in Lean operation firms, and the findings of the paper 
underline that finance functions continue to play an important role in Lean 
operation firms. 
Practical implications: Decision makers in Lean operation firms should not be 
hesitant with respect to integrating finance function workers in the Lean operation. 
Furthermore, decision makers should understand that a balanced emphasis of the 
roles of finance functions is necessary in order to avoid overemphasizing 
exploitation at the expense of exploration or vice versa.  
Originality/value: This is the first paper to provide large-scale evidence of the 
roles of finance functions in Lean operation firms and to show that Lean principles 
from operations diffuse to the finance function. Furthermore, the paper introduces a 
new instrument for measuring finance function roles, based on the competing 
values framework.  
9.1. Introduction 
Research on the roles of finance functions has a relatively long history in 
management accounting research. It dates back to the 1940s (Anderson, 1944), 
although it gained momentum in the 1990s (e.g., Ahrens, 1997; Chapman, 1998; 
Granlund & Lukka, 1998; Mouritsen, 1996). A number of studies have explored 
the antecedents of finance function roles. For example, Caglio (2003), Granlund 
170 
 
and Malmi (2002), and Jarvenpäa (2007) studied how the implementation of 
enterprise resource planning systems affected finance function roles; Ahrens and 
Chapman (2000) studied differences in occupational identity and the roles of 
finance function workers in relation to the German and British nationalities; 
Granlund and Taipaleenmäki (2005) studied the roles of a finance function in a 
new economy firm; and Byrne and Pierce (2007) established comprehensive 
evidence of the antecedents of roles in a study of 16 companies. Based on the 
evidence presented in these papers, it is fair to say that finance functions workers 
spend more time on business-integrated roles, organizational design, and system 
development in comparison with, for example, the 1980s (Big Eight White Paper, 
1988). A specific firm characteristic that seems to influence the roles of finance 
functions is worth noting. In a firm implementing the process method of production, 
focusing on customer value and cost reductions, Burns and Baldvindsdottir (2005) 
found that controlling responsibility was transferred from finance function workers 
to operations after the implementation. However, new roles emerged and finance 
function workers were more involved in operations than they were prior to the 
implementation. This pattern is echoed in Lind's (2001) study of a firm 
implementing world class manufacturing
29
 and to some extent in Tillema and van 
der Steen's (2015) study of two companies implementing Lean manufacturing. As 
this paper focuses on the roles of finance functions in Lean firms, it seeks to extend 
their findings.  
In recent years, Lean has been widely adopted in production (Tillema & van der 
Steen, 2015) and service firms (Maleyeff, 2006). The implementation of a Lean 
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 Burns and Baldvindsdottir's (2005) descriptions of the program implemented in their case 
company resembles Lean, and we therefore include their findings. Furthermore, we 
consider world class manufacturing and Lean to be very similar and therefore include 






 affects the entire firm (Liker, 2004) as Lean is an enterprise-wide 
system where structures are aligned and people at all levels are involved and 
committed to the implementation (Emiliani et al., 2003; Furlan et al., 2011; 
Netland et al., 2015). In the management accounting literature, research has 
focused on how Lean affects management accounting systems, and recent evidence 
shows that firms adapt their management accounting systems to be congruent with 
Lean implementation (Kennedy & Widener, 2008; Fullerton et al., 2013; 2014). 
Except for a few case studies, there is no research on finance functions roles in 
Lean operation firms. 
Although highlighting the importance of cost accounting, Cooper (1996) raised a 
concern for finance function workers in Lean operation firms, as he predicted that 
most of their responsibilities would be transferred to employees in operational 
areas. Further, he claimed that only finance function workers who developed skills 
in change management, system design, and strategy would survive. This concern is 
echoed in more recent literature (Maskell et al., 2012). However, Kapanowski 
(2017) states that the finance function continues to encompass important roles in 
Lean firms with respect to controlling and monitoring performance, analyzing the 
financial impact of Lean results, and developing the Lean implementation.  
We view Lean operation firms through the lens of contextual ambidexterity 
(Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004). Contextually ambidextrous firms are characterized 
by having aligned all organizational structures in order for employees to balance 
simultaneous exploration and exploitation (Raisch et al., 2009). It is predicted that 
the finance functions are representative of these organizational structures, and we 
maintain that finance functions play an integral role in Lean operation firms. In 
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 We use the term "Lean operation" as our sample includes firms from the manufacturing 
and services sectors. 
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order to operationalize finance function roles as representing the organizational 
structures that enable contextual ambidexterity, we develop four roles based on the 
competing values framework (CVF) (Cameron et al., 2014), which sheds light on 
the different but necessary organizational elements that must permeate an 
ambidextrous organization (Carmeli & Harlevi, 2009). We also predict that finance 
function roles in Lean operation firms are interdependent because these roles 
represent organizational structures that must be in place and must be balanced in 
order for the firm to simultaneously exploit and explore (cf. Cao et al., 2009).  
Practices and systems in Lean operation firms are recognized as being tightly 
coupled (Roberts, 2004). This, we argue, not only requires that practices and 
systems be adapted to fit the Lean implementation but it also implies that Lean 
increases the extent to which functions in a Lean operation firm depend on one 
another for assistance, communication, coordination and compliance with respect 
to the performance of their respective tasks. It also increases the extent to which 
successful ideas are shared throughout the firm (Ross, 1974). We predict that Lean 
diffuses from operations to finance functions in that finance functions in Lean 
operation firms adopt Lean principles. Further, it is argued that finance functions 
which employ Lean principles obtain a greater understanding of customer demands 
and greater flexibility, and we predict that this affects finance function role 
emphases in Lean operation firms.  
Using a sample of 408 firms from the Danish manufacturing and service sectors, 
we apply structural equation modeling (SEM) to examine the predicted 
relationships. We contribute to the literature in three main ways. We are the first to 
provide large-scale survey evidence of finance function roles in Lean operation 
firms. We find that a Lean operation increases emphasis on four roles; 1) the 
collaborate role focusing on alignment and cooperation, 2) the adhocracy role 
173 
 
focusing on growth, adaption to the environment and innovation, 3) the compete 
role focusing on cost-reduction, goal-setting, and productivity, and 4) the control 
role focusing on consistency, predictability, and monitoring of performance. We 
also find that the roles of finance functions are interdependent. Altogether, these 
findings respond to a call made by Fullerton et al. (2014), who welcome more 
research that increases understanding of the interplay between management 
accounting and Lean. They also respond to Mahlendorf (2014), who welcomes 
research on interdependencies among finance function roles. Second, we respond 
to Byrne and Pierce (2007), who call for research on more contemporary finance 
function roles in other sectors than manufacturing. Third, we use the CVF as 
theoretical guidance to develop a measurement instrument for finance function 
roles specifically pertaining to Lean operation firms. We apply a dyadic approach 
(Schäffer, 2007) as we also use sub-sample of COOs in the firms where the CFO 
responded in order to verify the construct validity, reliability, and interrater 
agreement of the instrument.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we go through 
the literature and develop hypotheses. In Section 3, the sample and methods are 
presented and, in Section 4, we present the results. Results are discussed and 
conclusions are presented in Section 5, while Section 6 presents the limitations of 
this paper.  
9.2 Background literature and hypotheses development 
There is little empirical evidence pertaining to the roles of finance functions in 
Lean operation firms in the academic literature. Lind (2001) studied the 
implementation of world class manufacturing in a Swedish firm and found that 
finance function employees were involved with operations with respect to 
perfecting and sharing financial and nonfinancial information with managers, and 
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they were acting as partners of the managers' daily work. This had been not the 
case prior to the implementation. Tillema and van der Steen (2015) studied the 
implementation of Lean manufacturing in decentralized manufacturing units in two 
firms. Both units had a local finance function. In one of the units, the finance 
function supported operations with respect to developing non-financial measures 
and connecting them with financial measures. In the other unit, the local finance 
function translated non-financial Lean progression to headquarters. In both units, 
there were tensions with headquarters, as headquarters continued to rely on 
financial information whereas the local manufacturing units relied on Lean-related 
non-financial information. The local finance functions tried to alleviate these 
tensions but were "caught in the middle" between satisfying reporting requirements 
to headquarters and supporting local Lean development. Kennedy and Widener 
(2008) studied the implementation of Lean manufacturing in a case firm. They 
found that a Lean accountant actively led the necessary transformation of the case 
firm's management control system in order to provide employees the information 
they needed for Lean related decision-making.  
Studying the implementation of world class manufacturing in a case firm, Jazayeri 
and Hopper (1999) found that most control of performance was transferred from 
the finance function to operations personnel through the use of an MRP system and 
the generation and use of quality reports. These reports removed the finance 
function as an information filter and enabled employees to act as consultants and to 
play creative roles within teams at strategic and operational levels. However, the 
finance function continued to provide financial information to managers at higher 
hierarchical levels. Ezzamel et al. (2008) studied the role of accounting in a firm 
implementing a continuous improvement program. The firm emphasized a linking 
of accounting metrics with operations in order to secure that accounting metrics 
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were understood and acted upon by operations employees. A senior accountant 
who was responsible for strengthening the linkages focused on working closely 
with operations. This close collaboration made the finance function aware of 
relevant accounting metrics for operations, and these metrics were ultimately 
visualized on the shop floor.  
Burns and Baldvindsdottir (2005) focused on the implementation of the process 
way of working, which resembles Lean operation in the sense that the primary 
focus of the process way of working is on satisfying customer demands and 
reducing costs. They found that much controlling and budgeting responsibility was 
transferred from the finance function to operations personnel. However, the finance 
function took on other roles after the implementation. First, the finance function 
taught business managers financial accounting in order for them to take on this new 
responsibility. Second, although it was to a small extent, finance function workers 
assisted business managers in financial accounting related matters, and they also 
tweaked management accounting systems to comply more with the needs of 
business managers. Third, finance function workers advised product stream leaders 
in strategic matters and risks.  
In sum, it appears from these studies that finance functions are involved in 
performance system design and that they work closely together with operations in 
Lean firms. In some cases, the control of operative performance in Lean operation 
firms is transferred to operations personnel, and finance functions still appear to 
perform financial controlling, although to a lesser extent and primarily as a 
function of demands from higher hierarchical levels. It is difficult to draw general 
inferences from these single-firm studies, and some findings are confounding. Thus, 
to show how management accounting can support firms implementing Lean, a 
cross-sectional study is needed (Jazayeri & Hopper, 1999). No cross-sectional 
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study has explored what finance functions do in Lean operation firms, and Cooper's 
(1996) predictions have consequentially not been studied to determine whether 
they have held. We rely on the notion of contextual ambidextrous organizations 
(Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004) to explore the roles of finance functions in Lean 
firms. Contextual ambidexterity means that the organization has structures 
permeating the entire organization that enable its members to simultaneously 




9.2.1 Lean operation firms and ambidexterity  
March (1991) notes that exploitation is about efficiency, control, and variance 
reduction, while exploration is about search, discovery, autonomy, and innovation. 
Overemphasizing exploitation at the expense of exploration causes organizational 
myopia (Radner, 1975), competency traps (Levitt and March, 1988), and a loss of 
long-term competitive advantages as a function of changing contingencies; 
overemphasizing exploration at the expense of exploitation is destructive as the 
firm neglects to exploit current competencies and potentially leaps from one search 
failure to another (Levinthal & March, 1993). Thus, March (1991) argued, it is 
necessary to maintain a proper balance between exploitation and exploration for 
firms to prosper. Firms that are able to balance exploration and exploitation are 
conceptualized as ambidextrous organizations (Tushman and O'Reilly, 1996). 
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 Most literature connecting ambidexterity and Lean uses the term "Toyota Production 
System." In the next section, we use "Toyota Production System" whenever used by the 
presented literature. Otherwise we use "Lean operation" throughout the paper to ensure 
parsimony and coherence. It is justifiable to do so, as Lean rests upon the Toyota 
Production System (Krafscik, 1988). 
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Lean firms possess the characteristics of ambidextrous organizations (Adler et al., 
2009). An example is Adler's (1999) description of how the Toyota Production 
System works: workers are expected to follow standardized work, which is the 
current best way of performing a process. In addition, inventory is assigned a circle 
on the floor indicating the location and highlighting the acceptable inventory level, 
and work tools have a specified place at every work station (Brunner et al., 2010). 
Also, materials follow predefined flows throughout the operation facility, and the 
kanban system ensures a standardized amount of items flowing between work 
stations (Emiliani et al., 2003). Thus, the Toyota Production System employs 
precepts of scientific management relying heavily on standardization (Adler et al., 
2009). This standardization is employed for reducing variability in processes in 
order to ensure consistent output (Liker, 2004) and leads to exploitation. However, 
finding and setting a standard is an effort pertaining to all organizational members, 
as employees and management both participate in identifying and setting the ideal 
(Adler & Borys, 1996). Employees enjoy great flexibility and are encouraged to 
continuously challenge standards in the pursuit of improvement that is both 
incremental, kaizen, and radical, kakushin (Adler et al., 2009) and that can foster 
exploration.  
The Toyota Production System also emphasizes what Brunner et al. (2010) 
characterize as deliberate perturbations. Deliberate perturbations are novel stimuli 
that disrupt the execution of otherwise standardized processes (Adler et al., 2009). 
For example, the Toyota Production System uses a feature called jidoka, which 
basically translates to autonomation (Liker, 2004). Jidoka is a device that stops 
manufacturing if problems are about to or do occur, typically with the use of an 
andon cord that, when activated, creates a perturbation (Brunner et al, 2009). 
Workers pull the andon cord, which triggers a sound and lights up a visual control 
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board, after which workers and the manufacturing leader gather, discuss, and solve 
the problem by improving the process (exploration). Firms following the Toyota 
Production System intentionally shrink inventories to low levels (Womack & Jones, 
2003). This is done to reduce waste as well as to induce perturbations (Brunner et 
al., 2010). The low levels of inventories reduce slack and make workers fail in 
unpredictable ways, thereby inducing perturbations. The use of deliberate 
perturbations necessitates that employees be trained in problem solving and 
continuous improvement and that they be empowered, which is the case in firms 
following the Toyota Production System (Spear & Bowen, 1999). Higher level 
deliberate perturbations occur during during product development as well. For 
example, if a product does not qualify according to the expected objectives, be they 
cost objectives, quality objectives, or customer demands, the development stops 
and the processes are analyzed, resulting in either the refinement of processes or 
the development of a different product (Brunner et al., 2010). In sum, the Toyota 
Production System emphasizes both exploration and exploitation.  
Ambidexterity comes in three forms: sequential, structural, and contextual. 
Sequential ambidexterity means that firms focus on exploration at one point in time 
and then focus on exploitation at another point in time (Laplume & Dass, 2012); 
structurally ambidextrous firms dedicate some organizational units to performing 
exploration and others to pursuing exploitation (O'Reilly & Tushman, 2008). 
Contextual ambidexterity means that firms build structures that permeate all 
functions, enabling simultaneous exploitative and exploratory efforts (O'Reilly & 
Tushman, 2013). Specifically, Gibson and Birkinshaw (2004) describe contextual 
ambidexterity as a multidimensional construct where flexibility and control each 
constitute separate, but interrelated, non-substitutable elements that cause the entire 
organization to integrate and adapt so that the organization may explore and exploit 
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simultaneously. In Gibson and Birkinshaw's view, contextually ambidextrous firms 
require a supportive collaborative structure that encourages employees to make 
their own judgment of to how to divide their time between exploration and 
exploitation.  
The contextual form of ambidexterity corresponds with a Lean operation. In a Lean 
operation firm, all functions and systems are congruent and aligned in order for the 
firm to achieve success with the implementation of the Lean operation (e.g., Adler 
et al., 2009; Liker, 2004; Roberts, 2004), and we argue that the roles of finance 
functions in Lean operation firms are representative of the congruent organizational 
structures that enable employees to simultaneously perform exploitation and 
exploration. In the next section, the CVF is described as a means for 
operationalizing the roles of finance functions in Lean firms, and the hypotheses 
are developed in the subsequent sections.  
9.2.2 The competing values framework and the roles of finance functions 
The CVF is used to measure and operationalize the roles of finance functions in 
Lean firms because it provides a framework for analyzing the underlying 
organizational structures that must be in place and balanced in order to achieve 
simultaneous exploration and exploitation (Carmeli & Halevi, 2009). Furthermore, 
the CVF encompasses the characteristics of exploitation and exploration that are 
suggested by March (1991). The CVF highlights contradictory yet interdependent 
organizational components by shedding light on differences between control and 
flexibility and between internal and external focus (Cameron et al., 2014) (see 
Figure 1). The combination of these two dimensions—control versus flexibility and 
internal focus versus external focus—forms four quadrants with different foci 
(Hooijberg, 1996). The internal focus and flexibility axes form the collaborate 
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quadrant, which is characterized by an emphasis on internal alignment, autonomy, 
and cooperation (Cameron et al., 2014). The external focus and flexibility axes 
define the adhocracy quadrant, which emphasizes growth, adaption to the 
environment (Lawrence et al., 2009), and innovation (Losonci et al., 2017). The 
collaborate and the adhocracy quadrants represent exploration. The control and 
external focus axes form the compete quadrant, where the overarching emphasis is 
on cost reduction, goal-setting, and increasing productivity (Lawrence et al., 2009). 
Last, the control and internal focus axes create the control quadrant, which 
emphasizes consistency and predictability, monitoring of performance, and 
planning (Cameron et al., 2014). The control and market quadrant represent 
exploitation, and the four quadrants and their foci represent the distinctions 
between the four different finance function roles in this paper
32
. The CVF is 
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 The CVF was developed by Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1981) and it was originally intended 
for measuring organizational effectiveness. Since then it has been applied in a wide and 
diverse range of research, such as the investigation of paradoxical leadership behavior 
(Denison et al., 1995; Buenger et al., 1996), organizational culture and strategy (Bluedorn 
& Lundgren, 1993) and fit between organizations' value emphases and the environment 













9.2.3 Hypotheses development 
9.2.3.1 Lean and exploitative roles of finance functions 
Lean firms rely heavily on standardized work (Liker & Meier, 2006), which 
includes detailed descriptions of the current best known ways for employees to 
perform work processes. This includes explanations of how work processes should 
be performed as well as pictures of work processes, which are assigned time 
intervals including the length of time it should take to carry them out. Standardized 
work is implemented to reduce variance (Womack & Jones, 2003) and ultimately 
to provide the highest quality product or service at the lowest cost possible (Liker 























Figure 1: The competing values framework 
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and financial controls to be visualized throughout the organization (Liker, 2004) in 
order to detect any deviations from the standard and to guide employees. When 
deviations occur, the focus is on the process, not on the "people" (Emiliani et al., 
2003), and analyses of financial and non-financial information are performed. For 
example, when increasing their emphasis on non-financial information, Lind (2001) 
found that managers in operations also received standard cost reports and that these 
were used in concert with non-financial information to analyze flow group 
performance. Ezzamel and Wilmott (1998) made similar findings in a case firm 
that restructured operational processes. The firm continued to rely on financial 
information to control work group performance. Besides providing and analyzing 
financial and non-financial information, finance functions operate as translators of 
Lean results and measures to top management (Tillema & van der Steen, 2015). 
This pertains to Lean progression, project results, and budgeting (Kapanowski, 
2017), where budgeting involves cross-functional meetings in which sales and 
marketing employees provide forecasts of the expected sales for the next 12 
months, production employees provide information on capacity levels, and finance 
employees bring financial information (Maskell et al., 2012). Operations 
employees also create profit and loss statements pertaining to their value streams, 
and it is the responsibility of the finance function to do the month-end 
consolidating reporting (Kapanowski, 2017; Maskell et al., 2012). In ambidextrous 
firms, control activities are vital in that they ensure stability and certainty and that 
they connect efforts with clear feedback rapidly (March, 1991). This leads to our 
first hypothesis:  




Standardized work in Lean firms is a prerequisite for continuous improvement 
(Liker & Meier, 2006), and when proven improvements are identified or 
contingencies change, standards are updated accordingly (Ahrens & Chapman, 
2004). Potential improvements are typically analyzed with respect to cost 
reductions obtained by implementing a changed process (Turney & Stratton, 1992), 
but costs associated with the implementation are also analyzed; finance functions 
identify and evaluate the relevant information and calculate the financial impact of 
the improvement (Kapanowski, 2017). For example, Ezzamel and Wilmott (1998) 
found that finance function employees were responsible for identifying and 
calculating the outcomes of different strategies with respect to the restructuring of 
manufacturing facilities in their case firm. Sharing this information with operations 
workers enables them to choose between alternatives for improvement and 
enhances the outcomes of the improvements (Lind, 2001). Cooper (1995) also 
notes that workers can be expected to effectively commit to targets and achieve 
cost reductions only if the relevant cost information is shared with them. The 
sharing of cost information thus helps improve decision making as well as fosters 
and preserves motivation (Drury, 1992), because workers are assured that their 
work efforts cause improvements in their firm. The focus on the continuous 
refinement of current processes increases the likelihood of positive returns for 
performing these processes (March, 1991). The refinement thus ensures that firms 
continue to exploit current competencies in a familiar niche (He & Wong, 2004). 
This leads us to the second hypothesis:  





9.2.3.2 Lean and exploratory roles of finance functions 
The implementation of a Lean operation involves delegating autonomy to 
employees (Fullerton et al., 2013). This delegation is necessary as employees are 
expected to execute the day-to-day decisions and continuous improvement related 
to the Lean operation implementation. Furthermore, breakdowns or delays have 
severe effects both upstream and downstream in Lean operation firms, as 
organizational components are tightly coupled (Roberts, 2004). This further 
substantiates the need for fast decision-making and for empowerment of employees, 
which requires that employees be provided with the necessary real-time operative 
information to make well-informed decisions. Lean operation firms transform their 
management accounting system so that the information is simple (Fullerton et al., 
2013) and understandable for operations employees, with an increased emphasis on 
non-financial information (Lind, 2001; Maskell et al., 2012). McVay et al. (2013) 
argue that the finance function should take the role as a leader in this 
transformation by listening to suggestions regarding the change of the management 
accounting system and by collaborating with operations personnel. This echoes the 
findings of Kennedy and Widener (2008) and Burns and Baldvindsdottir (2005). 
The provision of the tailored real-time information thus enables the delegation of 
autonomy to employees, making them capable of executing day-to-day decisions, 
managing trade-offs, and performing experimentation. Autonomy is important for 
employees in ambidextrous firms (March, 1991), and it increases their potential to 
generate innovations (Patel et al., 2013). Thus, we hypothesize the following: 




Customer value is of paramount importance to Lean firms (Womack & Jones, 
2003), and customers are analyzed in the sense that Lean firms acquire information 
on customer needs and integrate this information into product development and 
planning activities. The information can be used in radical innovations for new 
markets or products. Product innovation is based on employee suggestions and 
information on customer needs obtained, for example, through surveys (Brunner et 
al., 2010). The processes for radical product innovations are basically similar to 
those of incremental innovations or improvements but are different in terms of how 
opportunities or problems are framed (Womack & Jones, 2003), in that radical 
innovations typically involve a cross-functional effort (Karlsson & Åhlström, 
1996). For example, the price that customers are willing to pay for a new product is 
compared with development and manufacturing costs and a target profit (Modaress 
et al., 2005). Such analysis involves development engineers, operations personnel, 
and the finance function. This cross-functional framing of product development 
reduces the equivocality of goals and combines knowledge synergies (Jansen et al., 
2009), thus increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of innovations. Finance 
functions play an important role here because they deal with business fundamentals 
such as which products should be produced, which customers should be targeted 
(Ahrens, 1997), and which investments should be undertaken (Järvenpää, 2007). 
Thus, we hypothesize the following:  
H1d: The implementation of Lean operations is positively associated with the 
adhocracy role. 
9.2.3.3 Lean operation and Lean principles in the finance function 
As noted, Lean is an enterprise-wide system (Liker, 2004; Shah & Ward, 2007) in 
which all employees are engaged in continuous improvement (Furlan et al., 2011). 
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Given that these systems and practices are interdependent (Roberts, 2004), we 
argue that the implementation of the Lean operation increases the extent to which 
functions in a Lean operation firm depend on one another for assistance, 
communication, coordination, and compliance in the performance of their 
respective tasks. This is not necessarily limited to when finance functions adapt 
practices and systems congruent with the Lean operation implementation: 
interdependence among functions in a firm also increases the intra-organizational 
diffusion of systems and practices, as employees in different functions are more 
likely to use the same systems and practices (Kim & Srivastava, 1997). 
Furthermore, the ensuing communication and interaction among employees in 
different functions enables the sharing and dispersion of ideas (Ross, 1974) on 
what works and do not work in different functional settings. With respect to a Lean 
operation, this does not necessarily imply that the entire set of Lean principles is 
adopted by other functional areas, as their settings are different (Geoirgescu, 2011). 
However, McVay et al. (2013) argue that transferring Lean to finance functions 
should include the identification and standardization of all repetitive procedures, a 
focus on understanding internal customer needs, and an emphasis on continuously 
improving procedures according to these demands. We thus hypothesize the 
following:  
H2: The implementation of a Lean operation is positively associated with an 
increased focus on Lean principles in the finance function. 
9.2.3.4 Lean principles in the finance function and the roles of finance functions 
Lean operation is implemented to eliminate waste, increase efficiency, and to 
create quality products according to customer demand (Liker, 2004). Research 
finds that a Lean operation improves lead time (e.g., Khachanapong et al., 2014) 
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and flexibility (e.g., Bortolotti et al., 2014), which in turn enables workers to 
increase focus on continuous improvement and innovation, creating value for 
customers. Studying Lean in a software provider, Staats et al. (2011) found that 
standardization decreased the cognitive focus and the time that workers otherwise 
spent on repetitive tasks. Relatedly, Granlund and Malmi (2002) found that the 
automation of repetitive processes resulting from an implementation of an ERP-
system freed capacity for finance function workers. Brewer and Kennedy (2013) 
describe how an implementation of Lean in a finance function freed capacity for 
workers and enabled them to better serve the needs of their internal customers. 
Accordingly, we argue that that the implementation of Lean finance frees cognitive 
and time-wise capacity spent on repetitive tasks such as regulatory reporting, 
changes focus to improving processes, and enables a greater understanding of 
internal customer demands. As we elaborated in Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2, internal 
customers in Lean operation firms require finance function roles that support the 
stability, certainty, and refinement of current operational processes as well as 
innovation, system alignment, and autonomy. Thus, we hypothesize the following: 
H3a: Lean finance is positively associated with the control role. 
H3b: Lean finance is positively associated with the compete role. 
H3c: Lean finance is positively associated with the collaborate role.  
H3d: Lean finance is positively associated with the adhocracy role. 
9.2.3.5 Interdependence among finance function roles  
According to Gibson and Birkinshaw's (2004) view of contextually ambidextrous 
organizations, structures in such organizations are non-substitutable and 
interdependent. This means that an increase or decrease in an innovation activity 
leads to an increase or decrease, respectively, in an efficiency related activity in 
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order to maintain the balance between exploration and exploitation (Cao et al., 
2009). There is not much evidence of interdependencies among finance function 
roles. Sathe (1983) argued that interdependencies exist between the functional and 
local responsibilities of "strong" controllers: by getting more closely involved in 
local decision-making, they would be in a better position to perform their 
functional duties. However, Maas and Matejka (2009) found that these 
responsibilities were in fact substitutes. In their cross-sectional study of the 
determinants of finance function roles, Chang et al. (2014) found that 
interdependencies existed among three roles, which they labeled strategic partner, 
performance management and reporting, and compliance and control/risk 
management. We predict that the four finance function roles are interdependent in 
Lean operation firms. For example, advice from the finance function pertaining to 
innovations (the adhocracy role) is more viable if the finance function has 
substantial knowledge of the current practices in operations (the control role). 
Similarly, calculations of the effects of potential improvement efforts (the compete 
role) are better informed if the finance function includes suggestions for 
improvement stemming from operations (the collaborate role). The development of 
cost-saving plans (the compete role) is better supported if these plans are based on 
knowledge of the current performance in operations (the control role). Last, 
providing strategic advice to operations (the adhocracy role) is more legitimized if 
the finance function exhibits leadership towards operations (the collaborate role). 
Based on these arguments
33
, the following hypothesis is formulated: 
H4: The four roles of finance functions in Lean firms are interdependent.  
                                                     
33
 This argument corresponds with congruence theory and implies that decision makers in 
Lean firms are aware of the interdependence between the roles of finance functions and that 
they make, more or less, optimal decisions (Grabner & Moers, 2013).   
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9.3.1 Data and sample  
Our sample is taken from the Danish database of registered companies, which 
includes all Danish firms. The database contains information on firm names and 
addresses, financial information, top management team information, sector codes, 
and employee information. For the survey, we included privately and publicly held 
firms as well as firms in the government and not-for-profit sector. Firms had to 
Figure 2: Research model 
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have more than 50 employees, and we selected CFOs as our target respondents, as 
done by other survey research papers on the roles of finance functions (e.g., Chang 
et al., 2014; Mouritsen, 1996). We identified 1775 usable firms for the survey. 
Contact information on CFO was collected via telephone, and firms were provided 
details of the research.  
Data collection via email included a link to an online survey instrument, and 
collection was conducted in two rounds from July 2016 until December 2016. We 
conducted a third round of data collection via postal mail in January 2017. In total, 
responses from 525 firms were received, yielding a response rate of 29.5 percent, 
which is similar to the 10–30 percentage range reported in recent studies in 
management accounting that survey top management members (e.g., Baines & 
Langfield-Smith, 2003; Henri, 2006; Widener, 2007). Sample characteristics are 
presented in Table 1. As accounting data related to control variables was necessary 
for this paper
34
, we excluded not-for-profit and government firms from the sample, 
yielding a sample size of 408 firms. We assessed potential nonresponse bias by 
comparing responding and nonresponding firms. T-tests were used to compare 
these groups with respect to the number of employees (respondents vs. 
nonrespondents T: .651 p. .515), 2015 revenues (respondents vs. nonrespondents 
T: .392, p. 695), and 2015 return on assets (respondents vs. nonrespondents T: .143, 
p. .633). None of the results indicated nonresponse bias. Respondents were 48.5 
years of age on average, had worked 9 years in the current firm, and had 5.9 years 
of tenure in their current position. Therefore, they had several years of experience 
on which to base their answers to the questionnaire.  
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 We use archival data to reduce common method bias concerns. 
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After completing the collection of data from the CFOs, we found names and 
contact information on the chief operating officer (COO) of the firms for which the 
CFOs had responded. Two rounds of data collection were performed, one via e-
mail and one via postal mail. In total, 107 responses were received. We used the 
responses from the COOs to investigate interrater agreement of the factors 
representing the roles of finance functions'
35
 and to ensure their construct validity 
and reliability. We compared firms in the sample from which only the CFO 
responded with firms in the subsample for which we received responses from the 
CFO and the COO. T-tests used to compare groups with respect to the number of 
employees (T: .839, p. .402), 2015 revenue (T: .452, p. .652), and 2015 return on 
assets (T: .523, p. .601) did not produce significant results. The COOs were 49.5 
years of age on average, had worked 12.6 years in their firms, and had 6.9 years 
tenure in their current position.  
Table 1: Sample characteristics     
Manufacturing n= 193 Service n=215 
Iron and Rubber 30% Retailing 42% 
Machines  30% Finance  24% 
Food  13% Transportation 14% 
Textiles 7% Utilities 10% 
Electronics 6% Other 7% 
Chemicals 4% Communication 2% 
Health-care 4% Property 1% 
Furniture  3% 
  




    
Total 100%   100% 
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 This also reduces the likelihood that our results are driven by social desirability bias. 
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9.3.2 Variable measurement 
The questionnaire consisted of 158 items. However, we included only a portion of 
the questionnaire for analysis in this paper. All items were measured on a labeled 
Likert scale with a range of 1–7. Eutsler and Lang (2015) have shown that labeled 
scales are superior to unlabeled scales as they reduce measurement error, centrality, 
and extreme response bias. Furthermore, a range of 1–7 increases the variance in 
the responses (Eutsler & Lang, 2015). 
9.3.2.1 Lean production  
We measure Lean production in operational areas using five items capturing 1) the 
degree of flow; 2) the degree of continuous improvement; 3) the degree to which 
employees are multifunctional; 4) the degree to which the production or 
operational areas are structured in cells, and 5) the degree to which standardization 
is implemented in the production or operational areas. All items are based on 
Fullerton et al. (2013). 
9.3.2.2 Roles of the finance function 
We performed a literature review of empirical research in order to capture a sound 
base of items pertaining to the roles of finance functions. The terms "controller," 
"role," "management accounting"/"accountant" and "role" were searched for in 
paper titles and abstracts in the EBSCO host business source premier database and 
the ABI/INFORM database. We reviewed 31 papers, of which 23 were published 
in highly ranked journals
36
. Mahlendorf (2014) draws attention to the fact that 
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 We reviewed 34 papers, of which 23 were published in highly ranked journals: European 
Accounting Review: 10, Management Accounting Research: 7, Accounting, Organizations 




finance function roles typically share the characteristics of practiced-defined 
variables rather than theoretical variables, and he refers to Luft and Shields (2007), 
who argue that, compared with practiced-defined variables, "…theory-defined 
variables are more likely to have well-defined, stable, unitary meanings, making it 
possible to identify consistent cause and effect relations" (pp. 43). In the empirical 
context of Lean firms, we rely on the CVF to predict relations between Lean and 
the roles of finance functions, because the CVF captures the organizational 
structures necessary for contextual ambidexterity (Carmeli & Halevi, 2009). Thus, 
we use the CVF as a lens to identify items and descriptions of finance function 
activities in previous research that fit to each quadrant's underlying values. We 
measure finance function roles via activities to reduce the effects of social 
desirability bias (Mahlendorf, 2014) and we use a frequency scale to capture the 
frequency with which respondents "perceived the roles to be part of their work 
activity rather than [measured] the number of times a given activity was 
performed" (Floyd & Wooldridge, 1992).  
We used four items to measure the adhocracy role. Item 1 was based on Burns and 
Baldvindsdottir's (2005) findings covering the frequency with which the finance 
function provides operations with advice on strategic matters. Item 2 was from 
Maas and Matejka (2009) and was intended to capture the frequency with which 
the finance function develops new investment potential. Item 3 was adapted from 
Chang et al. (2014) to capture the frequency with which the finance function helps 
to set strategic imperatives and directions for the firm, and Item 4 was based on the 
findings of Goretzki et al. (2013) to capture the frequency with which the finance 
function contributes with advice on growth and future potential for the firm.  
The compete role was measured using four items. Items 1, 2, and 3 were adapted 
from Maas and Matejka (2009) to cover the frequency with which the finance 
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function 1) develops cost-savings plans for the firm, 2) analyzes customer and 
product profitability, and 3) helps other functions reaching their targets. Item 4 was 
based on Lambert and Sponems' (2012) findings and covers the frequency with 
which the finance function promotes fast decision-making. 
Four items are used to measure the control role. Item 1 was based on Burns and 
Baldvindsdottir's (2005) findings and was intended to capture the frequency with 
which the finance function performs variance analysis of costs incurred and 
revenue incurred by other functions. Item 2 was adapted from Chang et al. (2014) 
to capture the frequency with which the finance function monitors the performance 
of other functions. Item 3 was developed on the basis of Goretzki et al. (2013) and 
covers the frequency with which the finance function performs forecasting, while 
Item 4 was adapted from Mouritsen (1996) to capture the frequency with which the 
finance function participates in budget preparation and implementation in other 
functions.  
We used four items to measure the collaborate role. We developed Item 1 to 
capture the frequency with which the finance function exhibits leadership towards 
other functions in the firm. Item 2 was adapted from Chang et al. (2014) to capture 
the frequency with which the finance function aligns management control systems 
to the firm's business. Item 3 was based on the findings of Pierce and O'dea (2003) 
to cover the frequency with which the finance function collaborates with other 
functions to establish consensus between functions. We developed the fourth item 
to measure the frequency with which the finance function listens to and helps 





9.3.2.3 Lean principles in the finance function 
Lean practices used in an operational setting may not be directly translated to the 
finance function (Dilton-Hill, 2015), and no study has developed measures for 
assessing the extent of Lean in such a setting. We drew on the Lean service 
literature. All items were based on Malmbrandt and Åhlström (2013). Item 1 
captures the degree to which the finance function understands customers' needs. 
Item 2 captures the degree to which the finance function performs continuous 
improvement. Item 3 captures the degree to which finance functions focus on 
problem solving, and Item 4 captures the extent of standardized work. All survey 
items can be found in Appendix 2.  
9.3.2.3 Control variables 
Size is controlled for by relating size to all four roles, as size might indicate that 
firms have more resources at their disposal that can be directed to both exploration 
and exploitation (Mom et al., 2008). Size is measured as the natural log of the total 
number of full-time-equivalents employed by the firm. Chang et al. (2014) found 
that environmental uncertainty was positively related to an increased emphasis on 
compliance and control and on supporting firm growth. We accordingly model a 
relationship between environmental uncertainty and the control role and between 
environmental uncertainty and the adhocracy role. Environmental uncertainty is 
measured by the standard deviation of the sales growth of firms within the same 
sector during the past three years (Cao et al., 2009). Additionally, we control for 
debt-to-equity ratio by relating D/E to the compete and control roles, as firms with 
a greater ratio are expected to emphasize exploitation because they are more prone 
to meeting cash flow obligations (Choi et al., 2016). D/E is computed as total debt 
(long-term and current liabilities) divided by the book value of equity. We include 
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a dummy for respondents' position (CFO or not) since only 66.4 percent of 
respondents were CFOs
37
. We also control for whether the firms operate in the 
services or the manufacturing sector.  
9.3.3 Exploratory factor analysis 
Although several of the items have been used in prior research, most have not been 
used in the same analysis. Thus, we conduct an exploratory factor analysis with 
oblique rotation including all items for the latent variables. The analysis yields six 
factors with eigenvalues greater than 1 commutatively explaining 59.06 percent of 
the variance: Lean, Lean finance, the adhocracy role, the compete role, the 
collaborate role, and the control role (see Table 2). The six factors are in 
accordance with a priori expectations, and their Cronbach's alphas are 
between .686 and .828, showing adequate to very good reliability (Kline, 2011) 
(see Table 3). To address the criterion validity of the Lean finance construct, it was 
correlated with a single item measuring the extent to which Lean is implemented in 
the finance function. The correlation was significant at p. <.05, r: .399. 
Table 2: Exploratory factor analysis and descriptive statistics 
Factor Lean  
Adhocracy 
role 





Mean Std. deviation 
Indicator                 
LP1 .774           5.90 .99 
LP2 .756           5.64 1.16 
LP3 .650           5.35 1.20 
LP4 .588           5.45 1.35 
LP5 .608           5.58 1.27 
ROLE1   -.787         5.70 1.17 
ROLE2   -.663         4.19 1.65 
ROLE3   -.788         5.82 1.24 
                                                     
37
 Other respondents identified themselves as: "senior finance manager" (6.6 percent), 
"controller" (2 percent), CEO (2 percent), and "other" (23 percent). 
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ROLE4   -.819         4.74 1.60 
ROLE5     .630       5.07 1.32 
ROLE6     .468       4.90 1.33 
ROLE7     .427       5.42 1.53 
ROLE8     .737       4.06 1.68 
ROLE9       .835     6.55 .95 
ROLE10       .555     6.07 1.38 
ROLE11       .524     6.17 1.25 
ROLE12       .769     6.63 .88 
ROLE13         -.708   5.20 1.24 
ROLE14         -.756   5.22 1.27 
ROLE15         -.851   5.94 1.09 
ROLE16         -.781   5.57 1.03 
LF1           .482 5.87 1.06 
LF2           .753 5.77 .96 
LF3           .858 5.66 1.09 
LF4           .796 5.66 1.08 
KMO of sampling adequacy for factors: .839. Bartlett's Test of Sphericity is significant p. <. 000 
  
Only loadings exceeding .400 are shown 
       
9.3.4 Confirmatory factor analysis 
We perform a confirmatory factor analysis in AMOS 23 including all latent 
variables. This is a two-step procedure where the measurement model without 
structural paths is evaluated to ensure fit, which is followed by an evaluation of the 
structural model (Hair et al., 2014). The measurement model is evaluated using 
several fit indices, as recommended by Kline (2011). We assess χ
2
 to degrees of 
freedom (Bollen, 1989) which should be less than three (Kline, 2005); root mean 
square error of approximation (RMSEA), which should be below .08 (Browne & 
Cudeck, 1993); and standardized root mean square residual (SRMR), where a value 
below .1 indicates acceptable fit (Schermelleh-Engel et al., 2003). Furthermore, we 
evaluate the comparative fit index (CFI) (Bentler, 1990), incremental fit index (IFI) 
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(Bollen, 1989), and Tucker-Lewis index (TLI) (Tucker-Lewis, 1973). CFI, IFI, and 
TLI are evaluated for their closeness to 1.0 (Byrne, 2010), where values above .9 
indicate acceptable fit (Bentler, 1992; Kline, 2005). Lastly, we evaluate the 
Consistent Akaike's Information Criterion (CAIC) addressing model parsimony, 
taking sample size into account (Bozdogan, 1987) where the ratio of the 
hypothesized model and the saturated model should be less than one (Byrne, 2010). 
Although χ
2
 is significant (p. <.05), χ
2
 to degrees of freedom is 1.74, and fit indices 
are acceptable (see Table 3).  
Table 3: Confirmatory factor analysis, composite reliability and Cronbach’s alpha 




LP1 .650 7.739 
  
LP2 .819 8.112 
  
LP3 .486 6.744 
  
LP4 .461 a 
  





ROLE1 .694 15.428 
  
ROLE2 .702 12.173 
  
ROLE3 .730 a 
  





ROLE5 .658 a 
  
ROLE6 .729 10.982 
  
ROLE7 .494 8.314 
  





ROLE9 .742 10.658 
  
ROLE10 .707 9.387 
  
ROLE11 .455 7.607 
  









ROLE14 .727 11.462 
  
ROLE15 .784 11.713 
  





LF1 .439 6.961 
  
LF2 .542 a 
  
LF3 .808 10.280 
  
LF4 .798 9.774     
χ2 to degrees of freedom: 1.745 RMSEA: .043, SRMR: .050, IFI: .941, TLI: .930, CFI: .940, CAIC: .406 (925.26/2278.662 
saturated model) 
"a" indicates a loading fixed to 1 
       
The factors' convergent validity, discriminant validity, and construct reliability are 
evaluated as well. Convergent validity is assessed with the fitted standardized 
residual matrix and the standardized loadings of the factors' indicators (Fullerton & 
Wempe, 2009). None of the standardized residuals exceeded an absolute value of 
2.58, therefore not indicating potential misfit (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1988), and all 
standardized loadings on factors are highly significant at p. <.05, indicating 
convergent validity
38
. Discriminant validity is determined by comparing the 
correlation between factors and their squared average variance extracted (AVE) 
(Fornell & Larcker, 1981), where the squared AVE of individual factors should be 
greater than their correlation. Squared AVE is shown at the diagonal in Table 4 and 
is greater than all factor correlations. Additionally, all factors' composite 
reliabilities (CR) are above .7, which is the threshold recommended by Hair et al. 
(2014). The measurement model did not indicate any multicollinearity issues, as 
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 One of the modification indices was greater than 10, suggesting correlation between the 
residuals of Item 1 and Item 3 of the adhocracy role. Both items are related to an outward 
focus on strategy of the finance function. Byrne (2010) states that such modification to a 
measurement model should only be carried out if it makes substantial sense. Given the 




none of the variance inflation factors were above 1.3, and tolerance statistics were 
above .75.  
Table 4: Factor correlations and squared AVE's 
    
  
Lean 
operation Adhocracy role Compete role Control role Collaborate role Lean finance 
Lean operation .594           
Adhocracy role .240** .754         
Compete role .249** .614** .629       
Control role .287** .368** .457** .642     
Collaborate role .352** .360** .488** .272** .714   
Lean finance .431** .150** .321** .350** .344** .666 
Squared AVE's are shown at the diagonal 
    
** indicates a p.<.05 
      
We perform another confirmatory factor analysis but only include items pertaining 
to the variables measuring the finance function roles and only with data from the 
COO sample. The results of these tests are indicated in table 1 and 2 in Appendix 1. 
All fit indices and construct validity and reliability indicators are acceptable
39
. Last, 
we evaluate interrater agreement using the average deviation index (ADI) (Burke et 
al., 1999). The ADI is determined by evaluating the extent to which the individual 
factor item ratings differ from the mean of the factor, then summing the absolute 
distances, and finally dividing the sum by the number of deviations (Burke et al., 
1999). For a 7-point Likert scale, an ADI below 1.714 indicates acceptable inter-
factor agreement (Burke and Dunlap, 2002). The ADIs of the four finance role 
function factors range from .83 (the compete role) to 1.24 (the control role). In sum, 
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 Again, a modification indices test suggested a correlation between the residuals of Item 1 
and Item 3 of the adhocracy role. In the measurement model pertaining to the responding 
COOs, these residuals are correlated.   
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the four roles based on the CVF appear to be a good representation of the roles of 
finance functions in the Lean operation firms in our sample
40
.  
As relationships between exogenous and endogenous variables are tested by only 
using data from the CFOs, we acknowledge that there is a potential for common 
method bias (Podsakoff et al., 2003). Although the problem typically is prevalent 
in single-respondent studies, where the endogenous variables are, for example, 
self-reported performance (Grabner & Speckbacher, 2016), which does not apply 
to this study, the potential issue was addressed ex ante in that the survey instrument 
ensured the respondents complete anonymity, and the measurements of exogenous 
and endogenous variables were randomly ordered. Ex post, we addressed the 
potential common method bias issue by performing the Harmann's single-factor 
test (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). The test did not reveal a great concern for 
common method bias, as the one factor including all items only explained 23.6 
percent of the variance in the data. Last, we ran tests for linearity of relations 
between our main exogenous and endogenous variables. All relations were 
significantly linear with R
2
s ranging from .02 to .124 and t-values ranging from 
7.56 to 57.31. 
9.4 Empirical tests and results 
Before investigating the results of the structural relations, the fit indices of the 
SEM are assessed. All fit indices exceed the minimum thresholds (see Figure 3). 
Contextual ambidexterity demands that organizational structures are aligned with 
the strategy of the firm (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004), and we expected this to hold 
for the roles of finance functions in Lean operation firms (H1a–H1d). Consistent 
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 Bear in mind that there were no significant differences between firm characteristics in the 




with the predictions, the firms in the sample have aligned their finance functions 
according to the Lean operation, as represented by the positive significant relations 
between Lean and the control role (std. β: .162, p. <.05), the compete role (std. 
β: .134, p. .07), the collaborate role (std. β: .250, p. <.05), and the adhocracy role 
(std. β: .205, p. <.05) (see Table 5 and Figure 3). These results suggest that when 
firms increase their implementation of a Lean operation, finance functions intensify 
their work efforts pertaining to efficiency, control, and variance reduction (i.e., 
exploitation), and search, discovery, autonomy, and innovation (i.e., exploration)
41
. 
Further, we predicted that the implementation of Lean operation would lead to an 
intra-organizational diffusion process of Lean principles to the finance function 
(H2). The result confirms our prediction (std. β: .431, p. <.05). As such, the fact 
that systems and practices in Lean operation firms are tightly coupled allows 
knowledge sharing and transfer of ideas and systems across functional boundaries, 
in this case, from operations to the finance function.  
Regarding Hypotheses 3a–3d, we predicted that Lean finance would lead to a 
greater emphasis on all four finance function roles, as Lean finance frees up 
capacity and enables a greater understanding of internal customer needs. Three 
hypotheses were confirmed, as Lean finance is positively related to the control role 
(std. β: .270, p. <.05), compete role (std. β: .264, p. <.05), and collaborate role (std. 
β: .236, p. <.05). The relation between Lean finance and the adhocracy role was not 
significant (std. β: .049, p. .477). Given that the relation between Lean operation 
and the adhocracy role is significant, this insignificant result suggests that the 
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 We decided to test for other forms of relationships. Linear relationships were generally 
the best representations of associations between Lean operations and the four finance 
function roles. However, a quadratic relation between Lean operation and the collaborate 
role proved to explain .01 more variance, although with a lower t-value. We have no 
plausible explanation for this relationship and it remains something for future research to 
resolve.     
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emphasis on the adhocracy role is a function of a demand for this role to support 
the Lean operation implementation rather than a function of a supply of resources 
resulting from freed capacity. The results suggest that Lean finance frees up 
capacity and enables a greater understanding of customer needs
42
. To provide 
evidence of H4, the residuals of the four finance function roles are correlated 
(Grabner & Moers, 2013). In order to confirm the hypothesis, all correlations must 
be significant and positive. The results confirm the predictions as all pair-wise 
correlations are significant and positive, p. <. 05. We also assess indirect effects
43
 
(see Table 5). Lean is positively indirectly related to the compete role, the control 
role, and the collaborate role, and the total effects are greater than the direct effects. 
These results suggest that Lean operation and Lean finance intervene and increase 
the emphasis on these three roles.  
As a robustness check, control variables are entered in our structural model and 
paths are modeled, as indicated in Section 3.2.3. Although the relation between 
environmental uncertainty and the control role (std. β: .105, p. <.05) is significant, 
and the relationships between CFOres
44
 and the adhocracy role (std. β: .150, p. <. 
05), the compete role (std. β: .223, p. <.05), the control role (std. β: .091, p. <. 074), 
and the collaborate role (std. β: .146, p. <. 05) are significant, our statistical 
inferences remain similar
45
. In a third model, we relax our assumption of 
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 We acknowledge that R
2
s of role variables are relatively low (see Figure 3). However, 
they are similar to the R
2
s ranging from 8.24 to 14.61 percent presented  by Chang et al. 
(2014) in a survey paper on the determinants of finance function roles.   
43
 This analysis is performed by a boot-strapping procedure in AMOS with 2000 samples. 
In order to perform this test, missing values are replaced using the expectation 
maximization method. Little's MCAR tests of all individual items did not reveal that 
missing values appeared in a non-random fashion.  
44
 If the respondent was CFO = 1 or not = 0.  
45
 To reduce unobserved heterogeneity issues (Grabner & Moers, 2013) concerning H4, we 
also ran a test where all control variables were related to all roles.  The results were similar 
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interdependence among finance function roles. The resulting model fits the data 
significantly worse (χ
2
 231.1 p. <. 05). Altogether, the results of the main model 
are robust.  
Table 5: Results 
     
Panel A: Main results Main model Model with control variables 
Relationships Hypothesis Std. Coefficients T-values Std. Coefficients T-values 
Lean operation => Control role H1a .162 2.327** .153 2.200** 
Lean operation => Compete role H1b .134 1.793* .130 1.750* 
Lean operation => Collaborate role H1c .250 3.335** .258 3.413** 
Lean operation => Adhocracy role H1d .205 2.756** .208 2.765** 
Lean operation => Lean finance H2 .431 5.230** .430 5.211** 
Lean finance => Control role H3a .270 3.807** .263 3.732** 
Lean finance => Compete role H3b .264 3.375** .246 3.201** 
Lean finance => Collaborate role H3c .236 3.325** .220 3.110** 
Lean finance => Adhocracy role H3d .049 .711 .041 .596 
Compete role <=> Control role H4 .390 5.174** .372 4.981** 
Compete role <=> Collaborate role H4 .408 5.012** .387 4.761** 
Control role <=> Collaborate role H4 .161 2.440** .160 2.429** 
Adhocracy role <=> Compete role H4 .771 8.014** .767 7.992** 
Adhocracy role <=> Control role H4 .285 4.159** .272 4.010** 
Adhocracy role <=> Collaborate role H4 .294 4.160** .279 3.971** 
Panel B: Indirect and total effects   Indirect effects Total effects Indirect effects Total effects 
Independent variable Dependent variable Std. Coefficients Std. Coefficients 
Lean operation Compete role .114** .248** .106** .236** 
Lean operation Control role .117** .279** .113** .266** 
Lean operation Collaborate role .102** .352** .095** .352** 
Lean operation Adhocracy role .021 .227** .018 .226** 





Adhocracy role Compete role Control role Collaborate role 
 
Size -..043 -.003 .066 -.004 
 
CFOres .150** .233** .091* .146** 
 




                                                                                                                                       
to the main model as correlations between residuals of all finance function roles remained 







Sector .017 -.054 -.003 .030   
** indicates a p.<.05 
     
*indicates a p.<.10 
      
 
Note: The results in the structural model are depicted without control variables. **indicates a p. <. 05, 




Figure 3: results model 
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9.5 Discussion and conclusion 
This paper set out to explore the relations between Lean and the roles of finance 
functions. Although a few case studies have described how the implementation of 
Lean affected the roles of finance functions, this is a neglected topic in the 
literature. Cooper (1996) predicted a dystopian future for finance function workers 
in Lean operation firms when he suggested that much of their work would be 
transferred to operations employees and that, if finance workers were to have any 
relevance in Lean operation firms, they would have to develop and perfect skills in 
strategy, system design, and change management. This prediction is maintained in 
more recent literature on Lean accounting (Maskell et al., 2012). In this research, 
we show that their predictions only tell part of the story, and we make several 
contributions to the literature. We characterized Lean operation firms as 
contextually ambidextrous (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004). We predicted that 
finance functions were the representatives of the necessary structural parameters 
that enable employees in Lean operation firms to balance exploration and 
exploitation.  
We found that Lean operation firms emphasized the collaborate role, focusing on 
collaboration, empowerment, and the alignment of systems. As such, finance 
functions in our sample play a part in changing and aligning management control 
systems to firms' Lean operation, and they incorporate suggestions from operations 
personnel to make the management control system congruent with their needs 
(Burns & Baldvindsdottir, 2005). The latter is important in Lean operation firms 
because operations employees need to be empowered in order to make timely, 
well-informed decisions, as they have low buffers to secure them against 
breakdowns (Liker, 2004). From a broader perspective, the collaborate role differs 
from the more traditional finance function work. This indicates that the finance 
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function can indeed support organizational changes (Granlund & Taipaleenmäki, 
2005) by working closely together with other functional areas of the firm (Ezzamel 
et al., 2008), ensuring that financial matters remain a priority. The close 
cooperation emphasized by the collaborate role increases the likelihood that the 
"offer" from finance functions to other functions involves meeting the demands of 
these functions (Lambert & Sponem, 2012). Additionally, we found that an 
increase in Lean operation was related to an increased emphasis on the adhocracy 
role. The adhocracy role connects customer demands with operations which, of 
course, are of great importance to Lean operation firms (Womack & Jones, 2003). 
This role provides the calculative skills necessary for evaluating manufacturing and 
development costs and the price that customers are willing to pay for a new product 
or service; it also evaluates which customers should be targeted based on financial 
criteria (Ahrens, 1997).  
However, we also found that Lean operation firms emphasized the control role. 
The control role focuses on monitoring and analyzing operations performance and 
the preparation of budgets. This finding is in contrast to Burns and 
Baldvindsdottir's (2005) findings. Likewise, although there has been an increasing 
emphasis on non-financial controls in recent research (Fullerton et al., 2013; 
Fullerton et al., 2014; Staats et al., 2011), the reliance on the control role indicates 
that financial controls remain important in Lean operation firms. The Lean 
operation firms in our sample also emphasize the compete role. The main focus of 
this role is cost reductions, and it provides operations with financial information 
pertaining to the improvement potential of work processes and products. This 
information improves the foundation on which operations personnel can base their 
choice of improvement and better enables them to choose between alternatives 
(Lind, 2001).  
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Furthermore, we find that the four finance function roles are interdependent. This 
implies that the managerial choice of emphasizing one role and the "usefulness" of 
this role depend on the choice of emphasizing the other roles and vice versa in 
Lean operating firms. If this interdependence is not recognized by decision-makers 
in a Lean operation firm, for example if they only employ the control role and the 
compete role or exaggerate focus on the collaborate and adhocracy roles, they 
might end up overemphasizing exploitation or exploration, respectively, which 
inevitably leads to negative consequences for the firm (March, 1991).  
The finance functions in our sample of Lean operation firms adapt Lean principles. 
We argue that they do so because systems and practices in Lean firms are tightly 
coupled (Roberts, 2004), which enables sharing of knowledge and ideas (Ross, 
1974), which in turn initiates an intraorganizational diffusion of Lean principles 
from operations to the finance function. We find that the adaption of Lean 
principles in finance functions induces a further emphasis on the control, compete, 
and collaborate roles. Likewise, the adoption of Lean principles in the finance 
function works as a catalyst, as it reinforces the relationship between Lean and 
these three roles. We interpret this finding as an indicator that Lean principles in 
the finance function leverage finance functions' understanding of operations 
workers' demands as a result of the intraorganizational diffusion of Lean principles 
and that this also results in increased internal customer focus. As such, Lean 
principles in the finance function further connect and integrate operations and 
finance functions in Lean operation firms. 
Our findings are relevant for practitioners in Lean operation firms. First, they 
should acknowledge that the inclusion of finance function workers is integral to 
success with Lean implementation. Second, they should understand that a balanced 
emphasis on finance function roles is necessary to avoid dysfunctional 
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consequences stemming from overemphasizing certain roles. Third, they should 
understand the benefits from integrating Lean principles to the finance function, as 
this increases the understanding of customer demands. 
Methodologically, this paper brings a new measurement instrument for the roles of 
finance functions in Lean firms. We performed a literature review of papers 
dealing with finance function roles in order to capture items relevant for our 
research purposes, and we used the CVF (Cameron et al., 2014) as an ex ante 
guidance for developing the instrument to cover finance function roles in Lean 
firms. We went to great lengths to ensure the construct validity and reliability of 
the instrument. We utilized a dyadic approach (Schäffer, 2007) and collected 
responses from both CFOs and COOs. The measurement instrument proved to be 
an adequate representation of the roles of finance functions in Lean firms, as fit 
indices, construct validity and reliability indicators, and the average deviation 
index were acceptable.  
9.6 Future research and limitations 
As with any other cross-sectional study, we cannot claim causal inferences. Our 
evidence must be considered as consistent with our theoretical arguments. Second, 
having only one respondent as an indicator for both exogenous and endogenous 
variables presents a potential common method bias problem. However, we 
addressed this problem ex ante and ex post and found that it was of little concern. 
Third, although they are comparable to recent survey research on the roles of 
finance functions (Chang et al., 2014), our results should be interpreted with 
caution, as the R
2
s of endogenous variables are relatively low. 
We encourage future research that refines our measurement instrument. 
Furthermore, as the measurement reflects finance function roles related to 
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exploration and exploitation, we suggest that it be used to explore finance function 
roles in other firms encompassing ambidextrous characteristics. An in-depth case 
study of the intraorganizational diffusion of Lean practices from operations to other 
functions and vice versa is an interesting future research endeavor, as current 
research provides little detail of such processes (Flight & Palmer, 2013). Last, we 
have no measure of the level of experience that the firms in the sample have with 
Lean operations. A future research possibility is then to study if the level of 
experience with Lean affects the relationships between Lean operations and the 
roles of finance functions. Our research is the initial step in understanding the roles 
of finance functions in Lean operating firms, and several research avenues lie 
ahead. 
9.7 Appendix 1 
Appendix 1: Table 1: COO Confirmatory factor analysis, composite reliability and Cronbach's alpha 
    
Factor indicators   Standardized loadings T-value (All significant p.<.01) C.R Alpha Mean Std. Dev. 
Adhocracy role 




























































































ROLE16   .699 7.02     5.21 1.49 
χ2 to degrees of freedom: 1.606 RMSEA: .075, SRMR: .083, IFI: .927, TLI: .908, CFI: .925, CAIC: .480 (373.29/772.77 
saturated model) 
  
"a" indicates a loading fixed to 1 
       
Appendix 1: table 2 COO factor correlations and squared ave 
  Collaborate role Adhocracy role Compete role Control role 
Collaborate role .751       
Adhocracy role .546*** .739     
Compete role .685*** .648** .683   
Control role .346*** .452** .408** .735 
*** indicates a p. <.05 
   Squared average variance extracted is indicated at the diagonal 
  
9.8 Appendix 2 
 
Appendix 2 
       Table 1: Survey Items             
Lean Operation  
      Please indicate the level of agreement regards to whether the production area or similar areas have adapted the following 
1: strongly disagree, 2: mostly disagree, 3: slightly disagree, 4: neutral,  5: slightly agree, 6: agree, 7:strongly agree 
 LP1 Flow 
      LP2 Continuous Improvement 
      LP3 Multifunctional employees 
      LP4 Value Streams  
      LP5 Standards for operational processes             
Control 
       Please indicate the frequency of which the finance function perform the following activities 
   1: never, 2: very rarely, 3: rarely, 4: occasionally, 5: frequently, 6: very frequently, 7: 
almost always 
   
ROLE13 
Variance analysis of cost and revenue incurred in other 
functions 
    
ROLE14 
Monitors performance of other 
functions 
      ROLE15 Forecasting 
      
ROLE16 
Prepares and implements budgets in other 




       Please indicate the frequency of which the finance function perform the following activities 
   1: never, 2: very rarely, 3: rarely, 4: occasionally, 5: frequently, 6: very frequently, 7: 
almost always 
   ROLE9 Develops cost-savings plans for the business 




      
ROLE11 
Helps other functions to meet performance 
targets 
     ROLE12 Promotes fast decision-making             
Collaborate Role 
      Please indicate the frequency of which the finance function perform the following activities 
   1: never, 2: very rarely, 3: rarely, 4: occasionally, 5: frequently, 6: very frequently, 7: 
almost always 
   
ROLE1 
Exhibits leadership towards other functions in the 
firm 
     ROLE2 Aligns finance and operational systems with the business 
    ROLE3 Collaborates with other functions and establishes consensus among them 
   ROLE4 Actively listens to and legitimizes other employees' suggestions that affects the firm's financials    
Adhocracy 
       Please indicate the frequency of which the finance function perform the following activities 
   1: never, 2: very rarely, 3: rarely, 4: occasionally, 5: frequently, 6: very frequently, 7: almost 
always 
   
        
ROLE5 
Provides advice on strategic matters to 
operations 
     
ROLE6 
Develops and evaluates investment opportunities for the 
business 
    
ROLE7 
Helps to set strategic directions and imperatives for the 
business 
    ROLE8 Provides advice concerning growth and future potentials for the business       
Lean 
finance 
       Please indicate the level of agreement regards to whether the finance function has adapted the following 
  1: strongly disagree, 2: disagree, 3: slightly disagree, 4: neutral,  5: slightly agree, 6: agree, 7: strongly agree 
 LF1 Flow  
      
LF2 
Clear understanding of internal customers' 
needs 
     LF3 Motivational efforts pertaining to continuous improvement  
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Abstract:  
The main purpose of this paper is to explore complementarities among 
management control mechanisms (social, behavioral, and output control 
mechanisms) and their effects on performance in Lean manufacturing companies. 
We construct two competing hypotheses and test them in two structural equation 
models. We compare the additive performance effects of the management control 
mechanisms modeled as first-order factors with the performance effects of the 
management control mechanisms modeled as a complementary second-order factor 
capturing the multilateral interactions and the covariance among management 
control mechanisms. Utilizing a cross-sectional sample of 368 Lean manufacturing 
companies, we show that the complementary effects are superior to the additive 
effects of management control mechanisms. In fact, output control mechanisms and 
visual social control mechanisms are not additively related to performance.  
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10.1 Introduction  
Interest in complementarity and in its role in the design of organizations has 
garnered increasing attention in the academic literature (Ennen & Richter, 2010). 
Practices that work together are considered to be complementary when doing more 
of one practice increases the marginal return of another practice and vice versa 
(Milgrom & Roberts, 1995). Lean manufacturing is an ideal setting in which to 
study complementarity (Furlan et al., 2011) as it is recognized as an enterprise-
wide management system consisting of interdependent practices (Roberts, 2004; 
Shah & Ward, 2007). Lean manufacturing was conceptualized by Krafcik and 
colleagues (1988), when studying Toyota as part of the MIT International Motor 
Vehicle Program, and it is generally accepted that Lean manufacturing improves 
firm performance (e.g., Fullerton & Wempe, 2009; Hofer et al., 2012; Jayaram et 
al., 2010; Maiga & Jacobs, 2008). However, both Shah and Ward (2003) and 
Furlan et al. (2010) suggest that it is the simultaneous, systematic implementation 
of several practices that contributes to firm performance through the 
complementary effects of these practices. This implies that the partial 
implementation of practices or of practices that do not work in concert will 
contribute to a lesser extent to firm performance.  
The implementation of Lean manufacturing has been found to be associated with 
companies' management control mechanisms
46
 (e.g., Åhlström & Karlsson, 1996; 
Fullerton et al., 2013; Kristensen & Israelsen, 2014; Netland et al., 2015), and it is 
recognized that management control mechanisms can either hinder or help Lean 
manufacturing implementations (Åhlström & Karlsson, 1996; Fullerton et al., 
2014). However, there is still much to understand about how management control 
                                                     
46
 We use the label "management control mechanisms" as Kennedy and Widener (2008) use 
this label. We believe that it is equivalent to the label "management control forms" used in 
other studies, e.g., Kristensen and Israelsen (2014). 
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mechanisms work in the Lean manufacturing context. In this study, we investigate 
the complementary effects of management control mechanisms
47
 on firm 
performance in Lean manufacturing companies. As it is imperative that we 
examine these management control mechanisms from a holistic perspective (Ennen 
& Richter, 2010), we utilize the conceptual framework developed by Kennedy and 
Widener (2008), who extended the work of Ouchi (1978, 1979) and Snell (1992) to 
management control mechanisms in Lean manufacturing companies. Kennedy and 
Widener's framework (2008) views management control as interdependent 
mechanisms consisting of training, visualization, empowerment, peer pressure 
(social control mechanisms), standardization of practices and rules (behavioral 
control mechanisms), and performance measurements (output control mechanisms). 
We extend social management control mechanisms to also include Lean thinking 
(Emiliani et al., 2003), as it is an important catalyst for successful Lean 
manufacturing implementation, and we increase the granularity of Kennedy and 
Widener's framework (2008) by distinguishing between social cultural control and 
social visual control mechanisms as well as between non-financial and financial 
control mechanisms.     
Different strategies are used when testing for complementarity between 
organizational variables. Ennen and Richter (2010) describe two: the interaction 
strategy, focusing on the complementarity of two organizational variables, and the 
systems strategy, focusing on the complementarity of a broader set of variables. 
Using a sample of 368 American Lean manufacturing facilities, we adapt the 
systems strategy and follow the procedure developed by Tanriverdi and 
Venkatraman (2005). We develop and compare two competing structural equation 
                                                     
47
 Management control is defined by Anthony (1965, p. 17) as, "the process by which 
managers ensure that resources are obtained and used effectively and efficiently in the 
accomplishment of the organization's objectives."   
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models: The first model utilizes a second-order factor to capture multilateral 
interactions and covariance among the management control mechanisms as well as 
the effects of the second-order factor on firm performance. The second model 
conceptualizes the management control mechanisms as first-order factors and 
explores their additive effects on performance. We argue that this method for 
testing complementarity is superior to the different variants of regression analyses 
utilized in research on management control.   
This study makes two major contributions to the small body of knowledge on this 
topic. First, we find that the performance effects of a complementary set of 
management control mechanisms are superior to their isolated additive effects. In 
fact, three of five management control mechanisms—visual social control 
mechanisms, financial output control mechanisms, and non-financial output control 
mechanisms—do not additively contribute to firm performance. Second, our study 
is the first to provide empirical support from a large sample of firms suggesting 
that the full set of Lean management control mechanisms is complementary. 
Moreover, we provide detailed descriptions of how Lean management control 
mechanisms work together in order to facilitate a deeper understanding of the 
complementarity effects on firm performance. We are especially motivated by 
Fullerton et al. (2013), who call for an extension of their study to encompass all the 
management control mechanisms from the Kennedy and Widener (2008) 
framework, and by Malmi and Brown (2008), who welcome research on more 
specified management control mechanisms.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we describe the 
literature and develop our two competing hypotheses. In Section 3, we present our 
sample and methods and, in Section 4, we present our results. We discuss and 
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conclude the paper in Section 5. Limitations and recommendations for future 
research are presented in Section 6.   
10.2 Literature and hypotheses development 
It is well established that Lean manufacturing is positively associated with firm 
performance (e.g., Hofer et al., 2012; Fullerton et al., 2014; Khanchanapong et al., 
2014; Maiga & Jacobs, 2008). Hence, the focus here is not on whether Lean 
manufacturing can benefit performance but rather on how management control 
mechanisms assist Lean manufacturing companies in achieving improved firm 
performance. Management control mechanisms have garnered attention in the Lean 
manufacturing literature (e.g., Fullerton et al., 2013; Netland et al., 2015) and have 
been conceptualized as consisting of social, behavioral, and output controls 
(Kennedy & Widener, 2008). Research has found that Lean manufacturing is 
related to these management control mechanisms. For example, Lean 
manufacturing has been found to be related to visualization (Banker et al.,1993 ), 
peer pressure (Ezzamel & Willmott, 1998), employee empowerment (Lind, 2001), 
and training (Woolson & Husar, 1998). Lean manufacturing has also been found to 
be related to standard operating procedures (Rondeau et al., 2000) and rules (Shah 
& Ward, 2003). Evidence also suggests that Lean manufacturing relies on non-
financial performance measurements (Banker et al., 1993) and financial 
performance measurements (Emiliani et al., 2003). Table 1 depicts the 
management control mechanisms used in this study. These are drawn from 
Kennedy and Widener's (2008) framework, but we increase the granularity of the 
framework as we distinguish non-financial control mechanisms from financial 
control mechanisms as well as social cultural control mechanisms from social 




Table 1: Lean management control mechanisms 
  
 Social controls  Behavioral controls  Output controls  
Social cultural controls Social visual controls Standard operating procedures Non-financial output controls Financial output controls 
Employee empowerment  Visualization Rules Non-financial performance measurements Financial performance measurements 
Peer pressure 
 
   Training  
 
   Lean thinking         
 
Empirical research suggests that Lean management control mechanisms are 
interrelated, but there is limited evidence of their complementarity. For example, in 
their case study of a Lean manufacturing company, Kennedy and Widener (2008) 
found that social, behavioral, and output controls were interrelated, meaning that, 
for example, performance measurements (output control mechanism) went hand in 
hand with employee empowerment (a social control mechanism), and standard 
operating procedures (behavioral control mechanism), similarly, went hand in hand 
with visualization (social control mechanism). Kristensen and Israelsen (2014) 
studied balance among social control mechanisms, behavioral control mechanisms, 
and output control mechanisms in a single firm. Their results indicated that greater 
balance led to greater firm performance, and they argued that the results were 
evidence of complementarity. However, their methodology made it difficult to 
capture patterns of interactions and covariance among the Lean control 
mechanisms because the control mechanisms were collapsed into two aggregate 
measures. Without using the management control mechanism terminology, 
Emiliani et al. (2003) found that social, behavioral, and output controls were 
interrelated in a Lean manufacturing company. Emiliani et al. (2003), Kennedy and 
Widener (2008), and Kristensen and Israelsen (2014) were single firm studies, 
which makes their findings difficult to generalize. Furthermore, Emiliani et al. 
(2003) and Kennedy and Widener (2008) did not study the complementary effects 
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of the management control mechanisms on firm performance. In a cross-sectional 
study, Fullerton et al. (2013) investigated fragmented parts of the Lean 
management control mechanisms. They found that employee empowerment (social 
control mechanism) and visual performance information (output control 
mechanism) were interrelated. Fullerton et al. (2013) did not study complementary 
effects on performance, and their reductionist method is problematic when 
studying complementarity (Ennen & Richter, 2010).    
To establish clear evidence of complementarity among Lean management control 
mechanisms, firm performance effects stemming from individual management 
control mechanisms must be compared with performance effects stemming from 
complementarity of the complete set of management control mechanisms 
(Tanriverdi & Venkatraman, 2005). Furthermore, a detailed exploration of how the 
interrelatedness and complementarity of management control mechanisms can 
support Lean manufacturing companies (Maskell et al., 2012) is needed in a cross-
sectional setting (Kennedy & Widener, 2008). As we will explain in the sections 
below, we expect that Lean management control mechanisms are complementary 
and that the complementary effects on firm performance are greater than the 
additive effects from management control mechanisms. We follow the same 
argumentation logic and structure as Tanriverdi and Venkatraman (2005). First, in 
Sections 2.1-2.3, we describe Lean management control mechanisms and explain 
how management control mechanisms are interrelated; second, in Section 2.4, we 
develop our hypotheses and describe how we expect complementarity to exist 
between management control mechanisms. 
2.1 Social control mechanisms 
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According to Kennedy and Widener (2008), social control mechanisms in Lean 
manufacturing companies encompass visualization, peer pressure, training, and 
employee empowerment. Visualization is essential in Lean manufacturing 
companies (Belekoukias et al., 2014; Cunningham & Fiume, 2003), and it goes 
hand in hand with both behavioral and output control mechanisms. Boards are used 
in the manufacturing area to visualize the current and future state of operations (a 
non-financial output control mechanism) and to show standard operating 
procedures (a behavioral control mechanism). Boards also show whether current 
activities are deviating from standards (Emiliani et al., 2003) and provide real-time, 
easy-to-understand performance metrics that direct employees' attention to 
potential improvement areas and manufacturing related problems, ensuring that 
production objectives are aligned with the Lean strategy (Liker, 2004). Training 
matrices and employee capabilities indicators are used to highlight the skills 
required for working in a manufacturing cell and to show the current skills for each 
individual employee working in that cell (Kennedy & Widener, 2008; Maskell et 
al., 2012). This assists employees during the planning of their work activities. 
However, visualization goes beyond informing employees about standards, 
improvement potential, performance, and skills: Visualization also includes a 
structuring of the entire manufacturing area with high visibility, which should 
allow employees to assist one another between work processes and to help them 
understand how their own work activities are related to other areas of the facility 
(Liker, 2004). This can be referred to as global transparency (Adler & Borys, 1996). 
Global transparency reduces the risk of sub-optimization and enables employees to 
identify problems and improvement potentials in other manufacturing cells than 
their own.  
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For visualization to be effective, employees in Lean manufacturing companies 
must be trained in Lean principles (Fullerton et al., 2013) such as kaizen, standard 
operating procedures, and creativity. Employees not trained in Lean principles will 
not be able to fully grasp, act, and react to the information on the boards or to use 
this information to solve problems and identify potential improvement areas. The 
Lean training can be done onsite, e.g., by employees continuously going to the 
gemba and figuring out solutions or improvements (Farris et al., 2009). Employees 
are motivated to undergo training, as cell capability indicators highlight whether 
they are experts in a certain skill (Kennedy & Widener, 2008). The training also 
facilitates the empowerment of employees responsible for quality, cost, and flow, 
enabling them to make timely and effective decisions and adjustments to their work 
(Cua et al., 2001; Fullerton et al., 2013). This is especially important in Lean 
manufacturing companies with reduced buffer inventories, as potential breakdowns 
have severe effects downstream (Callen et al., 2005; Kristensen & Israelsen, 2014). 
Additionally, the empowerment of employees enables them to carry out 
experiments and perform continuous improvement, potentially improving their 
own and others' work processes. This, of course, is not something that happens 
without employees being motivated or being encouraged to do so. A possible 
motivational element is that Lean thinking permeates the minds of employees and 
managers. Lean thinking enables them to think, act, and behave with a passion for 
Lean manufacturing (Wood et al., 2015), and it therefore functions as an internal 
motivational factor (Bhamu & Sangwan, 2014). Here we extend Kennedy and 
Widener's framework (2008), inspired by clan controls
48
 (Ouchi, 1979). Peer 
pressure is another catalyst for employees to solve problems, identify improvement 
potentials, and undergo additional training (Kennedy & Widener, 2008). Peer 
                                                     
48
 Ouchi (1979, pp. 837) states that some of the characteristics of clan controls are to ensure 
that employees try to achieve the "right" objectives. 
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pressure in Lean manufacturing companies can occur when employees at the same 
hierarchical level mutually reinforce their desire to obtain additional knowledge, 
work skills, and higher performance, both in comparison to other employees in the 
manufacturing cell as well as in comparison to other manufacturing cells and value 
streams. The monitoring and highlighting of skills and performance within and 
between manufacturing cells (a non-financial output control mechanism) can lead 
to a sense of pride among employees and can improve motivation (Kennedy & 
Widener, 2008). We have decided to distinguish between social cultural control 
mechanisms and social visual control mechanisms, because the former is input 
oriented, intended to affect behavior ex ante, whereas the latter is process oriented, 
intended to guide immediate behavior.   
2.2 Behavioral Control Mechanisms 
Behavioral control mechanisms in Lean manufacturing companies consist of 
standard operating procedures and rules (Kennedy & Widener, 2008). These are 
seen as an aid to help employees reach the desired output, both in terms of levels 
output and quality and in terms of the best practice in reaching that output (Secchi 
& Camuffo, 2016). They are not seen as strict instructions from which deviations 
are not acceptable but as systematic descriptions of value-added and non-value-
added activities that enable employees to perform continuous improvement (Adler 
& Borys, 1996; Kristensen & Israelsen, 2014). In fact, without standard operating 
procedures, continuous improvement becomes impossible, as any improvement 
will be just another variation of the work processes (Liker, 2004). Standard 
operating procedures are updated to incorporate proven improvements, or they are 
changed in response to changes in demand or other contingencies (Ahrens & 
Chapman, 2004). For example, a cell may optimize standard operating procedures 
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affecting other production cells, or changes in market conditions may require 
manufacturing cells to perform activities differently to meet customer demand.  
Standard operating procedures go hand in hand with social control mechanisms, 
described in Section 2.1. For example, standard operating procedures are visualized 
(a social visual control mechanism) to employees: pictures of the assembly of parts 
are made visible on boards in a manufacturing cell, floor markings indicate the 
flow of materials and finished goods (Kennedy & Widener, 2008), and visual 
controls indicate whether or not work-in-progress levels are under control 
(Kristensen & Israelsen, 2014). Furthermore, employees in Lean manufacturing 
companies undergo training (a social cultural control mechanism) that enables 
them to understand, perform, and challenge the standard operating procedures 
(Liker, 2004).  
Standard operating procedures work together with non-financial output control 
mechanisms as well. For example, whiteboards are used in the manufacturing cells 
to post numbers showing the ability to deliver on time, indicating how well 
employees are performing. This operating information is used in concert with 
standard operating procedures to help employees determine whether corrective 
actions are needed (Kristensen & Israelsen, 2014). The corrective action may 
adjust current activities, but it may also involve changing and improving the 
standard operating procedure.  
Behavioral controls go beyond standard operating procedures. For example, the 
Kanban system ensures the replenishment of materials (Shah & Ward, 2007). It 
includes paper cards that are utilized to pull the right materials to the right places, 
in the quantities needed, when needed (Emiliani et al., 2003). This demands 
standards for quantities, materials, procedures for internal customers, and the exact 
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point for when to pull additional materials. One-piece flow and the use of line 
balancing and level schedules (heijunka) are behavioral controls as well. Optimally, 
one-piece flow ensures that a part moves to the next operation only when the prior 
operation is successfully completed (Emiliani et al., 2003). In essence, one-piece 
flow is then a rule that demands that products are produced only as needed; for this 
to happen, companies need standard operating procedures that document the 
sequence of operator work, machine work, and operator movement that is required 
to produce one unit of a product or part (Miltenberg, 2001). Likewise, line 
balancing and level schedules demand close relationships with suppliers (Chavez et 
al., 2015) and standards for production planning and the delivery of products in 
order to reduce fluctuations in demand and output (Liker, 2004).  
2.3 Output control mechanisms 
Output control mechanisms consist of performance measurement systems 
(Kennedy & Widener, 2008). Lean manufacturing companies use detailed non-
financial performance measurements to facilitate real-time analyses of cell 
performance (Fullerton et al., 2014). These measurements track different kinds of 
cell performance, such as day-by-the-hour, first time through, work-in-progress to 
standard work-in-progress, and operational equipment effectiveness (Maskell et al., 
2012), and they provide fast feedback when problems arise (Banker et al., 1993). 
These measurements also include past, current, and desired performances, which 
are supposed to function as motivators for employees and to direct attention to 
issues that need to be solved. Although different non-financial performance 
measures are used, this applies for value streams and the facility as well (Emiliani 
et al., 2003; Maskell et al., 2012). Besides tracking performance and providing 
feedback, the main purposes of these non-financial performance measures are to 
align behavior with Lean manufacturing objectives (Liker, 2004). This is done in 
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close relationship with social visual control mechanisms, as non-financial 
performance measures are visually displayed throughout the facility. For example, 
recurring problems are highlighted on visual boards to initiate kaizens (Emiliani et 
al., 2003) and to enhance peer pressure in teams (a social cultural control 
mechanism). These non-financial performance measurements work together with 
the financial performance measurements presented in quarterly and annual reports 
(Liker, 2004). Financial performance measurements are also necessary to assist 
managers and employees in stimulating communication, sending signals related to 
strategic issues, and fostering learning throughout the organization (Henri, 2006). It 
is important to distinguish between Lean non-financial and financial output control 
mechanisms, as they are inherently different. Financial output controls typically lag 
non-financial output controls, because many of the non-financial output controls 
are measurement drivers of future financial results (Johnson, 1992).  
2.4 Hypothesis development 
The previous sections described Lean management control mechanisms and 
clarified their interrelatedness. We expect that this interrelatedness will cause 
complementary effects on firm performance in that the benefits from any Lean 
management control mechanism are greater when the mechanism is accompanied 
and integrated with the other Lean management control mechanisms (Roberts, 
2004). For example, performance measurement systems (output control 
mechanisms) drive behavior to a greater extent and are more likely to direct 
employees' attention to problems if they are visualized through social controls. The 
effect of peer pressure (a social control mechanism) will be higher if boards 
containing skill matrices are visualized (an output control mechanism) to other 
employees. Standard operating procedures (a behavioral control mechanism) may 
be tacit knowledge for employees, but they are more effective if they are visualized, 
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ensuring that all employees work according to the best standard currently known. 
The visualization of standards also enables employees to challenge and improve 
these standards. Additionally, the effectiveness of standard operating procedures 
will likely be higher if all employees are trained according to these standards 
(social control mechanism). 
When complementarities exist among management control mechanisms, a firm 
needs to coordinate the use of these management control mechanisms by 
implementing them simultaneously. Thus, we follow the same procedure as 
Tanriverdi and Venkatraman (2005) and develop a latent second-order construct. 
The first level of this construct captures the sub-additive effects arising from social, 
behavioral, and output control mechanisms, and the second level captures the 
super-additive effects from the complementarity of management control 
mechanisms. When assessing the performance effects of a complementary system 
of management control mechanisms, we have to compare the performance effects 
of individual management control mechanisms with the performance effects of the 
complementarity among management control mechanisms, and we have to ensure 
that the complementarity performance effects outweigh the individual effects 
(Tanriverdi & Venkatraman, 2005; see also Ichniouwski et al., 1997, and 
Whittington et al., 1999). Following Tanriverdi and Venkatraman's procedure 
(2005), we develop two competing hypotheses to test whether the performance 
effects of management control mechanisms in Lean manufacturing companies are 
contingent on the complementarity of these management control mechanisms or 
whether the individual management control mechanism has an independent direct 
effect on performance: (1) a "strong form," stating that the complementarity of 
management control mechanisms will have a direct positive effect on firm 
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performance, and (2) a "weak form," stating that each management control 
mechanism will have an independent direct positive effect on firm performance.  
H1 (strong form): The complementarity of social control mechanisms, 
behavioral control mechanisms, and output control mechanisms has a 
positive effect on firm performance. 
H2 (weak form): Social control mechanisms, behavioral control 
mechanisms, and output control mechanisms have independent positive 
effects on firm performance. 
Figure 1 includes a conceptual model of the complementarity hypothesis (H1).
 
10.3 Methods  
The survey was distributed online to 4,357 subjects, representing 697 
manufacturing facilities, in September 2012, and responses were received until 
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December 2012. The subjects were identified from the Shingo Prize
49
 Organization 
database of individuals who had expressed an interest in receiving information 
about Lean principles, Shingo seminars and workshops, and the Shingo Prize. We 
received responses from 510 individuals, representing 368 different facilities, 
yielding a response rate of 11.70% which is similar to other research papers on 
Lean manufacturing (e.g. Hofer et al., 2012; Shah & Ward, 2003). We averaged 
responses from plants from which we received multiple responses, leaving us with 
a usable sample size of 368 and a facility response rate of 52.8%. Collectively, the 
368 facilities represented 195 different organizations. 30% of the organizations 
produced vehicles or provided components to the automotive industry, 29% 
produced healthcare related products, 23% made products for the aerospace 
industry, and 19% produced components for the department of defense.  
Of the facilities, 52% had more than 500 employees and 53% of the facilities had 
sales of over $100M. The average management experience of the respondents 
within their current firms was 11.3 years. This is important to our study, as 
experienced managers are likely to understand our holistic set of questions 
regarding management control, Lean manufacturing, and performance in their 
facilities
50
. Of the respondents, 53.5% were responsible for Lean, quality, or 
continuous improvement. Survey questions were intended to assess the level of 
                                                     
49
 The Shingo Prize is an award given to companies based on their world-class results and 
organizational culture. The database includes many companies, as most organizations do 
not wait to challenge for the Shingo Prize until they are likely to win it.  
50
 As the large majority of respondents had management experience and were responsible 
for Lean at their facility, our constructs might be subject to common method bias. To 
reduce these concerns, we perform a Harman's one factor test including all our latent 
variables. There is a potential bias if the majority of the variance is explained by one factor 
(Podsakoff and Organ, 1986). The test shows that the concern for common method bias is 
low, as a one factor solution only accounts for 45% of the total variance. 
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Lean manufacturing and management control implementation at the respondents' 
facilities as well as to obtain a self-assessment of firm performance.  
In the following sections, we describe how we developed our variables. We also go 
through our statistical tests and explain why we decided to utilize Tanriverdi and 
Venkatraman's (2005) test for complementarity. Figure 2 illustrates the sequence of 






10.3.1 Measures  
Although the questionnaire included 148 questions, we only included a portion for 
analysis in the present article. We drew upon Kennedy and Widener (2008) in 
developing most management control mechanism items, and we adapted several 
items from Fullerton et al. (2013; 2014). We developed four items covering 
cultural social control mechanisms, intended to cover the degree to which the entire 
facility is trained in Lean principles (CLTR 4), employee empowerment (CLTR 3 
and CLTR 1), and peer pressure (CLTR 8). Furthermore, we developed three 
additional items, CLTR 5, CLTR 6, and CLTR 7, intended to capture the degree to 
which the facilities work with continuous improvement, the degree to which 
management is focused on eliminating waste, and the degree to which Lean 
thinking has permeated all operations, respectively. CLTR 2 was adapted from 
Section 3.2 
Exploratory factor analysis 
                                               
Purpose: Development of 
the factors to be included in 
our study. 
Section 3.3 
Confirmatory factor analysis, 
tests for multicollinearity and 
linearity. 
Purpose: To ensure that the 
developed factors fit the data, 




Tests of the two full structural 
models. 
                                                      
Purpose: To test the additive 
model and the complementary 
model in order to assess the two 
hypotheses. 
Figure 2: Sequence of statistical tests 
Section 3.5 
Assessment of the second order 
measurement model. 
Purpose: To ensure the existence 
of the second-order model, and to 
ensure multidimensionality, 
convergent and discriminant 




Fullerton et al. (2013) and was intended to cover the degree to which management 
is committed to quality-related training. Of the seven items covering visual social 
control mechanisms, MAS 2, MAS 4, MAS 5, and MAS 7 were adapted from 
Fullerton et al. (2013), while the remaining three items were developed in 
accordance with Kennedy and Widener (2008). All items were intended to capture 
the degrees of different types of visualization.  
Three of four items covering behavioral control mechanisms were adapted from 
Fullerton et al. (2013) and were intended to cover the degree of facilities' use of 
standardization of manufacturing procedures (MFG 1), a Kanban system (MFG 2), 
and one-piece flow (MFG 3), and we developed MFG 4 to capture the use of line 
balancing and level schedules.  
The three items covering non-financial output controls were intended to capture the 
importance of non-financial performance measures related to cell performance 
(PRF 1), value stream performance (PRF 2), and facility performance (PRF 3). As 
these measures are rather generic, we follow the same procedure as Fullerton et al. 
(2013) and include a test for criterion validity where we correlate our non-financial 
output controls with criterion variables in order to demonstrate plausibility. This 
test can be found in Appendix 1, table 1. We developed four additional items 
covering financial output control mechanisms, intended to capture the importance 
of performance measures related to market share (PRF 4), cash flow (PRF 5), 
overall financial results (PRF 6), and customer satisfaction (PRF 7). One of the six 
items covering performance (LIMP 3) was adapted from Fullerton et al. (2014), 
while we developed the remaining items in order to cover the extent to which Lean 
initiatives have freed inventory resources (LIMP 1), improved capacity 
management effectiveness (LIMP 2), improved quality (LIMP 4), improved 
communication (LIMP5), reduced costs (LIMP 6), and improved profitability 
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(LIMP 7). Thus, our performance items cover both a goal-centered and an 
accounting approach (Kihn, 2005). Survey items can be found in Appendix 1, table 
2. 
All items were measured on a 5-point labeled Likert scale. Eustler and Lang (2015) 
have shown that labeled scales are superior to unlabeled scales as they reduce 
measurement error and response bias.  
10.3.2 Exploratory factor analysis 
We conducted an exploratory factor analysis including our exogenous variables 
with oblique rotation. We removed one item that loaded greater than .4 on more 
than one variable
51
. After the removal of one item, we conducted another 
exploratory factor analysis, which yielded five factors with eigenvalues greater 
than one, collectively explaining 66.8% of the variance: cultural social controls, 
visual social controls, behavioral controls, non-financial output controls, and 
financial output controls. Additionally, we performed an exploratory factor 
analysis for the performance items yielding one factor with an eigenvalue greater 
than one, explaining 65.5% of the variance. Along with the exogenous factors, the 
performance factor represents the variables used in this study (see Table 2). All 
factors' Cronbach's alphas are between .786 and .913 (see Table 3), demonstrating 
good to excellent reliability (Kline, 2011). 
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 The .4 cut-off have been used in prior research on Lean manufacturing (e.g., Fullerton & 
Wempe, 2009; Fullerton et al., 2014). The removal of one item did not affect the 
composition of the five factors. 
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Table 2: Exploratory factor analysis and descriptive 

















Indicator                 
CLTR1 .585           3.49 .99 
CLTR2 .517           3.84 .83 
CLTR3 .707           3.33 .95 
CLTR4 .568           3.33 .79 
CLTR5 .727           3.42 1.07 
CLTR6 .851           3.44 1.05 
CLTR7 .755           3.50 1.01 
CLTR8 .766           3.18 1.08 
MAS1   -.629         3.68 .94 
MAS2   -.651         4.08 .87 
MAS3   -.724         3.35 1.15 
MAS4   -.849         3.72 1.06 
MAS5   -.745         3.39 1.04 
MAS6   -.854         3.67 1.08 
MAS7   -.745         3.37 1.14 
PRF1     -.851       3.18 1.10 
PRF2     -.790       3.02 1.13 
PRF3     -.852       3.18 1.05 
PRF4       .825     3.43 1.17 
PRF5       .869     3.72 1.13 
PRF6       .749   
 
4.17 .87 
PRF7       .509   
 
4.19 .89 
MFG1         -.413 
 
3.86 .82 
MFG2         -.727   3.52 1.06 
MFG3         -.719   3.27 1.11 
MFG4         -.779   3.50 1.06 
LIMP1           .754 3.24 .95 
LIMP2           .850 3.59 .86 
LIMP3           .848 3.72 .87 
LIMP4           .785 3.64 .86 
LIMP5           .768 3.62 .84 
LIMP6           .828 3.60 .89 
LIMP7           .829 3.53 .90 
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KMO of sampling adequacy for the management control mechanism factors: .944, Bartlett's Test of Sphericity is significant p<. 000.     
KMO of sampling adequacy for the firm performance factor .887, Bartlett's Test of Sphericity is significant p<.000. 
The KMO values above .5 and the significance of the Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity indicates that the data is suitable for exp loratory factor 
analysis, and that there are patterns among items (Field, 2005). 
   
Only loadings exceeding .400 are shown. 
      
 
10.3.3 Confirmatory factor analysis 
We perform a confirmatory factor analysis in AMOS 23 including our factors, 
using maximum likelihood estimation. This is a two-step procedure where the 
measurement model without structural paths is evaluated to ensure that it fits, and 
this is followed by an evaluation of the entire structural model (Hair et al., 2014). 
We evaluate the measurement model using several fit indices, as recommended by 
Kline (2011). We assess χ
2 
to degrees of freedom (Bollen, 1989), as it seems to be 
the consensus in the SEM literature, although Kline (2011) states that there is little 
statistical and logical foundation for using this measure of model fit. We assess the 
root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) and the standardized root mean 
square residual (SRMR). Additionally, we evaluate the comparative fit index (CFI) 
(Bentler, 1990), incremental fit index (IFI) (Bollen, 1989), and Tucker-Lewis index 
(TLI) (Tucker & Lewis, 1973). In general, there are no accepted minimal 
thresholds for what constitutes acceptable model fit (Schermelleh-Engel et al., 
2003). However, there are suggested parameters in published academic work for 
what would represent acceptable fit: χ
2 
to degrees of freedom should be less than 
three, indicating acceptable fit (Kline, 2005); a RMSEA value below .08 would 
indicate acceptable fit (Browne & Cudeck, 1993; Kline, 2011); a SRMR value 
below .1 indicates acceptable fit (Schermelleh-Engel et al., 2003); and CFI, IFI, 
and TLI are evaluated for their closeness to 1.0 (Byrne, 2010) with values over .9 
(Bentler, 1992; Kline, 2005), indicating acceptable fit. Lastly, we evaluate the 
Consistent Akaike's Information Criterion (CAIC), addressing the issue of 
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parsimony in the assessment of model fit, taking sample size into account 
(Bozdogan, 1987), where the ratio of the hypothesized model and the saturated 
model should be less than one (Byrne, 2010). Although the χ
2 
is significant (p<. 
001), the χ
2
 to degrees of freedom is less than three, and fit indices are more than 
acceptable (see Table 3). 
Table 3: Confirmatory factor analysis, composite reliability, and Cronbach's alpha 
   
Factor indicators Standardized loadings T-value (All significant p<.01) C.R. Alpha 
 



































   



















































   















   

















































   
LIMP7   .72 13.50     
 χ2 to degrees of freedom: 2.299, RMSEA: .060, SRMR: .054, IFI: .923, TLI: .915, CFI: .922, CAIC: .429 (1663.439/3875.435 saturated 
model). 
 
To assess construct validity, we investigate the factors' convergent validity, 
construct reliability, and discriminant validity. All our factors show good 
convergent validity, as their average variance extracted (AVE) is above .5 (see 
Table 4) and their construct reliability (CR) is well above .7 (Hair et al., 2014). 
Furthermore, as indicated in Table 3, all factor loadings (standardized coefficients) 
are above .5 (Bagozzi & Yi, 1988). Discriminant validity is assessed by comparing 
the square root of the AVE of the factors with their correlation (Fornell & Larcker, 
1981), where the square root AVE of individual factors should be greater than the 
interfactor correlation. Square root AVE of factors is indicated at the diagonal of 
Table 4 and is greater than the interfactor correlations
52
. Additionally, none of the 
                                                     
52
 Squared AVE to inter-factor correlations is computed in SPSS 23. We compared the 
squared AVE to the inter-factor correlations in AMOS 23 as well. This test revealed 
discriminant validity issues only concerning the performance factor, the social controls 1 
factor, and the behavioral controls factor. All of our factors correlated less than .85, not 
indicating poor discriminant validity (Kenny, 2012). Kenny (2012) also suggests restricting 
the correlation between two factors to 1, which is similar to collapsing the two factors (Hair 
et al., 2014). This is done to investigate if a one-factor model is more appropriate than a 




 is significant (Hair et al., 
2014). We performed a test in AMOS 23 where we constrained correlations between both 
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interfactor correlations exceed their alphas, which is another indicator of 
discriminant validity (Crocker & Algina, 1986). Table 4 also indicates that all 
factors correlated significantly. Our measurement model did not indicate 
multicollinearity issues, as none of the variance inflation factors exceeded 2.8, and 
all tolerance statistics exceeded .36.  
Before running the two full structural models, we also test all relationships from 
exogenous variables to performance for linearity. All relationships are significantly 
linear p<.01 and have R
2
 values ranging from .146 to .656 and F-values between 
62.658 and 697.191. In addition, the number of free parameters to be estimated 
compared with the sample size is well above the minimum ratio of 1:5 
recommended by Worthington and Whittaker (2006) in both the first-order 
structural model and the second-order structural model. 
 
                                                                                                                                       
the performance factor and behavioral controls and the performance factor and social 
controls 1. In both instances, a two-factor model fitted the data significantly better: 
restricting the correlation to one between performance and behavioral controls yields a χ
2 
of 




 (p<.01) and the 
following fit indices: RMSEA: .064, SRMR: .1307, IFI: .911, TLI: .902, and CFI: .911. 
Restricting the correlation to one between performance and social controls 1, on the other 
hand, yields a χ
2





(p<.01) and the following fit indices: RMSEA: .061, SRMR: .0748, IFI: .918, TLI: .910, 




10.3.4 Testing for complementarity 
There are several strategies when testing for complementarities in research. Ennen 
and Richter (2010) divide these strategies into two main categories: the interaction 
approach and the systems approach. The interaction approach is of a reductionist 
character (Drazin & Van de Ven, 1985), as it only includes pairs of interactions and 
their main effects in a regression model. This is often a function of statistical 
necessity, as individual variables in complementary systems are heavily correlated 
and, furthermore, heavily correlated with the interaction term. When the main 
variables and their pair-wise interaction terms are heavily correlated, coefficient 
estimates obtained from the regression model do not reflect the inherent effects of 
any particular independent variable on the dependent variable but only the 
marginal effects or the partial effects, given the other, independent variables in the 
model (Tanriverdi & Venkatraman, 2005). Our independent variables are 
significantly correlated, as shown in Table 4. Likewise, our multiplicative 
interaction terms are heavily correlated with each other and with their main 
Table 4: Factor correlations, squared average variance extracted and average variance extracted 
   
Factor # of measures 1 2 3 4 5 6 AVE 
Non-financial output controls 3 .883 
     
.779 
Visual social controls 7 .620** .773 
    
.598 
Cultural social controls 8 .667** .678** .739 
   
.547 
Behavioral controls 4 .528** .607** .609** .738 
  
.544 
Financial output controls 4 .411** .447** .428** .475** .713 
 
.508 
Firm performance 7 .627** .674** .762** .718** .491** .774 .600 
** significant at the p<.01 level. 
       All measures are a labeled Likert scale from 1–5. 
       Square roots of AVE are shown at the diagonal. 
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variables (correlations ranging from .311 p<. 001 to .935 p<.001)
53
. Furthermore, 
by focusing only on pairs of interactions, researchers that are not able to detect the 
expected complementarity between two variables might overlook that the expected 
complementarity is a function of a third variable (Ennen & Richter, 2010). Our 
theory concerns complementarities among multiple variables. Given the theoretical 
development and explanations leading to our complementarity hypothesis, the 
interpretational problems inherent in the interaction approach render it an 
ineffective means of testing the hypothesis. 
The systems strategy testing complementarity involves focusing on a holistic set of 
variables (Ennen & Richter, 2010). However, Ennen and Richter (2010) do not 
elaborate on the statistical testing techniques of this strategy. Profile deviation 
analysis is suggested by Gerdin and Greve (2004). Studies that use profile 
deviation analysis segment data based on a criterion variable and find the ideal 
state of systems within each of these segments (see, e.g., Hult et al., 2007). As a 
second step, researchers use the city block distance or the Euclidian distance, 
expecting that the deviations from the ideal state are negatively associated with 
performance. However, the city-block distance only accounts for additive effects, 
and it is unclear exactly what is captured by the Euclidian distance. Another 
possibility when pursuing systems strategy is to apply higher-order interactions in a 
regression model. However, this approach will increase the correlations between 
individual variables and their multiplicative interactions, leading to interpretational 
problems of the regression model (Tanriverdi & Venkatraman, 2005). Other studies 
that apply the systems strategy attempt to capture the nature of organizational 
systems by using a categorical variable that studies whether or not a particular 
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factor is in place (e.g., Furlan et al., 2011). However, this approach provides little 
information on the nature of the relationships that drive the complementarity 
effects observed (Ennen & Richter, 2010).   
As the tests described here were not appropriate for testing our hypotheses on 
complementarity, we sought an alternative statistical method and decided to utilize 
the approach applied by Tanriverdi and Venkatraman (2005). Tanriverdi and 
Venkatraman (2005) constructed two models in order to test for complementarity: 
a first-order model to capture the sub-additive effects of their variables on 
performance and a second-order factor model to account for the multilateral 
interactions and covariance among their variables, in order to test for 
complementary effects on performance. A second-order factor is an entity that is 
reflected by first-order factors serving as its indicators (Williams et al., 2004) and 
is the main source of covariance among first-order factors; it explains why the first-
order factors coexist and co-vary with each other (Rindskopf & Rose, 1988). 
Utilizing Tanriverdi and Venkatraman's (2005) procedure, we avoid the 
interpretational challenges of the other tests for complementarity of multiple 
variables (in our case, control mechanisms), and we can compare the additive 
effects on firm performance with the complementary effects on firm performance. 
We are thus able to test both our hypotheses and to determine whether the 
complementary effects outweigh the additive effects as well as whether some of the 






10.3.5 Assessment of the second-order measurement model 
Following Tanriverdi and Venkatraman's procedure (2005)
54
, we need to compare 
the first-order measurement model where we correlate our management control 
mechanisms with the second-order measurement model in order to assess the 
existence of a second-order model and to ensure the multidimensionality, construct, 
and convergent validity of the second-order model. Marsh and Hocevar (1985) 
developed the target coefficient statistic, which is the ratio of the chi-square of the 
first-order model to the chi-square of the second-order model. The target 
coefficient has an upper limit of 1.0 (Tanriverdi & Venkatraman, 2005), and 
support for the existence of a second-order factor becomes stronger when the target 
coefficient approaches unity (Marsh & Hocevar, 1985). The value of the target 
coefficient of our second-order complementarity factor is .98, indicating that a 
second-order factor explains 98 percent of the relations among the first-order 
factors. Furthermore, all second-order factor loadings are highly significant 
(p<.001), providing further acceptance of a second-order model. Collectively, these 
results support the existence, multidimensionality, convergent and discriminant 
validity, and reliability of a second-order complementarity construct (Tanriverdi & 
Venkatraman, 2005) (see Table 5).  
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 Following Tanriverdi and Venkatraman's (2005) procedure, we did not include the 
performance variable in this test.  
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10.4 Empirical tests and results 
     10.4.1 Test of hypotheses 
The figures below depict the models of our two competing hypotheses. Figure 3 
shows a graphical representation of the model for testing Hypothesis 1. This 
depicts our management control mechanisms modeled initially as first-order factors. 
The second-order factor in the figure models the complementarity among our 
management control mechanisms by accounting for their covariance and 
multilateral interactions, and the directions of the structural links are from the 
second-order factor to the first-order factor, indicating that all the management 
Table 5: Panel A: Fit indices for the first-order measurement model and 
the second-order measurement model 







    X2 605.899 617.845 
    Degrees of freedom 289 294 
    X2 to degrees of freedom 2.097 2.012 
    IFI .946 .945 
    TLI .939 .938 
    CFI .946 .944 
    RMSEA .055 .055 
    SRMR .056 .058 
    CAIC (default model to 
saturated model 
.422 .422 
    Target statistic: .980 
(605.899/617.845) 
      
       Panel B: First-order factor loadings on 
complementary factor 
     Relationships     Standardized 
coefficient 
T-values (all significant at p<.001) 




  Visual social controls <-- Complementarity 
factor 
.844 9.060 
  Cultural social controls <-- Complementarity 
factor 
.866 10.101 
  Behavioral controls <-- Complementarity 
factor 
.793 a* 
  Financial output controls <-- Complementarity 
factor 
.549 7.205     
* Indicates a loading fixed to 
1. 
             
255 
 
control mechanisms are adapted simultaneously and systematically. In order to test 
our hypothesis, the second-order factor is related to firm performance. Figure 4 
shows a graphical representation for testing Hypothesis 2. It shows the 
management control mechanisms as first-order factors, models their pair-wise 
covariance, and relates the management control factors additively to firm 
performance. In Figure 3, the structural parameter from the complementarity 
second-order factor to firm performance is positive and significant (standardized ß 
coefficient: .927, p<.001, R
2
: .859), providing support for Hypothesis 1, the strong 
form. This finding indicates that a second-order factor accounting for the 
complementarity among management control mechanisms has a positive effect on 
firm performance. In Figure 4, only two of the five structural parameters, cultural 
social control mechanisms (standardized ß coefficient: .399 p<.001) and behavioral 
control mechanisms (standardized ß coefficient: .400 p<.001, collective R
2
 from all 
additive effects: .805), from management control mechanisms to firm performance 
are significant (also see Table 6, Panel A). Financial and non-financial output 
control mechanisms and social visual control mechanisms do not contribute to 
performance in isolation. Thus, Hypothesis 2, the weak form, is not supported. 
Both the standardized ß coefficient and R
2
 from the complementary factor to firm 
performance are greater than the collective R
2
 and the standardized ß coefficients in 
the additive model. These results suggest that the complementary effects on firm 
performance among the complete set of Lean management control mechanisms 
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 As suggested by Camacho-Minano et al. (2013), we controlled for size and unionization. 
Size was proxied for by the number of facility employees and facility sales, and 
respondents were asked to indicate whether their facility was fully unionized or not. We ran 
256 
 
   
 
  
Table 6: Panel A: Hypotheses tests (weak form) 
  Independent variable   Dependent variable Standardized coefficient 
VSC --> Firm performance .094 
CSC --> Firm performance .399*** 
OUTNF --> Firm performance .058 
OUTF --> Firm performance .082 
BC --> Firm performance .400*** 
R2 Firm performance: .805 
   
Panel B: Hypothesis test (strong form) 
  
Independent variable   Dependent variable Standardized coefficient 
Complementarity --> Firm performance .927*** 
R2 Firm performance: .859. 
   ***significant at the p<.001 level. 
   
We have decided to report the fit indices in Figures 3 and 4, for which there are 
consensus in the structural equation modeling literature (Kline, 2011), although 
Tanriverdi and Venkatraman (2005) chose not to do so. All fit indices indicate 
acceptable fit.   
                                                                                                                                       
tests with respect to both hypotheses where size variables were additively related to firm 
performance and chi-square difference tests where size variables moderated all structural 
relationships.  We ran the same tests regarding unionization. We find that all statistical 













10.5 Discussion and Conclusion  
This study focused on complementarities among management control mechanisms 
in Lean manufacturing companies. Little research has been carried out on this topic, 
which is rather paradoxical, as Lean manufacturing is recognized as an enterprise-
wide system consisting of interdependent practices (Liker, 2004; Maskell et al., 
2012). Our aim with this research was to study Lean management control 
mechanisms and their complementary effects on firm performance. Earlier research 
provides limited evidence of complementarity among Lean management control 
mechanisms. Emiliani et al. (2003) and Kennedy and Widener (2008) were single 
firm studies and found that Lean management control mechanisms were 
interrelated, but did not provide evidence of complementary effects from Lean 
management control mechanisms to firm performance. Kristensen and Israelsen 
(2014) was a single firm study showing that greater balance among management 
control mechanisms led to greater firm performance, but their method made it 
difficult to capture the covariance and interactions among Lean management 
control mechanisms. Fullerton et al. (2013) was a cross-sectional study and found 
that management control mechanisms were interrelated. However, the study did not 
provide evidence of the complementary effects from Lean management control 
mechanisms to firm performance, and did not encompass the complete set of 
management control mechanisms.  
Informed by the Lean manufacturing literature and complementary theory, we 
expected that Lean management control mechanisms were complementary. We 
utilized the holistic framework developed by Kennedy and Widener (2008), which 
characterizes Lean management control mechanisms as social, behavioral, and 
output control mechanisms. In order to confirm that management control 
mechanisms were complementary, we constructed two competing hypotheses. The 
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first hypothesis predicted that the complementarity of management control 
mechanism was positively related to firm performance. The second hypothesis 
predicted that the management control mechanisms were independently, additively 
related to firm performance. By constructing two competing hypotheses, we were 
able to compare the performance effects of individual system components with the 
performance effects of the complementarity among system components, and we 
were able to point out the conditionality of individual effects on the effects of other 
system components (Tanriverdi & Venkatraman, 2005).  
We contribute to the literature on Lean management control mechanisms in two 
major ways. We are the first to show that the complementary effects among Lean 
management control mechanisms outweigh their additive effects on firm 
performance. Thus, firm performance will suffer as a result of implementations that 
do not consider the complementarity among management control mechanisms 
(Roberts, 2004). Furthermore, only social cultural control mechanisms and 
behavioral control mechanisms were independently related to firm performance. 
Second, this research adds cross-sectional empirical evidence that the full set of 
Lean management control mechanisms is complementary. We also add greater 
granularity to the understanding of Lean management control mechanisms because 
we distinguish financial output controls from non-financial controls as well as 
social visual controls from cultural visual controls, and we add a detailed analysis 
of their systematic interrelatedness. In other words, we provide evidence of five 
different management control mechanisms compared with the three found in 
Kennedy and Widener's (2008), and Kristensen and Israelsen's (2014) studies. 
Inspired by Ouchi (1979), we also extend the Kennedy and Widener (2008) 
framework by incorporating Lean thinking into social control mechanisms. The 
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greater granularity and greater level of detail are important steps forward in 
understanding Lean management control mechanisms.  
To illustrate our findings, consider that non-financial output control mechanisms 
are not recognized as complementary with peer pressure (a social cultural control 
mechanism) in the system. That will lead to a reduction of the motivational effects 
otherwise promoted by non-financial output control mechanisms. Likewise, the 
effects of structuring the manufacturing facility with high visibility (a social visual 
control mechanism) are reduced if managers do not recognize the complementarity 
with training in Lean principles (a social cultural control mechanism), as 
employees will not be able to assist other manufacturing cells in preventing 
problems or improving work processes. Furthermore, if managers do not recognize 
that visualization of quality data (a social visual control mechanism) is 
complementary with standardization (a behavioral control mechanism), the effects 
of visualization of quality data are reduced, as it is difficult to leverage for 
continuous improvement, because employees have no baseline from which they 
can test potential improvements. The performance effects of financial and non-
financial output control mechanisms and of social visual control mechanisms are 
thus not isolated additive effects; they affect performance through their 
complementarity with social cultural control mechanisms and behavioral control 
mechanisms.  
In a Lean manufacturing milieu, social cultural control mechanisms and behavioral 
control mechanisms are then not only enhancers of firm performance but also 
enablers for the performance effects of financial and non-financial output control 
and social visual control mechanisms. In a similar vein, the effects of social 
cultural control mechanisms and behavioral control mechanisms on firm 
performance are greater when they are accompanied by non-financial output 
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control and social visual control mechanisms in a complementary system. This 
underlines that the greatest benefits from Lean management control mechanisms 
arise when they are implemented in a complete, systematic manner.  
Methodologically, this study makes two contributions to the management control 
literature. First, we use a second-order factor technique to find evidence of 
complementarity among management control mechanisms. This technique is new 
to this body of literature and it overcomes the struggles of other techniques testing 
for complementarities. The second methodological advance of this study is that we 
show the specifics of management control mechanisms in a Lean manufacturing 
context and show how individual management control mechanisms are related 
(Malmi & Brown, 2008).  
Our findings have important managerial implications. First, companies will not 
achieve the full performance potential of implementing Lean manufacturing if they 
decide to employ a system where some of the management control mechanisms are 
missing. In line with this reasoning, and if a company has already employed for 
example social control mechanisms, it should invest in implementing the remaining 
management control mechanisms rather than putting more effort into the existing 
one. Second, the implementation of all Lean management control mechanisms 
affects the entire company, and employees might have to unlearn old principles and 
practices before new ones can be put fruitfully into use. Thus, the implementation 
of the full set of management control mechanisms should be performed with a 
great emphasis on company-wide coordination, and companies would benefit from 
preparing employees thoroughly before embarking on the Lean manufacturing 
journey. Third, it is important for decision makers to understand that the 
performance effect of the implementation of one management control mechanism 
is dependent on the level of implementation of another management control 
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mechanism, and vice versa, and that the company will not obtain the full 
performance effects until the system of management control mechanisms is 
completely implemented. Therefore, although initial performance effects might be 
lower than expected, the company should not hesitate with respect to increasing the 
level of the implementation of Lean management control mechanisms. In fact, our 
research enables decision makers a greater ex ante understanding of how Lean 
management control mechanisms work together which can guide and assist them in 
overcoming some hesitations related to implementing the tightly coupled system of 
management control mechanisms. This ex ante guidance leaves less to understand 
for decision makers post hoc, and can enable the organizational change and 
complex coordination that the implementation of the full set of complementary 
Lean management control mechanisms requires (Robert 2004; Ennen and Richter, 
2010). Fourth, the set of questionnaire items that we developed in this research can 
be applied by practitioners during Lean audits to ensure that they are on track and 
reaching Lean manufacturing objectives, and the set of items can be used as a 
benchmarking tool between business units. Fifth, our evidence suggests that 
decision makers should understand that financial output control mechanisms 
remain important in Lean manufacturing companies. In the literature, e.g. Johnson 
(1992), it is typically noted that such control mechanisms should be avoided and 
substituted with non-financial control mechanisms, but we have shown that non-
financial and financial control mechanisms are complementary. Finally, Lean 
management control mechanisms might be relatively easy to replicate between 
companies. Furthermore, knowledge of Lean principles and practices is wide-
spread. After all, these principles and practices have received abundant attention 
since the late eighties (Bhamu and Sangwan, 2014). Therefore, despite that initial 
costs might be high, companies should go far in order to understanding the 
complementarity among the complete set of management control mechanisms as it 
264 
 
may lead to a sustainable competitive advantage because it is difficult for 
competitors to replicate (Porter, 1996).  
10.6 Future research and limitations 
As with other studies, this study has its limitations. As our study is of a cross-
sectional nature, it is difficult to claim causal inferences, and we cannot rule out 
that unobserved factors may be driving our evidence. Rather, our evidence must be 
considered as consistent with our theoretical arguments. Furthermore, our sample is 
not random, as it was drawn from a population of Lean companies. This reduces 
the generalizability of our evidence to other manufacturing regimes, but it also 
increases the likelihood of the population understanding the survey questions and 
consequently helps alleviate some of the concerns about data collection in survey 
research (Fullerton et al., 2013). Last, surveying only one respondent in each firm 
represents a potential common method bias problem. However, we addressed this 
limitation and found that it was not a concern.    
Our study suggests that examining the benefits or effects of financial and non-
financial control mechanisms and social visual control mechanisms in isolation at 
Lean companies may lead to inconsistent results due to a failure to control for 
social cultural and behavioral control mechanisms. Future research on management 
control in Lean companies must then encompass a focus on the entire set of 
management control mechanisms. The simultaneous, systematic implementation of 
Lean management control mechanisms might overwhelm employees' absorptive 
capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). A possible future research endeavor is then 
to clarify if the effects of Lean management control mechanisms on firm 
performance are affected by the length of time companies have used Lean 
manufacturing. A second future research idea is to clarify whether our findings are 
applicable to more loosely coupled manufacturing regimes. In these manufacturing 
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regimes, the individual management control mechanism might work, as practices 
are less interdependent (Roberts, 2004). Testing for complementarities among 
management controls has recently been debated (see Grabner & Moers, 2013). We 
consider the second-order technique as an important addition to this debate, and we 
suggest that future management control research on complementarities should 
consider using the second-order technique.      
10.7 Appendix 1 
Table 1: Criterion Validity 
   
Measure Test variable Explanation for correlation Properties test variable Correlation 
OUTNF Cost of quality 
If a firm uses non-financial control 
mechanisms, it is likely to measure 
the cost of quality. Single item .583** 
OUTNF Productivity 
If you use non-financial management 
control mechanisms, you are likely to 
measure productivity. Single item .515** 
OUTNF On-time deliveries 
If a firm uses non-financial 
management control mechanisms, we 
expect it to measure on-time 
deliveries. Single item .431** 
OUTNF First-pass yields 
We expect that if a firm uses non-
financial control mechanisms, it is 
likely to measure first-pass yields. Single item .538** 
OUTNF Cycle time improvements 
If a firm uses non-financial 
management control mechanisms, it is 
likely to measure cycle time 
improvements. Single item .573** 




Table 2: Survey Items             
Social cultural controls 
     
Please indicate below what most closely represents your facility's organizational culture. 
 1: Strongly Disagree, 2: Disagree, 3: Neutral, 4: Agree, 5: Strongly Agree 
  CLTR 1 Management style is more participative than autocratic 
 
 CLTR 2 Management is committed to quality-related training 
 
 CLTR 3 All employees are involved in problem solving 
 
 CLTR 4 Our entire facility is trained in lean principles 
 
 CLTR 5 Every area of our facility works on continuous improvement 
 CLTR 6 Management is focused on eliminating waste everywhere 
  CLTR 7 Lean thinking has permeated all of our operations 
  CLTR 8 Team members feel peer pressure to perform     
Social visual controls 
     
For the following items, please mark the most appropriate response related to your facility's management accounting system. 
1: Strongly Disagree, 2: Disagree, 3: Neutral, 4: Agree, 5: Strongly Agree 
  MAS 1 Standard operating procedures are visible on the shop floor 
  MAS 2 Visual boards are used to share information 
 
  MAS 3 A training skills matrix is visible on the shop floor 
 
 MAS 4 Charts showing defect rates are posted on the shop floor 
  MAS 5 We have created a visual mode of organization 
  
MAS 6 Information on productivity is updated frequently on the shop floor 
 MAS 7 Quality data is displayed at work stations      
Behavioral controls 
     Please indicate below the extent to which your facility has implemented the following 
 1: Not at all, 2: Little, 3: Some, 4: Considerable, 5: Great deal 
   MFG 1 Use of standardization 
    MFG 2 A Kanban system 
    MFG 3 Use of one-piece flow 
    MFG 4 Use of line balancing and level schedules    
Non-financial output controls 
    Please indicate below how important these performance measures are to operations at your facility. 
1: Not at all, 2: Somewhat, 3: Important 4: Very Important 5: Critical 
  PRF1 Non-financial measures related to cell performance 
  PRF2 Non-financial measures related to value stream performance 
 PRF3 Non-financial measures related to facility performance    
Financial output controls 






Please indicate below how important these performance measures are to operations at your facility. 
1: Not at all, 2: Somewhat, 3: Important 4: Very Important 5: Critical 
  PRF 4 Market share 
     PRF 5 Cash flow 
     PRF 6 Overall financial results 
    PRF 7 Customer satisfaction     
Firm performance 
     Please indicate to what extent lean initiatives have affected the following 
  1: Not at all, 2: Little, 3: Some, 4: Considerable, 5: Great deal 
   LIMP 1 Inventory-related resources have been freed up 
  LIMP 2 Capacity is managed more effectively 
   LIMP 3 Cycle/production time is improved 
   LIMP 4 Quality is improved 
    LIMP 5 Overall communication is improved
   LIMP 6 Costs are reduced 
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This study addresses a holistic perspective on lean, where associations between 
lean manufacturing, management accounting practices, lean thinking, and 
performance are studied. It also investigates whether the operational performance 
effects from lean manufacturing, lean thinking and lean visual controls are 
moderated by the length of time companies’ have used lean manufacturing. By 
examining a structural equation model with survey data from 368 different 
manufacturing facilities, we find positive associations between lean manufacturing 
and all management accounting practices. We also find that lean manufacturing, 
value stream costing, and lean visual controls are positively related to lean thinking. 
Lean thinking is positively related to operational performance and lean 
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manufacturing, and value stream costing and lean visual controls are indirectly 
related to operational performance through lean thinking. Additionally, we find that 
the performance effects of lean manufacturing and lean visual controls are 
moderated by the length of time companies have used lean manufacturing. 
11.1 Introduction  
The term “lean manufacturing” was coined by Krafcik (1988) and colleagues 
during their study of the Toyota Production System as part of the MIT international 
vehicle program. Today, lean manufacturing is recognized as an integrated 
management system (Emiliani et al. 2003; Kennedy and Widener 2008; Shah and 
Ward 2007) and has garnered widespread adoption as an enabler for companies to 
succeed in an increasingly competitive environment.  
A key to the success of a lean initiative is that management accounting practices 
are aligned with lean objectives (Fullerton et al. 2014; Åhlström and Karlsson 
1996). In some parts of the accounting literature, the consensus is that companies 
should shift away from using standard costing because of the inherent 
dysfunctional behavioral consequences for the lean strategy (e.g., Huntzinger 2007; 
Huntzinger and Kennedy 2005; Kaplan and Cooper 1998). Yet the literature is not 
completely explicit regarding whether it is standard absorption costing and/or 
standard direct costing that has dysfunctional consequences for lean. In this study 
we focus explicitly on measurements of direct labor and materials efficiency. Some 
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of the lean accounting literature also claims that these are problematic in lean 
manufacturing (Maskell and Kennedy 2007; Maskell et al. 2012). However, the 
evidence is not consistent. For example, Kennedy and Widener (2008) found that 
their lean manufacturing case company substituted labor variances with actual 
costs and relied heavily on non-financial controls. Likewise, Fullerton et al. (2013; 
2014) found that lean manufacturing companies, in addition to relying heavily on 
non-financial controls, used value stream costing. Other empirical evidence 
suggests that lean manufacturing companies continue to use direct labor and 
materials efficiency variances. For example, Banker et al. (1993) found that just-in-
time (JIT) companies continued to use labor efficiency measures together with 
non-financial performance measures. In another study, Lind (2001) found that the 
case company continued to use efficiency variance analyses in concert with non-
financial performance measures.  
Another key for a successful lean manufacturing implementation is a change in 
mindsets (Emiliani et al. 2003; Womack and Jones 2003) in which lean thinking 
permeates the thinking of both employees and management. With lean thinking, 
management and employees share a constant focus on continuous improvement 
and problem solving; that they think, act, and behave with a passion for lean; and 
that they are trained according to lean principles. Lean thinking is important in lean 
manufacturing companies, as employees are given the autonomy to solve problems 
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and identify areas of improvement in order to achieve lean objectives. The first 
purpose of this study is to address the relationships between lean manufacturing, 
management accounting practices, lean thinking, and firm performance. In addition 
to measurements of labor and material efficiency (i.e., labor and materials 
efficiency variances), we use two components representing management 
accounting practices: value stream costing and lean visual controls. We 
hypothesize that lean manufacturing is positively related to these practices and that 
the practices are interdependent. We also hypothesize that lean manufacturing, 
value stream costing, and lean visual controls are positively related to lean thinking, 
and that lean manufacturing, lean visual controls, and lean thinking are positively 
related to operational performance.  
The second purpose of this paper is to examine whether the relationships between 
lean manufacturing, lean visual controls, lean thinking, and operational 
performance are affected by the length of time companies have used lean 
manufacturing. As the implementation of lean manufacturing includes a complete 
reorganization of the production areas, investments in visual controls, and changes 
in employees’ and management’s mindsets, we expect that time with lean 
manufacturing affects our hypothesized relationships. For example, the 
hypothesized improvements in operational performance caused by lean 
manufacturing might materialize to a greater extent when employees and 
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management have experimented with different work solutions, learned how to 
work with lean manufacturing, and unlearned some of the skills and behaviors 
necessary under previous manufacturing regimes that might be detrimental to the 
lean manufacturing implementation. We explain these thoughts with the concept of 
time compression diseconomies (Dierickx and Cool 1989). Anecdotally, 
Vermeulen (2009) described how time affected his capability to play the cello. 
Intensifying his input by only practicing one day a week, he was not able to play a 
piece as well the seventh day compared to when he spread his input equally among 
six days. Using this anecdote in a lean manufacturing context would imply that 
companies will benefit more from lean manufacturing, lean thinking, and lean 
visual controls as a function of the length of time they have used lean 
manufacturing. We also examine whether the relationship between lean 
manufacturing and management accounting practices is moderated as a function of 
the experience that companies have with lean manufacturing.  
Utilizing a cross-sectional sample of 368 lean manufacturing facilities, we use a 
structural equation model to examine our hypotheses. Not surprisingly, and 
supporting prior studies (Fullerton et al. 2013; 2014), we find that lean 
manufacturing is positively related to value stream costing and lean visual controls. 
We also find that lean manufacturing is positively related to measurements of 
direct labor and materials efficiency variances. In fact, we find that the relationship 
283 
 
between lean manufacturing and labor and materials efficiency variances is 
significantly greater at facilities with longer experience with lean manufacturing. 
This finding opposes the claims that standard costing (and all included budget 
variances) per se is detrimental to lean manufacturing (e.g., Huntzinger 2007; 
Johnson 1992; Kaplan and Cooper 1998; Maskell et al. 2012). We further find that 
the management accounting practices are interdependent and that lean visual 
controls and value stream costing are positively related to lean thinking. This 
supports the holistic perspective found in Fullerton et al. (2013). We also find that 
lean manufacturing and lean visual controls are positively related to operational 
performance, and the effect is intensified through lean thinking. Thus, lean thinking 
is a catalyst for lean manufacturing companies in achieving improved operational 
performance. In addition, we find that the relationships between lean 
manufacturing and operational performance and between lean visual controls and 
operational performance are significantly greater as a function of the length of time 
companies have used lean manufacturing. Thus, firms get greater benefit from lean 
manufacturing and lean visual controls as the employees and managers grow more 
experienced with lean manufacturing even if the extent of lean manufacturing and 
lean visual controls has not significantly increased 
Our findings contribute to the literature in three key ways. We expand the 
understanding of how management accounting practices can assist lean 
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manufacturing companies. Thus, we respond to Åhlström and Karlssons’ (1996) 
call for research on how management accounting practices integrate with 
operations and to Fullerton et al.’s (2013) call for research on ways these practices 
provide more useful information to decision makers in world-class firms. To the 
best of our knowledge, we provide the first survey-based evidence that more 
traditional measures of labor and material efficiency can supplement contemporary 
practices, value stream costing (VSC), and visual control to enhance performance, 
as opposed to substituting each other. Second, we show that companies can benefit 
more from lean manufacturing by getting every employee involved in lean and by 
ensuring that lean thinking has permeated the minds of all organizational members. 
Third, we show that lean manufacturing firms benefit more from lean visual 
controls and lean manufacturing as a function of the length of time firms have used 
lean manufacturing.  
The remainder of this article is structured as follows: in section 2, we describe the 
literature and develop our hypotheses. In section 3, we present our method and 
sample, and in section 4, the results are presented and discussed. We summarize 
and conclude our paper in section 5, and present limitations and future research 
agendas in section 6.  
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11.2 Literature review and hypotheses development 
The sections below include development of our hypotheses. In section 2.1, we 
develop hypotheses predicting relationships between lean manufacturing, 
management accounting practices, and lean thinking. In section 2.2, we develop 
hypotheses predicting relationships between lean manufacturing, lean visual 
controls, lean thinking, and operational and financial performance, while in section 
2.3, we develop hypotheses predicting that the length of time companies’ have used 
lean manufacturing moderates the inferred relationships from lean manufacturing, 
lean thinking, and lean visual controls to operational performance as well as from 
lean manufacturing to management accounting practices.  
11.2.1 Hypotheses 1a–1g 
Lean manufacturing relies on visual controls (Cunningham and Fiume 2003; 
Fullerton et al. 2013; Kennedy and Widener 2008; Zayko and Hancock 1998). 
Visual controls are used in lean companies to inform employees how work should 
be done and to visualize if current activities deviate from the expected standard 
(Emiliani et al. 2003; Liker 2004). Likewise, visual controls provide easy-to-
understand performance measurements that should direct employees’ attention to 
potential improvements and ensure that production objectives are aligned with the 
lean strategy (Liker 2004). However, visual controls go beyond informing 
employees about standards, improvement potentials, and deviations. Visual 
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controls are also related to structuring the facility with high visibility—meaning 
that employees should be able to help one another between work processes. This 
can be referred to as both internal and global transparency (Adler and Borys 1996), 
which reduces the risk of sub-optimization and enhances employees’ understanding 
of the entire production process. Furthermore, as lean companies have reduced 
buffer-inventories, they need real-time surveillance of their production facilities, as 
break-downs and quality-related issues have severe effects on production flow and 
delivery of products to customers (Callen et al. 2005). Fullerton et al. (2013; 2014) 
found that lean manufacturing was positively associated with visual controls. Thus, 
we hypothesize the following: 
H1a: Lean manufacturing is positively associated with lean visual 
controls. 
Standard costing has been criticized in relation to its usability in lean 
manufacturing companies (e.g., Bergstrøm 1995; Grasso 2005). Often the critique 
relates to the use of budget variance analyses. A central concern is that variance 
analyses produced by standard costing encourage large batch production and 
inventory building (Maskell et al. 2012); by increasing the number of outputs, 
standard hours will be credited and, ceteris paribus, the cost center in question will 
appear to be more efficient. Likewise, waste may be hidden in standards 
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(Kristensen and Israelsen 2013), making standard costing ill-equipped as an 
analytical tool for continuous improvement. Standard costs do not show root causes 
of problems (Huntzinger 2007), which are essential in lean manufacturing 
companies (Liker 2004); they are reported too late due to accounting period delays, 
which cause important improvements to be postponed or missed (Grasso 2005); 
and they are difficult for non-accountants to understand (Maskell et al. 2012). 
Another possible problem with standard costing measures in lean manufacturing 
companies is that they are embedded in traditional management control and thus 
impede the unlearning of the traditional practices and thinking necessary for lean to 
prosper. This can cause lean goal incongruent behavior, as employees might follow 
standards blindly instead of chasing continuous improvements. Fullerton et al. 
(2013; 2014) found in their cross-sectional study that while lean manufacturing 
companies used VSC, they did not capture whether lean manufacturing causes the 
abandonment of standard costing.   
The literature is clear on the lean goal incongruent effects stemming from standard 
costing. However, the researchers who produced this literature are not very clear 
regarding whether they are referring to standard absorption costing variances 
and/or standard direct costing variances as being lean goal incongruent. The 
distinction between these is important, as they are, of course, very different. 
Standard direct costing variances calculates labor efficiency, materials use 
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efficiency, purchase price unit variances for direct labor and materials, and budget 
variances for variable overhead adjusted for volume. Standard absorption costing 
variances, in turn, calculates efficiency of indirect fixed costs based on standard 
cost overhead rates (Drury 1992). In this study, we focus on measurements of 
direct labor and materials efficiency (i.e., direct labor and materials efficiency 
variances), as absorption variances of indirect costs is not found to be beneficial 
anywhere in the literature. Measurements of direct labor and materials efficiency 
are also accused of motivating lean goal incongruent behavior in parts of the lean 
accounting literature. Researchers have claimed that measurements of direct labor 
and materials efficiency motivate employees to produce large batches, increase 
inventories, lengthen cycle time, and ruin flow (Maskell and Kennedy 2007; 
Maskell et al. 2012).  
However, Drury (1992) argues that, by themselves, measurements of direct labor 
and materials efficiency do not per se lead to excessive inventories; rather, 
dysfunctional consequences arise because of the way managers use variance 
analyses. He also notes that measurements of direct labor and materials efficiency 
will continue to be important in lean manufacturing companies. Jönson and 
Grönlund (1988) describe that a company with a flow-based layout identifies an 
unfavorable materials variance in a standard costing system. The production 
foremen and workers gathered and analyzed what the reason for this unfavorable 
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materials variance might be. They concluded that a joint material used for two parts 
was too hard for the tool that was used to produce the parts. In correspondence with 
a supplier, they decided to get a harder and more expensive tool, which led to less 
material use. Thus, a materials variance reduced waste materials and was used to 
identify operational improvements.  
Grasso et al. (2015) found that direct labor efficiency measurements were used in 
all lean case companies and reported that these measures are not especially 
problematic in lean manufacturing companies. Guilding et al. (1998) surveyed 
whether UK- and New Zealand-based companies abandon the use of standard 
costing and variance analysis. An important result of their study is that most 
respondents indicate “no change” when asked if JIT/advanced manufacturing 
technology will reduce the importance of variance analysis. Additionally, more 
respondents see variance analysis as being more important rather than less 
important in such an environment.  
Sulaiman et al. (2005) surveyed local Malaysian firms and affiliates of Japanese 
companies in Malaysia on their use of several variance techniques. They found that 
60% of the Japanese affiliates rated measures of material efficiency variance as 
above average or vitally important. Furthermore, 80% of them rated measures of 
labor variance as above average or vitally important. At the local Malaysian 
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companies, even more respondents rate these measures to be above average or 
vitally important. In Linds’ (2001) case study of a world-class manufacturer, it was 
predicted that efficiency variance analyses at the individual process level would be 
abandoned and replaced by trend analysis because when employees were 
controlled against an agreed budget, they might stop improving performance once 
the budget was met. However, Lind (2001) found that the company continued to 
use efficiency variance analyses, albeit only at workgroup levels and in concert 
with non-financial measures. Likewise, Banker et al. (1993) found that plants 
employing JIT emphasized non-financial performance measures more compared to 
companies that did not employ JIT; however, they did not find any significant 
difference in the plants’ reliance on direct labor variance reports.  
In Jonsön and Grönlund’s (1998) case company, the materials variance analysis 
was used as a management by exception tool. However, measures of direct labor 
and materials efficiency can also be applied if a lean manufacturing company seeks 
to optimize its direct cost base. For example, Monden and Lee (1993) describes 
Kaizen Costing, as a method that uses the actual direct labor and direct materials 
cost performance at the end of the previous year and compares it with the current 
cost performance which, in turn, is compared with a cost reduction target. 
Variances can then be computed between actual direct labor and material costs 
performance and the reduction target to induce continuous improvement, and 
291 
 
actual direct labor and material costs can be compared with the cost performance at 
the end of the previous year to highlight improvements. Further, the reduction 
target is continuously challenged.  In this way, lean manufacturing companies can 
ensure continuous improvement of direct labor and material costs. 
Based on these previous studies, we argue that measurements of direct labor and 
materials efficiency are indeed usable in lean manufacturing companies. They can 
be used as instruments for continuous improvement by showing variances between 
actual costs and cost reduction objectives. We also argue that managers might be 
hesitant to replace measurements of labor and materials efficiency that worked 
during previous production regimes and that they instead attempt to learn how to 
use them congruently with lean manufacturing (Åhlström and Karlsson 1996). 
These variance analyses can be beneficial as a supplement to other performance 
measures in lean manufacturing companies. Further, lean manufacturing may 
enable greater use of measurements of direct labor and materials efficiency, as it 
involves a heavy reliance on standardized work. Standardized work includes 
standard operating procedures, which are assigned for a length of time to carry out 
the work processes. This information and bills of materials can be used as 
standards for labor and materials usage. In sum, measurements of labor and 
materials efficiency can be useful to lean manufacturing companies and may not be 
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replaced by lean-related financial performance measures or completely substituted 
with solely non-financial measures. Thus, we hypothesize the following:  
H1b: Lean manufacturing is positively associated with 
measurements of direct labor and materials efficiency. 
Lean manufacturing reduces companies’ need for standard full costing, as the 
production facilities are structured in value streams with no or as few shared 
resources as possible (Maskell et al. 2012). When companies structure the facility 
in value streams, the necessity for allocating capacity costs is reduced and a need 
for a management accounting system specifically designed for value streams arises 
(Brosnahan 2008). Datar et al. (1990) found that their case company’s use of an 
accounting system with pooled resources and volume-based allocation drivers, i.e., 
standard full costing, blurred cost reductions stemming from improvements of 
work processes. Relatedly, Maskell et al. (2012) and Kristensen and Israelsen 
(2013) reported that standard full-cost driver rates can conceal and reduce 
employees’ attention to the causes of waste. Kennedy and Widener (2008) found 
that their case company simplified the management accounting system after 
implementing lean, while Fullerton et al. (2013; 2014) found that lean 
manufacturing companies used VSC. VSC encompasses a separate income 
statement for each value stream and information on productive, non-productive, 
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and available capacity. This information is reported for prior periods, showing the 
performance trends leading to the current state, and for planned or desired future 
states to motivate continuous improvement and guide improvement efforts. VSC is 
well suited for lean companies, as it reveals the financial performance of a value 
stream, and covers the entire order to delivery process, and gives a clear picture of 
a value stream’s profit and contribution to the organization’s financial results 
(Maskell et al. 2012). Furthermore, VSC exposes bottleneck and capacity issues, 
and motivates continuous improvement in a simple, readily available, and efficient 
manner (Maskell and Kennedy 2007). Thus, VSC is a useful management 
accounting system in lean manufacturing companies because it tracks the total 
costs and the total profit of the value stream. We thus hypothesize the following: 
H1c: Lean manufacturing is positively associated with VSC. 
For lean manufacturing to prosper, a change of mindset among employees and 
management is needed (Fullerton et al. 2014). Continuous improvement resides at 
the core of lean manufacturing (Emiliani et al. 2003) and it is paramount that both 
employees and managers identify potentials for improvement, generate ideas, and 
engage in problem solving if the company is to be successful with lean 
manufacturing. Likewise, employees and managers need to ask themselves the 
following question: What is the essence of continuous improvement and how can 
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we increase our ability to continually improve? For this reflection to happen, 
managers and employees need to be trained in continuous improvement (Liker 
2004), for example, by continuously going to the genba
56
 and figuring out solutions 
or improvements (Ohno and Mito 1988). It is also important that employees and 
managers think, act, and behave with a passion for continuous improvement and 
are empowered to do so (Wood et al. 2015). This sort of lean thinking must be 
internalized and thus permeate the minds of all members in the facility if they are 
to solve problems and identify potentials for improvement. Extant literature finds 
that lean manufacturing involves several human resource practices, yet research on 
this broad concept of human resource practices is scarce. Fullerton and McWatters 
(2002), Fullerton et al. (2013), Kennedy and Widener (2008), and Lind (2001) 
found evidence of increased empowerment in lean manufacturing companies. Snell 
and Dean (1992) found that employees in operations in advanced manufacturing 
firms received comprehensive training. Shah and Ward (2003) found that lean 
manufacturing included cross-functional employees’ engagement in problem 
solving. Kennedy and Widener (2008) found that their case company increased 
cross-training of employees, and it used a company-wide intranet to promote 
training in lean principles and skills. In their lean-implementing case company, 
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 “Genba” is a Japanese term for the place where the work or activity is performed. In lean, 
employees and managers are encouraged to observe practice and the problems occurring in 
practice for themselves rather than relying on second-hand reports. 
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Woolson and Husar (1998) found that it was of high importance that employees 
received training in team skills, the firm’s new lean strategy, and continuous 
improvement. We conceptualize lean thinking as a state where all employees and 
managers are engaged in lean manufacturing, where they are trained according to 
and believe in lean principles, and where employees are empowered to perform 
problem solving. These elements are important if employees are to act in a lean 
manufacturing congruent manner (Hines et al. 2004). These elements are important 
if employees are to act in a lean manufacturing congruent manner. Thus, we 
hypothesize the following:    
H1d: Lean manufacturing is positively associated with lean thinking. 
Lean visual controls induce certain behavior and thinking among employees and 
management. For example, the case company described by Kennedy and Widener 
(2008) used “can do/needs help” flip charts in their production cells to highlight 
and prioritize problems and improvement opportunities identified and to track the 
progress being made toward implementing solutions. The “owner” of the idea or 
problem was displayed on the chart, and the owner indicated whether he/she 
needed assistance in solving problems or developing an idea (Kennedy and 
Widener 2008). This encouraged the “owner,” i.e., shop-floor employees and 
facility managers, to engage in solving problems or testing/developing ideas and 
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challenged their current beliefs and behavior. Likewise, Liker (2004) argues that 
getting all employees involved in continuous improvement requires the constant 
use of visual performance measurements. Emiliani et al. (2003) found that 
recurring problems were highlighted on visual boards, which initiated a kaizen
57
 for 
improving current processes. Empirical evidence of lean thinking is limited. 
However, following the arguments above, we contend that lean visual controls with 
information on objectives, ideas, problems, and flow induce lean thinking. With the 
information made visible to all, employees and managers are continually 
challenged to question current standards, their beliefs, and their behavior in order 
to achieve those objectives, develop ideas, and solve problems. Thus, we 
hypothesize the following:    
H1e: Lean visual controls are positively associated with lean thinking. 
VSC encompasses information on prior, present, and future financial performance 
objectives within the value stream (Maskell et al. 2012). For the value stream to 
reach the future performance objective, employees and managers must identify 
potential improvements and challenge their beliefs and behavior. In their lean case 
company, Åhlström and Karlsson (1996) found that a lean coherent management 
accounting system contributed to and drove lean. First and foremost, this related to 
                                                     
57
 ”Kaizen” is a Japanese term for continuous improvement. 
297 
 
the cognitive influence that the management accounting system had on the 
employees. Employees recognized that the lean congruent management accounting 
system helped them develop lean in their facility. Solomon and Fullerton (2007) 
also argue that VSC improves the decision-making process and communication in 
lean manufacturing companies. As such, we hypothesize the following:   
H1f: Value stream costing is positively associated with lean thinking. 
Drury (1992) argues that measurements of labor and materials efficiency should be 
reported in physical terms on the shop floor (e.g., on visual boards) because in a 
lean environment these measurements are important for monitoring operations and 
for encouraging employees and managers to reach their objectives. When the 
measurements are visualized, managers and employees will be assured that lean is 
causing improvements in their company, which, in turn, fosters and preserves 
motivation. The visualization of measurements of labor and materials efficiency 
will also direct employees’ and managers’ attention to problems that need to be 
solved. For lean companies to fully capitalize on and act according to the 
information gained from VSC, the information must be visualized (Maskell et al. 
2012). Because of the need for visualization in lean manufacturing, we expect that 
measurements of labor and materials efficiency are dependent on lean visual 
controls. There is little point in using VSC if the information is not shared with the 
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employees for whom it is intended. Thus, for VSC to work, it is dependent on lean 
visual controls for information sharing and motivating actions and behavior.  
To comprehensively assist employees and management in the lean implementation, 
the non-financial information shared through visual controls needs to be combined 
with financial information. Henri (2006) contends that comprehensive performance 
measurement systems, which are both financial and non-financial, are intended to 
capture all important areas of the firm. Furthermore, Henri (2006) found that an 
attention-focusing use of performance measurement systems, which he describes as 
using the performance measurement system with an aim to stimulate 
communication and send signals related to strategic issues and to foster learning 
throughout the organization, was positively associated with diversity of 
measurement (meaning both financial and non-financial). In a lean manufacturing 
context, an attention-focusing use of performance measurement systems can drive 
behavior and actions that are congruent with lean. Ittner et al. (2003) argue that 
measurement diversity is an important aspect of comprehensive performance 
measurement systems. Measurement diversity is “supplementing financial 
measures with a diverse set of non-financial measures capturing the key strategic 
performance dimensions” (717). In a lean manufacturing context, this means that 
daily non-financial measurement needs to be combined with financial value stream 
cost measurements. Furthermore, measurements of direct labor and materials 
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efficiency can be used to translate the non-financial measures to financial measures 
in order to assure employees at higher hierarchical levels that lean manufacturing is 
progressing at the facilities (Tillema and van der Steen 2015). Senior management 
might be more willing to accept the implementation of non-financial measures and 
VSC when they can continue to use measurements of labor and materials efficiency 
as an anchor of performance measurement. Thus, to comprehensively assist 
employees with information and drive behavior in a lean-congruent manner, lean 
visual controls are dependent on VSC and measurements of labor and materials 
efficiency, which makes them mutually dependent. Thus, we hypothesize the 
following:    
H1g: VSC, lean visual controls, and measurements of labor and 
materials efficiency are interdependent. 
11.2.2 Hypotheses 2a–2d 
Implementation of lean manufacturing includes a focus on standardization of 
production processes, pull production and single-piece flow, mistake proofing 
devices, and interaction with suppliers (Liker 2004; Shah and Ward 2007). These 
practices are introduced to eliminate waste, increase efficiency, and create quality 
products and value for and according to customer demand (Womack et al. 1990). 
When initiating lean manufacturing, companies experience improved operational 
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performance (Fullerton et al. 2014; Jayaram et al. 2010) such as reduced 
inventories (Hofer et al. 2011; Maiga and Jacobs 2008; Netland et al. 2015), 
improved lead time and quality (Khachanapong et al. 2014), and improved 
flexibility (Bortolotti et al. 2014).  
As indicated, lean manufacturing comprises several related practices (Fullerton et 
al. 2013; Shah and Ward 2007; Womack and Jones 2003). Lean manufacturing 
depends heavily on visual controls, as information on standards, deviations from 
standards, quality, and flow are essential (Liker 2004). Likewise, visual controls 
highlight potentials for continuous improvement; ensure alignment between lean 
objectives and operational processes; and direct employees’ attention to operational 
issues needing action (Womack and Jones 2003). Furthermore, by sharing 
information through visual controls such as floor markings indicating material and 
work flow, lean manufacturing firms can increase the internal and global 
transparency (Adler and Borys 1996). This reduces the risk of sub-optimizing work 
behavior and provides employees with the best work practices. Current standards 
are founded on the best practices currently known, and once made visible to all 
these current standards provide the baseline for continued improvement. If 
employees follow the visuals depicting current standards and use the visual 
information aligned with lean objectives, it is likely that they will contribute to 
operational improvement. Fullerton et al. (2014) found a positive relationship 
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between visual controls and operational performance and Flynn et al. (1994) found 
a positive relationship between visual charts and quality performance.  
Lean thinking is internalized in employees’ and management’s mindsets (Liker 
2004). This is accomplished by training employees and management in lean 
principles, continuous improvement, and problem solving and by encouraging 
them to go to the genba. This, in turn, will improve employees’ and managers’ lean 
capabilities and will enable them to identify potential improvements and deliver 
continuous improvement, leading to improved operational performance (Emiliani 
et al. 2003). Also, by internalizing lean thinking, employees and management will 
be able to identify and solve the root cause of problems instead of correcting 
symptoms or outcomes of problems (Liker 2004). This reduces the risk of recurring 
problems. Thus, lean thinking is a catalyst for operational improvements.   
Additionally, we argue that operational performance is positively associated with 
financial performance. Lean manufacturing firms are likely to capitalize on 
improvements in quality and cycle time, reduced inventory, and more efficient 
capacity management. Thus, when firms improve operational performance, 
improvements in financial performance should follow (Sila 2007). Fullerton et al. 
(2014) and Bortolotti et al. (2014) found that operational performance was 
positively associated with financial performance. Likewise, Hofer et al. (2011) 
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found that inventory leanness (operational performance) was positively associated 
with financial performance. Also, a reduction in cycle time (operational 
performance) is linked to improvements in financial performance (Kim et al. 2002).  
The following four hypotheses sum up the relationships between lean 
manufacturing, lean thinking, lean visual controls, operational performance, and 
financial performance:  
H2a: Lean manufacturing is positively associated with operational 
performance. 
H2b: Lean visual controls are positively associated with operational 
performance. 
H2c: Lean thinking is positively associated with operational 
performance. 







11.2.3 Hypotheses 3a–3b  
Dierickx and Cool (1989) introduced the concept of time compression 
diseconomies. They exemplified it with MBA students: MBA students enrolled in a 
one-year program may not accumulate the same stock of knowledge compared to 
MBA students in a two-year program even if all inputs other than elapsed time are 
doubled. We argue that time compression diseconomies reasonably hold for lean 
companies as well. Time compression diseconomies are quite similar to the law of 
diminishing returns and can be explained by absorptive capacity (Cohen and 
Levinthal 1990). Cohen and Levinthal (1990) described absorptive capacity as 
firms’ ability to recognize information, internalize it, and apply it to commercial 
ends. The premise underlying absorptive capacity is that firms need prior related 
knowledge to assimilate and use new knowledge. This means that building new 
knowledge is cumulative and that knowledge building performance is greatest 
when the object of concern is already known. Consequently, knowledge building is 
more difficult and lengthy in novel domains, such as when companies leave their 
current production regime and implement lean manufacturing. Nelson and Winther 
(1982) emphasize that organizational members learn and remember by doing. 
Therefore, by repeatedly performing work processes, going to the genba, engaging 
in training, problem solving, and continuous improvement, members of a lean 
manufacturing organization will learn and remember what worked and what did 
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not, and they will improve their lean capabilities over time. This applies to skills 
and knowledge gained from experiences prior to lean as well; employees can have 
gained experience, skills, and knowledge from periods prior to the introduction of 
lean manufacturing in their company, some of which they now need to unlearn 
(Åhlström and Karlsson 1996). This proceeds through several lengthy stages 
(Hines et al. 2004), and “experience that comes too fast can overwhelm managers, 
leading to an inability to transform experience into meaningful learning” 
(Eisenhardt and Martin 2000, 1115). There is not much research on how the length 
of time companies have used lean manufacturing affects operational performance. 
Callen et al. (2000) reported that early adopters of JIT outperformed later adopters 
on reducing work-in-progress inventory, reducing costs, and improving profits. 
However, they did not control for the extent of JIT. As such, we do not know 
whether the higher performance obtained by early adopters is a function of learning 
and fine-tuning of JIT or if it is a function of the early adopters having 
implemented JIT to a greater extent. 
As stated in hypotheses 2a–2c, we predict positive relationships between lean 
manufacturing, lean thinking, lean visual controls, and operational performance. 
Motivated by the arguments above, length of time companies have used lean 
manufacturing moderates these relationships and we hypothesize that the 
operational performance effects are greater for companies that having used lean 
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manufacturing for a longer period of time. Lean manufacturing includes a 
restructuring of the production area into cells; investments in and intensive use of 
visual controls; a change in the mindset of employees and management; new 
procedures, structures, and principles; and the empowerment of employees, all of 
which take time to work out and fine-tune. For our argument on time compression 
diseconomies to hold, it is necessary to control for differences in the extent of lean 
manufacturing, lean visual controls, and lean thinking. This is done to ensure that 
the hypothesized greater operational performance effects are a function of the 
length of time companies have used lean manufacturing, and not differences in the 
extent of these three variables. Arguing for an ordinal difference in the form of the 
relationships (Hartmann and Moers 1999), we hypothesize the following: 
H3a: The hypothesized positive relationships between lean 
manufacturing, lean visual controls, and lean thinking with operational 
performance are higher as a function of the duration of companies’ 
experience with lean manufacturing.   
Time compression diseconomies concern possible differences in outcomes when 
the same amount of “input” is either intensified in a short period or less intensified 
in a longer period. This cannot explain why a relationship between lean 
manufacturing measurements of direct labor and materials efficiency is higher as a 
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function of the duration of companies’ experience with lean manufacturing. There 
is little empirical evidence on how more/less experience with lean manufacturing 
affects the relationship between lean manufacturing and management accounting 
practices. The evidence that we know of compares management accounting 
practices in companies before and after a lean manufacturing implementation (e.g., 
Lind 2001; Kennedy and Widener 2008). However, measurements of labor and 
materials efficiency are ubiquitous in conventional production management 
controls systems and are most certainly already in place before lean manufacturing 
is implemented. We should see a less intensive use of labor and materials 
efficiency variances in the initiating periods of a lean manufacturing 
implementation due to the fact that the adoption and use of VSC and lean visual 
controls absorb employees’ attention and cognitive capacity, as these systems need 
to be properly installed and aligned with lean manufacturing. We thus hypothesize 
the following: 
H3b: The relationship between lean manufacturing and labor and 
materials efficiency variances is greater as a function of the length 
of time companies have used lean manufacturing.  






















The survey was distributed online to 4,357 people representing 697 facilities and 
plants in September 2012 and responses were received until December 2012. The 
people were identified in the Shingo Prize
58
 Organization database of individuals 
who had expressed an interest in receiving information about lean principles, 
Shingo seminars and workshops, and the Shingo Prize. We received responses 
from 510 individuals representing 368 different facilities, which resulted in a 
response rate of 11.2%. We averaged responses from plants that submitted multiple 
responses, leaving us with a usable sample size of 368 and a facility response rate 
of 52.8%. Collectively, the 368 facilities represented 195 different organizations. 
More than 50% of the facilities had more than 500 employees and sales of more 
than $100M. The large majority of respondents had management experience; 53.5% 
of the respondents were responsible for lean, quality, or continuous improvement 
or were plant managers. Survey questions were designed to assess the lean 
manufacturing and management accounting implementation at the respondents’ 
facility and obtain a self-assessment of operational and financial performance.   
 
                                                     
58
 The Shingo Prize is an award given to companies based on their world-class results and 
organizational culture. The database includes many companies as the Shingo Prize 
Organization provides information and sponsors seminars as well as running the prize 
competition, and most organizations do not wait to challenge for the Shingo Prize until they 
are likely to win it.  
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11.3.1 Measures  
While the questionnaire included 148 questions, we only included those of interest 
for our analysis in the present article. Six items measuring lean manufacturing were 
adapted from Fullerton et al. (2013; 2014). Two additional items (item 6 and 8) 
were included and are consistent with lean literature, e.g., Liker (2004) and Shah 
and Ward (2007). Six of the seven items measuring lean visual controls were 
adapted from Fullerton et al. (2013; 2014) and item 1 is included in accordance 
with Kennedy and Widener (2008).  
One of the items (item 1) measuring lean thinking was adapted from Fullerton et al. 
(2013),
59
 while the remaining four items are developed on the basis of Emiliani et 
al. (2003). Items reflecting operational performance are developed to cover the 
extent to which lean initiatives have affected inventory resources, capacity 
management, cycle time, quality, and communication. The two items measuring 
financial performance reflect cost reduction and profitability improvement. Along 
with these items, we include two items covering two observed variables: VSC and 
measures of direct labor and materials efficiency (i.e., labor and materials 
efficiency variances). While most variables used in a structural equation model are 
latent, it is acceptable to use observed variables (Kline 2005) when they are narrow 
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 This item was part of their empowerment factor. 
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and unambiguous to the respondents (Sacket and Lawson 1990; Wanous et al. 
1997). As the sample represents individuals connected to the Shingo Prize, we 
argue that they understand the following formulation: “Please indicate the extent to 
which your facility uses value stream costing.”
60
 The variable is measured on a 5-
point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (to a great extent). Measurements 
of labor and materials efficiency were measured in the same way.   
All other variables were measured on a 5-point labeled Likert scale as well. Eustler 
and Lang (2015) have shown that such labeled scales are superior to unlabeled 
scales, as they reduce measurement error and response bias. 
11.3.2 Exploratory factor analysis 
Initially, we conduct an exploratory factor analysis with oblique rotation, as we 
expect our factors to correlate, including our exogenous and mediator variables. It 
yields three factors with eigenvalues more than 1 in conformity with our a priori 
expectations: lean manufacturing, lean visual controls, and lean thinking. The three 
factors collectively explain 65 percent of the variance. Factor analysis is performed 
for the performance items as well. We follow Venkatranam and Ramanujam (1986) 
and divide performance into two dimensions measuring operational and financial 
performance, which provides us with a “comprehensive operationalization of 
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 Fullerton et al. (2013; 2014) measured VSC in the same way.   
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business performance” (p. 811) and both a goal-centered and an accounting 
approach (Kihn 2005). Furthermore, separating operational and financial 
performance will reduce the number of threats to the validity of the research design 
and uncover underlying types of performance that may be in conflict (Venkatranam 
and Ramanujam 1986). The factor analysis yields two factors; operational and 
financial performance, which explain more than 70 percent of the variance
61
. All of 
the factors’ Cronbach’s alphas are generally between .8 and .91 (see Table 2), 
indicating very good to excellent reliability (Kline, 2011).  
To reduce common method bias concerns, we perform a Harman’s one-factor test 
that includes all our latent variables. There is a potential bias if the majority of the 
variance is explained by one factor (Podsakoff and Organ 1986). The test shows 
that the concern for common method bias is low, as a one-factor solution only 
accounts for 46 percent of the total variance.    
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 In addition to the argument made, it makes empirical sense to force two constructs, as 
Fullerton and Wempe (2009) and Hofer et al. (2011) showed that operational performance 
mediated the relationship between lean manufacturing and financial performance. 
Furthermore, we ran a test comparing a model containing only one performance factor, 
including all items, and a model comprising two factors, operational and financial 
performance, by constraining their correlation to 1. This is done in order to investigate 
whether a two-factor model fits the data better compared to a one-factor model. A two-




 is significant (Hair et al. 2014). The model 
comprising two factors fitted the data significantly better: χ
2
 difference: 68.166, degrees of 




 p. < 0.001 and the following fit indices: 
RMSEA: .055, SRMR: .113, IFI: .948, TLI: .942, CFI: .948. The operational performance 
factor has an eigenvalue of more than 5 and the eigenvalue of the financial performance 




Table 1: Exploratory factor analysis and 
descriptive statistics           
 Indicators 
Factor 1: lean 
MFG 
Factor 2: lean 
Thinking 
Factor 3: lean 
VIS 
Factor 4: Opr 
pfm 
Factor 5: Fin 
pfm Mean Std.deviation 
MFG1 0.429         3.86 .83 
MFG2 0.698         3.65 1.08 
MFG3 0.794         3.52 1.07 
MFG4 0.820         3.27 1.11 
MFG5 0.869         3.28 1.08 
MFG6 0.850         3.51 1.06 
MFG7 0.620         3.36 1.01 
MFG8 0.573         3.44 .99 
CLTR1   -0.681       3.34 .95 
CLTR2   -0.837       3.40 1.08 
CLTR3   -0.884       3.44 1.05 
CLTR4   -0.836       3.51 1.01 
CLTR5   -0.779       3.18 1.08 
MAS1     0.69     3.68 0.94 
MAS2     0.704     4.08 0.88 
MAS3     0.744     4.13 0.85 
MAS4     0.886     3.72 1.07 
MAS5     0.698     3.40 1.05 
MAS6     0.895     3.67 1.08 
MAS7     0.797     3.37 1.08 
LIMP1       0.870   3.24 .95 
LIMP2       0.888   3.60 .87 
LIMP3       0.814   3.73 .88 
LIMP 4       0.749   3.64 .86 
LIMP5       0.737   3.63 .85 
LIMP7         -0.947 3.60 .89 
LIMP8         -0.936 3.54 .91 
VSC N/A         2.74 1.19 
MLME N/A         3.83 1.01 
LMFGY N/A     8.60 5.15 
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KMO of sampling adequacy for lean MFG, lean CLTR and lean VIS: .953, Bartlett’s test of sphericity p. <.000                                                                                                       
KMO of sampling adequacy for Opr Pfm and Fin Pfm: .887, Bartlett’s test of sphericity p. <.000                                                                                                                           
Only loadings exceeding .400 are shown 
Along with the observed variables VSC and MLME, these factors represent the 
variables used in our research model.  
11.3.3 Confirmatory factor analysis  
We perform a confirmatory factor analysis that includes our latent factors in Amos 
23 using maximum likelihood estimation. Hair et al. (2014) describe this as a two-
step procedure where the measurement model without structural paths is tested 
initially to ensure that it fits, which is then followed by the full structural model. 
The test of the measurement model did not reveal any theoretically or empirically 
justified covariances between error terms of the same factor.  
We evaluate the measurement model using several fit indices, as recommended by 
Kline (2011). We assess χ
2 
to degrees of freedom, which should be lower than two 
(Bollen 1989; Kline 2011), the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) 
(Steiger and Lind 1980), where values below .08 are acceptable (Browne and 
Cudeck 1993; Kline 2011), and the standardized root mean square residual (SRMR) 
(Bentler 1995), where a value below .1 indicates acceptable fit (Schermelleh-Engel 
et al. 2003). Furthermore, we evaluate the comparative fit index (CFI) (Bentler 
1990), the incremental fit index (IFI) (Bollen 1989), and the Tucker-Lewis index 
(TLI) (Tucker and Lewis 1973). CFI, IFI, and TLI are evaluated for their closeness 
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to 1.0 (Byrne 2010) with values over .9 (Bentler 1992; Kline 2005) indicating 
acceptable fit. Lastly, we evaluate the Akaike information criterion (AIC) (Akaike 
1987), where the ratio of the hypothesized model and the saturated model should 
be less than one (Kline 2011). Although the χ
2 
is significant, the χ
2
 to degrees of 
freedom is less than two and other fit indices are good.  




MFG1 0.65 11.80 
  MFG2 0.64 8.85 
  MFG3 0.75 10.71 
  MFG4 0.78 10.68 
  MFG5 0.76 10.91 
  MFG6 0.78 11.36 
  MFG7 0.76 a* 
  MFG8 0.75 11.48 
  lean Thinking 
  
0.905 0.904 
CLTR1 0.71 16.07 
  CLTR2 0.78 16.98 
  CLTR3 0.84 19.53 
  CLTR4 0.83 19.69 
  CLTR5 0.89 a 
  lean Visual Controls 
  
0.907 0.905 
MAS1 0.71 a 
  MAS2 0.77 10.56 
  MAS3 0.83 9.33 
  MAS4 0.78 8.95 
  MAS5 0.82 9.12 
  MAS6 0.77 8.15 
  MAS7 0.65 9.33 
  Operational Performance 
  
0.885 0.881 
LIMP1 0.74 a 
  LIMP2 0.83 12.97 
  
Table 2: Confirmatory factor analysis, Chronhach’s alpha and composite reliability 
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LIMP3 0.85 13.09 
  LIMP4 0.75 11.73 
  LIMP5 0.72 11.37 
  Financial Performance 
  
0.900 0.900 
LIMP6 0.92 a 
  LIMP7 0.89 20.32     
*”a” indicates a loading fixed to 1.                                                                                                                                                                                               
χ2 to degrees of freedom 1.906, RMSEA: .050, SRMR: .042 CFI: .958, IFI: .958, TLI: .953 and AIC:  .96 (780.628/810.000 
saturated model 
 
To assess construct validity, we investigate our CFA’s convergent validity, 
construct reliability, and discriminant validity. All our factors show good 
convergent validity, as their average variance extracted (AVE) is above .5 and their 
construct reliability (CR) is well above .7 (Hair et al. 2014). Furthermore, as 
indicated in Table 2, all factor loadings except for three are above .7. Discriminant 
validity is assessed by comparing the square root of the AVE of the factors with 
their correlation (Fornell and Larcker 1981). Square root AVE of individual factors 
should be greater than the correlation between the factors. Square root AVE of 
factors is indicated at the diagonal of Table 3 and is greater than factor 
correlations
62
. Table 3 also indicates that all factors correlated significantly as 
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 Squared AVE to inter-factor correlations is computed in SPSS 23. We compared the 
squared AVE to the inter-factor correlations in AMOS 23 as well. This test revealed 
discriminant validity issues only concerning the operational performance factor and the lean 
flow factor. All of our factors correlated less than .85. Thus, they do not indicate poor 
discriminant validity (Kenny 2012). Kenny (2012) also suggests restricting the correlation 
between two factors to 1. We performed a test where we restricted correlations between the 
operational performance and the lean manufacturing factor. A two-factor model fits the data 
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expected. Additionally, we test the measurement model for multicollinearity. None 
of the variance inflation factors exceed 2.1 and the tolerance statistics all exceed a 
critical value 0.2 (Menard 1995). Thus, our model does not indicate 
multicollinearity concerns. Before running the full structural model, we also test all 
relationships from exogenous to mediator variables and from mediator variables to 
endogenous variables for linearity. All relationships are significantly linear p. < .01 
and have R
2
 values ranging from .215 to .531 and F-values between 100 and 452. 
Now we will proceed to evaluate the full structural model fit.  
  # of measures 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
lean Manufacturing 8 0.736 
      
lean Thinking 5 .603*** 0.811 
     
lean Visual Controls 7 .617*** .653*** 0.764 
    
Operational Performance 5 .725*** .722*** .692*** 0.779 
   
Financial Performance 2 .623*** .604*** .552*** .729*** 0.905 
  
VSC  1 .498*** .474*** .436*** .427*** .367*** N/A 
 
MLME 1 .453*** .383*** .457*** .421*** .399*** .349*** N/A 
*** significant at the .01 level (two-tailed)                                                                                                                                                                      




                                                                                                                                       
significantly better than a one-factor model: χ
2
 difference: 69.9 and degrees of freedom 




 p. < 0.01. We assess the fit indices of the one-factor 
model as well. They are worse compared to the two-factor model: RMSEA: .055, 
SRMR: .1207, IFI: .948, TLI: .942, CFI: .948.   





11.4.1 Structural model 
All fit indices of the structural equation model indicate a good fit to the data. 
Although the χ
2 
is significant, the χ
2
 to degrees of freedom is less than two (1.855), 
indicating acceptable model fit. IFI, TLI, and CFI either equal or exceed .951, 
RMSEA is .048, and SRMR .is 041, indicating great model fit. Furthermore, AIC 
is lower for the default model compared to the saturated model (.94), indicating 
parsimony. 
11.4.2 Test results of hypotheses 1a–2d  
Table 4 presents the results of hypotheses 1a–2d. All hypotheses (1a–2d) are 
supported at a p-value at ≤. 05 and all directions are as expected.  
We find that lean manufacturing is positively related to lean visual controls and 
VSC. Lean manufacturing is also positively associated with lean thinking. This 
underlines that lean manufacturing includes a focus on and training in continuous 
improvement, empowerment of employees, and an internalization of lean 
principles among employees and management (Emiliani et al. 2003). Both VSC 
and lean visual controls are positively associated with lean thinking. This is 
important because it shows that both financial and non-financial measures can 
comprehensively assist employees and management in developing their lean 
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mindset and their focus on continuous improvement and problem solving. Lean 
manufacturing is positively associated with measurements of labor and materials 
efficiency. This finding contributes to the debate on standard costing in lean 
manufacturing companies, as it shows that lean manufacturing companies do not 
abandon the use of these measures and also indicates that lean companies use a 
wide portfolio of both financial and non-financial performance measurements.  
We also find that lean manufacturing is positively associated with operational 
performance. Lean visual controls are also positively related to operational 
performance. Therefore, by sharing information regarding takt time, best practices, 
quality, productivity, and defects, lean visual controls increase employees’ and 
managers’ work attention to production flow and emergent issues, which, in turn, 
improves operational performance. Lean thinking is positively associated with 
operational performance as well. This is expected, as lean thinking improves 
employees’ and managers’ lean capabilities and enables them to identify potential 
for and perform continuous improvement leading to improved operational 
performance (Emiliani et al. 2003). Additionally, operational performance is 
positively associated with financial performance. Thus, lean manufacturing firms 
do utilize operational performance improvements to improve profitability.  
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We test for interdependency among VSC, measurements of labor and materials 
efficiency, and lean visual controls (Grabner and Moers 2013). As indicated in 
Table 4, panel A, there are positive, significant relationships between VSC and 
lean visual controls, measurements of labor and materials efficiency and lean visual 
controls, and measurements of labor and materials efficiency and VSC, indicating 
that they are interdependent. This supports our argument that the value of VSC and 
measurements of labor and materials efficiency are reduced if they are not 
visualized and that employees and managers need financial as well as non-financial 
information to support their implementation of lean manufacturing.  
Panel A 
      Relationships     Hypotheses Expected sign Coefficient T-value 
 
   
   
lean manufacturing --> lean Visual Controls H1a + 0.685 10.584*** 
lean manufacturing --> MLME H1b + 0.489 9.261*** 
lean manufacturing --> VSC H1c + 0.517 9.830*** 
lean manufacturing --> lean thinking H1d + 0.317 4.956*** 
lean visual controls --> lean thinking H1e + 0.432 6.740*** 
VSC --> lean thinking H1f + 0.136 2.986** 
MLME <--> VSC H1g + 0.129 2.365** 
MLME <--> lean visual controls H1g + 0.218 3.491*** 
VSC <--> lean visual controls H1g + 0.156 2.546** 
lean Manufacturing --> Operational performance H2a + 0.460 7.763*** 
lean Visual --> Operational performance H2b + 0.199 3.624*** 
lean Thinking --> Operational performance H2c + 0.341 6.076*** 
Operational performance --> Financial performance H2d + 0.820 13.634*** 
Panel B           
Independent variable   Dependent variable Direct effects Indirect effects Total effects 
lean manufacturing 
 
Operational performance 0.460*** 0.370*** 0.830*** 
lean manufacturing 
 
lean thinking 0.317*** 0.366*** 0.683*** 




lean visual controls 
 
Operational performance 0.199*** 0.148*** 0.347*** 
VSC   Operational Performance -0.074* 0.05** 0.025 
***Significance of the p. value at <.01 two tailed, **Significance of the p. value at <.05 two tailed. *significance of the p. value at <.10 two tailed.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
χ2 to degrees of freedom 1.845, RMSEA: .048, SRMR: .041, CFI: .956, IFI: .956, TLI: .951 and AIC:  .938 (871.093/928.000 saturated model).  
We assess the indirect effects
63
 as well (see figure 2 and table 4, panel B). Lean 
visual controls are positively related to operational performance through lean 
thinking. Lean manufacturing is positively related to operational performance 
through lean thinking and lean visual controls, and positively associated with lean 
thinking through lean visual controls. These results leave us with important insights: 
not only do lean manufacturing and lean visual controls affect operational 
performance directly, they intervene as well (Luft and Shields 2007), resulting in a 
larger total effect on operational performance. Finally, VSC is positively related to 
operational performance through lean thinking. Taken together, these results 
indicate that lean thinking works as a catalyst for improved operational 
performance.       
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 We perform a boot-strapping procedure with 2,000 samples and use the bias-corrected 
confidence intervals in AMOS 23 when we test for significance of indirect effects. Amos 



















11.4.3 Test of hypothesis 3 
To test for hypothesis 3, we split the data at the median length of time companies 
have used lean manufacturing, dividing the total sample into two sub-samples (0 = 
lean manufacturing ≤ 8.5 years, n=178, 1 = lean manufacturing > 8.5 years, n=190). 
























Figure 2: Results model 
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measurement model is invariant across subgroups (Deng et al. 2005). We compare 
a model without structural parameters restricting all factor loadings to be equal 





 test to compare the measurement model across subgroups. If χ
2
 is 
significant, it is an indicator of model variance. The measurement model is 
invariant across our subgroups (p. 0.46). Next, we compare a model where all 
parameters (including structural parameters) are restricted to be equal across 
subgroups to a model where all these parameters vary freely (Hu and Bentler 1999; 




needs to be 
significant, indicating that the model is non-invariant across subgroups. 
We find that the duration of respondents’ experience with lean manufacturing 
functions as a moderator with a χ
2 
difference of 120.240 (p. 0.06). To gain further 
evidence of moderated relationships, we investigate every individual parameter of 
the model by constraining all parameters except the parameter of our interest and 
test for χ
2 
difference. Lean manufacturing to operational performance is 
significantly different between subgroups p. < 0.05 (0 = unstandardized 
estimate: .325, 1 = unstandardized estimate: .398). To control for differences in the 
extent of lean manufacturing, we compare means and variances of the lean 
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manufacturing factor in the subgroups. These are not significantly different
64
. This 
provides an important insight, as lean manufacturing not only improves operational 
performance, but the marginal effect is moderated positively by the duration of 
companies’ experience with lean manufacturing. Thus, as time goes on, the lean 
manufacturing practices become more fine-tuned and employees and management 
reap more benefits from them. This finding is in line with Nelson and Winther’s 
(1982) argument that new procedures and practices take time to be perfected. 
Likewise, it is an indication of a limitation of employees’ and management’s 
absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). The finding also documents that 
lean manufacturing firms are not just cherry picking easy performance 
improvements, as they also develop their lean capabilities over time.  
The relationship between lean visual controls and operational performance is 
marginally significantly different between the subgroups as well (p. 0.06) (0 = 
unstandardized estimate: .138, 1 = unstandardized estimate: .204), indicating that 
the longer companies have worked with lean manufacturing, the more employees 
act and react accordingly to and understand the non-financial information provided 
by visual boards. It also indicates that, with time, the visualized information is 
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 Difference of lean manufacturing between subgroups: variance (p-value 0.696) and mean 
(p-value 0.100) of lean manufacturing are not statistically different. Additionally, we tested 
for main effects in both our subgroups by incorporating the observed variable “lean 
manufacturing years” in our model and related it to operational performance. The 
relationship was not significant.  
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more fine-tuned to the lean implementation. We controlled for differences in the 




The relationship between lean manufacturing and measurements of labor and 
materials efficiency is significantly different between subgroups p. < 0.05 (0 = 
unstandardized estimate: .537, 1 = unstandardized estimate: .728)
66
. As such, lean 
manufacturing companies intensify their use of measurements of labor and 
materials efficiency as a function of the duration of their experience with lean 
manufacturing rather than abandoning them. This result indicates that, in the 
beginning of a lean manufacturing implementation, companies place less emphasis 
on measurements of labor and materials efficiency, as they need to adopt other 
non-financial performance measures and VSC and put them into use, which 
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  The difference in lean visual controls between subgroups: variance (p. 0.282) and mean 
(p. 0.910) of lean visual controls.  
66
 We tested for main effects in both our subgroups by incorporating the observed variable 
“lean manufacturing years” in our model and related it to MLME. The relationship was not 
significant. 
67
 The unstandardized beta-coefficient was also marginally significantly different at p. 0.06 
one-tailed.      
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Years implemented lean 
manufacturing 
  







lean manufacturing --> Operational performance H3a 0.325*** 0.398*** ** 
lean visual Controls --> Operational performance H3a 0.138* 0.204** * 
lean thinking --> Operational performance H3a 0.230*** 0.205*** n/s 
lean manufacturing --> MLME H3b 0.537*** 0.728*** ** 
Model comparison 
  
X2 Df p. value 
 Unrestricted model 
  
1151.31 732 
  Restricted model   1271.55 830   
X2 difference         0.06   
***Significance of the p. value at <.01 two tailed                                                                                                                                                        
**Significance of the p. value at. <.05 two tailed                                                                                                                                                         
*Significance of the p. value at <.10 two tailed                                                                                                                                                                                       
Group 0: ≤ 8.5 years implemented lean manufacturing n= 178, group 1: > 8.5 years implemented lean manufacturing n= 190. 
Coefficients reported are unstandardized     
11.4.4 Test of an alternative model 
To test another plausible explanation of the variation in dependent variables and 
strengthen the validity of our model (Van der Stede 2014), we decided to test a 
model where we included activity-based costing (ABC). Ittner et al. (2002) found 
that ABC was positively associated with advanced manufacturing procedures,
68
 
improved product quality, and led to reductions in cycle and lead time, which 
resulted in improved financial performance. Cagwin and Bouwman (2002) found 
that the relationship between ABC and ROI was insignificant; however, they found 
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 According to Ittner et al. (2002), “advanced manufacturing procedures” is an umbrella 
term incorporating JIT, total quality management (TQM), and cell-based production.   




that JIT was positively related to ABC. Thus, existing empirical literature indicates 
a positive association between lean manufacturing and ABC and between ABC and 
operational performance, while evidence of the relationship between ABC and 
financial performance seems mixed. Both Kaplan and Cooper (1998) and Turney 
and Stratton (1992) argue that ABC can support firms employing a continuous 
improvement program, as ABC can reveal cost reduction potential (e.g., reflecting 
costs of the setup-procedure of a machine or reflecting movement/transportation 
costs) and direct employees’ attention to improvement possibilities, thereby 
inducing lean thinking. However, Johnson (1992) and Grasso (2005) argue that 
ABC is not appropriate in lean manufacturing companies. Some of the critiques 
related to standard costing, e.g., that it hides waste in standards and induces 
incongruent lean behavior, apply here as well. Likewise, Grasso (2005) contends 
that ABC is not a driver of continuous improvement efforts. We address this debate 
and test a model where we include ABC
69
 and add paths from ABC to lean 
thinking and to operational and financial performance; none of the parameters are 
significant and model fit is worse
70
. This finding indicates that VSC, lean visual 
controls, and measures of labor and material efficiency are adequate performance 
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 The degree of ABC use is measured on a 5-point labeled Likert scale ranging from 1: not 




 to degrees of freedom: 1.992, RMSEA: .052, SRMR: .044, IFI: .946, TLI: .940, 
CFI: .946. χ
2




 significant at a p. < .01, 
indicating that the model including ABC fits the data worse.  
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measures regarding lean manufacturing. One can speculate that lean manufacturing 
companies have already performed much of the process analysis that ABC can 
support
71
. Lean manufacturing also reduces cost allocation requirements and the 
product heterogeneity that ABC is designed to address (Grasso 2005). Our 
performance variables relate to operational and financial performance. Although 
we do not find any significant relationships, ABC might still support strategic 
issues, such as choosing customer/product mix. These elements are not captured in 
our questionnaire.  
11.5 Conclusion 
Lean pundits suggest that management accounting practices should be aligned with 
the implementation of lean manufacturing in order to achieve its potentials. Some 
advocate that direct labor and materials efficiency variances should be abandoned 
because of inherent dysfunctional behavioral consequences for the lean 
implementation (Maskell and Kennedy 2007; Maskell et al. 2012). Instead, 
measurements of direct labor and materials efficiency should be replaced with an 
expanded focus on non-financial performance measurements and an 
implementation of VSC. They also underline the importance of a change in 
employees’ and managers’ mindsets in order for them to work toward the lean 
objectives (Emiliani et al. 2003; Fullerton et al. 2014). This study provides 
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 Additionally, we performed the same test on the subgroups according to the number of 
years they had lean manufacturing. None of the paths were significant.  
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empirical evidence of the relationships between lean manufacturing, management 
accounting practices, lean thinking, and firm performance. We use three 
components representing management accounting practices: VSC, lean visual 
controls, and measurements of direct labor and materials efficiency. Lean 
manufacturing is positively related to all management accounting practices, lean 
thinking, and operational performance. Further, the management accounting 
practices are interdependent; lean visual controls are positively related to 
operational performance and lean thinking; and VSC is positively related to lean 
thinking, which, in turn, is positively related to operational performance—which 
ultimately leads to improved financial performance. Importantly, lean 
manufacturing is indirectly related to operational performance through VSC, lean 
visual controls, and lean thinking. Thus, these two components of the management 
accounting practices and lean thinking enhance the operational benefits from lean 
manufacturing. Lean visual controls and VSC are also indirectly related to 
operational performance through lean thinking, which underlines that lean thinking 
is a catalyst for firms to achieve the potentials of lean manufacturing. Overall, it is 
apparent that a holistic perspective is required to grasp the interrelatedness of lean 
manufacturing, lean thinking, visual controls, multiple management accounting 
practices, and their effects on performance. As previously mentioned, we provide 
the first survey-based evidence that more traditional management accounting 
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practices, such as measurements of direct labor and material efficiency, supplement 
contemporary practices, such as VSC and visual controls, rather than substituting 
them.  
This study also provides empirical evidence of time compression diseconomies 
(Dierickx and Cool 1989) in lean manufacturing companies. The relationship 
between lean manufacturing and operational performance and the relationship 
between lean visual controls and operational performance are greater as a function 
of the length of time companies have used lean manufacturing. Further, when 
companies become more experienced with lean, they emphasize measurements of 
direct labor and materials efficiency to a greater extent. 
These findings provide substantial insights for research. Contrary to the lean 
accounting research consensus, our sample of lean manufacturing firms does not 
abandon measurements of direct labor and materials efficiency. In the beginning of 
an implementation of lean manufacturing, our sample of companies place less 
emphasis on these measures as they adopt, focus, and fine-tune their use of VSC 
and lean visual controls. However, as they gain experience with VSC and lean 
visual controls, the companies intensify their use of measurements of labor and 
materials efficiency. This can be a reflection of an increased need for measures 
showing unit-level cost improvements and a reflection of a cognitive limitation of 
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employees and management as they, in the beginning of a lean manufacturing 
implementation, pay more attention to the use and fine-tuning of other management 
accounting practices.  Measurements of direct labor and materials efficiency are 
also interdependent with VSC and lean visual controls, indicating that lean 
manufacturing companies need comprehensive visualized performance information 
to inspire employees and managers and to ensure that they are on par with lean 
objectives.  
Our research also shows that lean thinking is a catalyst in providing firms with the 
benefit from lean manufacturing. It underlines the importance of getting all 
organizational members involved in lean by training them in continuous 
improvement, by changing their mindsets, and by providing them with the 
responsibility and authority to identify potential improvements and to solve 
problems. The implementation of lean manufacturing is thus not only an exercise 
of implementing and aligning management accounting practices and lean 
manufacturing practices; it is an effort that requires the attention of all aspects of a 
firm.  
Our research is the first to show evidence of time compression diseconomies in 
lean manufacturing firms. After controlling for the extent of use, the firms in our 
sample benefit more from lean manufacturing and lean visual controls as a function 
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of the length of time they have used lean manufacturing. Although firms benefit 
from lean manufacturing and lean visual controls early in the implementation, our 
results show signs of the limitations of employees’ and managers’ absorptive 
capacity. Additional benefits from lean manufacturing and lean visual controls 
materialize when members of the organization become more experienced with lean 
practices and procedures. The results also indicate that members of the 
organization need to unlearn previous practices and procedures to benefit to a 
greater extent from lean manufacturing and lean visual controls.  
Our results have implications for lean practitioners as well. Firms seeking to 
benefit from lean manufacturing do not need to abandon the use of measurements 
of labor and materials efficiency. This can alleviate some of the possible tensions 
between management accountants and manufacturing personnel resulting from the 
intention to abandon traditional management accounting practices (Tillema and van 
der Steen 2015). Another implication of our research for lean practitioners is that 
success with lean manufacturing is not only a function of extending the 
implementation, but also a function of patience and learning to work with the 
current extent of lean implementation. This implies that time and patience as 
important for practitioners as additional investments in lean practices. Finally, our 
evidence shows that practitioners need to get every employee involved in lean 
thinking to achieve the full potentials of lean manufacturing.  
332 
 
11.6 Limitations and future studies 
Naturally, our study has its limitations. Our sample is not random, as it is drawn 
from a database consisting of companies employing lean manufacturing. This 
reduces the generalizability of our findings. However, it also alleviates some of the 
inherent problems that come with questionnaire research, as we believe that it 
improves our respondents’ understanding of lean-related questions (Fullerton et al. 
2013). Further, our data was gathered during a time of general industrial expansion 
following a severe recession, so the results may not be generalizable to other 
macroeconomic conditions.   
For now, we have little empirical evidence on how standard costing can work 
together with lean management accounting practices and this study only focused on 
labor and materials efficiency variances. We call for further in-depth case research 
shedding light on how different standard costing practices can aid or hinder the 
progression implementations of lean. Further, except Lind (2001) and Tillema and 
van der Steen (2015), we have little evidence of how management accountants can 
assist firms reaching lean objectives. For example, are some of their 
responsibilities handed over to production personnel, as suggested by Cooper 
(1996), or does an implementation of lean manufacturing create the necessity for 
management accountants to interact extensively with operations? Future research 
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might shed light on the roles of management accountants in such a manufacturing 
regime.    
 
lean Manufacturing             
Please indicate below the extent to which your facility has implemented the following 
  1: Not at all, 2: Little, 3: Some, 4: Considerable, 5: Great deal 
    
MFG 1 Use of standardization  
     
MFG 2 Use of production cells  
     
MFG 3 A Kanban system  
     
MFG 4 Use of one piece flow  
     
MFG 5 Reduction of lot sizes  
     
MFG 6 Use of line balancing and level schedules   
    
MFG 7 Reduction of buffer inventories   
    
MFG 8 Use of mistake proofing or pokayoke 
            
        
lean Thinking             
Please indicate below what most closely represents your facility’s organizational culture. 
  1: Strongly Disagree, 2: Disagree, 3: Neutral, 4: Agree, 5: Strongly Agree 
   CLTR 
1 All employees are involved in problem solving   
   CLTR 
2 Our whole facility is trained in lean principles   
   CLTR 
3 Every area of our facility works on continuous improvement   
  CLTR 
4 Management is focused on eliminating waste everywhere   
   CLTR 
5 lean thinking has permeated all of our operations 
          
        
lean Visual Controls             
For the following items, please mark the most appropriate response related to your facility's management accounting system. 
1: Strongly Disagree, 2: Disagree, 3: Neutral, 4: Agree, 5: Strongly Agree 
   
MAS 1 Standard operating procedures are visible on shop floor   
   
MAS 2 Visual boards are used to share information  
    
MAS 3 Information on quality performance is reviewed often   
   
MAS 4 Charts showing defect rates are posted on the shop floor   
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MAS 5 We have created a visual mode of organization   
   
MAS 6 Information on productivity is updated frequently on the shop floor   
  
MAS 7 Quality data is displayed at work stations 
            
        
Operational Performance             
Please indicate to what extent lean initiatives have affected the following: 
   1: Not at all, 2: Little, 3: Some, 4: Considerable, 5: Great deal 
    LIMP 
1 Inventory-related resources have been freed up 
     LIMP 
2 Capacity is managed more effectively 
      LIMP 
3 Cycle/production time is improved 
      LIMP 
4 Quality is improved 
      LIMP 
5 Overall communication is improved       
      
        
Financial Performance             
LIMP 
6 Costs are reduced 
      LIMP 
7 Profitability is improved   
          
        
Value Stream Costing             
Please indicate the extent to which your facility uses each of the following measurement systems? 
 1: Not at all, 2: Little, 3: Some, 4: Considerable, 5: Great deal 
    
Value stream costing             
        
Measures of direct labor and materials efficiency         
Please indicate the extent to which your facility uses each of the following measurement systems? 
 1: Not at all, 2: Little, 3: Some, 4: Considerable, 5: Great deal 
    
Performance measures related to labor/material efficiency         
 
       
lean manufacturing years             
Please indicate the following? 
      
lean manufacturing Years            
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